Why didn't Hannibal attack Rome? article Hannibal (Part 7) - Second Punic War

 

So far we have followed Hannibal on his war path from Iberia, through Gaul, across the Alps, and all the way into central Italy.

 He defeated the Roman legions time after time and after just 7 months of campaigning in Italy he stood only 130km from the capital.

 The road to Rome was open, less than ten days'

 march away.

 But Hannibal's next move is a subject of much debate, and in this article we want to discuss the decisions he made after his victory at Lake Trasimene...

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 The first 7 months of Hannibal Barca's campaign in Italy were nothing short of spectacular.

 Despite nearly half of his army perishing in the Alps, he led his tired troops and defeated the Romans at Ticinus and Trebia.

 This won him the support of Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul, many of whom joined the Carthaginian general.

 The march continued south towards central Italy, through the Apennine mountains and the Arno river swampland.

 The four days it took to cross the swamps were particularly costly.

 Many of his men drowned while others died from exhaustion.

 Hannibal himself lost sight in one eye due to infection.

 A great number of pack animals and horses were also lost, which caused a severe problem for his campaign plans.

 While he managed to patch up his baggage train by confiscating pack animals from Etruscan farmers, horses were far less common and needed to be trained for war.

 This left Hannibal's cavalry contingent greatly weakened for the upcoming battle against Flaminius.

 Yet, despite this setback, the elusive Carthaginian general remained hidden from the Romans after emerging from the swamp.

 Flaminius missed the opportunity to attack Hannibal's weakened enemy.

 And just days later, the Roman Consul would perish in the defeat at Lake Trasimene.

 Hannibal re-equipped his light infantry with weapons and armor taken from fallen Roman soldiers, and vast quantities of supplies were captured, such as food, canteens, clothing, boots, blankets, tents, saddles, bridles and fodder.

 But most importantly 4,000 pack animals and 2,000 cavalry horses were captured from Flaminius'

 army at Trasimene, and another 4,000 horses in Maharbal's ambush of Servilius' cavalry contingent Hannibal was now able to replace the horses he lost in the swamps, bringing his own cavalry contingent back to full strength.

 After 7 months of campaigning in Italy, Hannibal dominated the Romans in the field.

 Between the battle of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene and the ambush of Servilius' cavalry, Hannibal eliminated over 50,000 Roman soldiers, a number equal to 10 legions.

 Now that Fabius Maximus was elected dictator, Hannibal was encamped just 130km from the city of Rome.

 No army stood in his way and he could've marched on the capital in less than 10 days.

 Yet, he decided not to.

 Let's try to examine why.

 In warfare, tactical objectives and strategic objectives need to be connected in some form.

 "Tactics" refers to methods that an army employs in order to win battles.

 "Strategy" deals with broad objectives that a warring country has, as well as the means necessary to achieve these objectives.

 Without strategy, battles are disconnected individual events.

 Without tactics, any strategy falls apart.

 In the 2nd Punic war, Rome's strategic objectives were to keep the territories it won in the 1st Punic war and perhaps seize parts of Iberia.

 Carthage, on the other hand, sought to retain dominance over Iberia and its' valuable silver mines, and win back Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, that were lost in the 1st war, along with other minor islands in the Mediterranean.

 This would enable Carthage to regain its'

 dominance on the sea.

 Rome correctly understood Carthage's objectives and moved to prevent them.

 Of the 11 legions that were in the field at the time of Hannibal's arrival in Italy, 2 were stationed in Sicily, 2 in Sardinia, and 2 were sent to Iberia, while 1 remained in Tarentum.

 4 legions were left in Italy to deal with Hannibal.

 At the time of the battle at Lake Trasimene two legions were commanded by Flaminius, which were destroyed.

 The other two were commanded by Servilius, which were rendered useless after the destruction of their cavalry, forcing Servilius to return north to fight an ongoing battle with the marauding Gauls.

 With the appointment of Fabius Maximus, Rome did authorise the formation of two new legions for the defense of the city, an annual practice that became regular as of 217 BC.

 But these legions likely were not fully trained, and perhaps weren't at full strength either.

 Hannibal, held a clear advantage in the field.

 Furthermore, he could rely on the 70 Carthaginian ships that roamed the waters off the Etruscan coast, only 120km from Hannibal's position.

 Why did Carthage send these ships so far into Roman waters?

 70 ships was over 60% of their entire fleet.

