Caesar's Civil War - (ALL PARTS 1 - 5) - FULL

 

The year is 48 BCE.

 Julius Caesar is stationed at the city of Brundisium, waiting to cross the Adriatic sea.

 He is after the republican forces that retreated across the sea to Greece, led by his arch-rival, Pompey Magnus.

 A pivotal conflict of ancient history was about to take place...

 The

 previous year was a busy one for Julius Caesar.

 He had declared war on the senate, marched on Rome and proceeded to capture most of the Italian peninsula, constantly chasing after the senate's forces.

 His civil war was a characteristic outcome of his personality, he was a man of an overgrown sense of worth and self-importance and he would not allow a bunch of old bureaucrats to tell him what to do and when to do it, let alone willingly deprive himself of his political power by handing over his legions and rendering himself defenseless in the face of certain persecution and marginalization, or even imprisonment and murder.

 Because this was the situation he faced just before he embarked on his civil war, when the Senate specifically ordered him to disband his