 Since they were not carrying reinforcements nor supplies for the army in Italy, their presence near Rome itself right at the same time when Hannibal was also so close to the capital suggests that a possible land-sea operation was planned to take the city.

 The 70 Carthaginian warships would prevent Roman transport ships from ferrying troops from Sardinia to the capital, while Hannibal attacks the city.

 The fact that supports this is the positioning of the Roman fleet.

 Of the 220 ships in the fleet, 10 were at Ariminium on the Adriatic coast, 150 were protecting the waters of Sicily, and another 30 were stationed in Iberia to support the Scipio brothers.

 Therefore, only around 30 warships were protecting the capital.

 With 70 ships Carthage had a clear naval advantage for any immediate operations against the city.

 And on land, Hannibal was virtually at the gates, unopposed.

 To move on the capital after Trasimene would've made tactical AND strategic sense.

 An attack, a siege, or even a feint, would've forced the Romans to withdraw troops from other theaters to protect the city.

 This would've exposed Sicily, Sardinia, or Iberia, to Carthaginian attacks.

 At the same time, Hannibal could lift the siege to deal with any approaching armies.

 This failure to create a link between the strategic and tactical objectives perhaps played a decisive role in the outcome of the war.

 Hannibal himself later acknowledged that this was a missed opportunity, but he never explained his decisions.

 Two main reasons for not attacking the Roman capital were suggested by historians: First, that Hannibal did not have enough troops to besiege the city, due to its' size and its' garrison.

 This first argument doesn't sufficiently explain why Hannibal decided not to attack.

 Namely, during the times of the Republic, the population of the city of Rome was between 450,000 and 500,000 people.

 The entire population lived in an area of just 13.5-square-km.

 The city was surrounded by the 11km-long Servian Wall, a stone barrier that's 10m high in some places.

 There were 5 main gates on major roads leading into the city.

 10-meter-deep defensive trenches were dug up in front of the walls where the city faced open fields.

 These defences should not have posed a formidable obstacle to Carthaginian engineering abilities.

 Nor was the city too big to be besieged by Hannibal's army of around 50,000 troops.

 In addition, even if the city's garrison of two legions were battle ready, 10,000 troops manning the walls and multiple gates would not have posed a strong enough threat to deter an attack.

 The second suggestion is that a naval blockade was not possible because the Roman fleet would keep the supply lines open along the river Tiber.

 This would've been true had Ostia been big enough to be Rome's main port at that time, but it didn't become a major port for another 250 years, until Emperor Claudius expanded it.

 At the time of the 2nd Punic war, the majority of seaborne supplies for the capital came through the port of Puteoli, over 190km down the coast, and were then transported to the city overland.

 Hannibal could've cut off these supplies by blocking the roads.

 At least for some time a naval blockade of Rome would not be needed, and the Carthaginian ships could focus on preventing transports from bringing in reinforcements from Sardinia.

 So why did Hannibal, one of history's greatest risk takers, choose not to attempt to take the city while he was arguably at his strongest and Rome was at its' weakest?

 One possibility that is often suggested by historians is that Hannibal's view of war was influenced by Hellenistic thinking.

 He was certainly an admirer of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

 Namely, Hannibal's view was maybe that the total destruction of the enemy was not needed to win the war.

 Instead, battles would be fought until the leadership of one side conceded defeat once they realized that they can no longer win on the field of battle and stood to lose more if they continued fighting.

 Therefore, he may have assumed that Rome would seek terms once the many contests of arms had been decided.

 If Hannibal did indeed hold this conventional Hellenistic viewpoint, he may have thought that an attack on Rome would've been more costly than fighting battles in the open.

 But the Roman view of war was straightforward: Destroy or be Destroyed.

 Rome would not accept any form of defeat, no matter the cost.

 They would rather fight to the last man than have an enemy assert their dominance by imposing conditions on its' citizens.

 Perhaps Hannibal still didn't fully understand this in 217BC.

 Whatever the case, Fabius began defensive preparations in Rome while, unbeknownst to him, Hannibal turned east towards the Adriatic coast.

 A game of cat and mouse between the two commanders is about to begin...

 In this article we provided plausible reasons, based on our research, as to why Hannibal didn't attack Rome after Lake Trasimene.

 We'd certainly like to know what your thoughts are, so if you have any theories of your own, let us know in the comments.

 As always, thank you for watching.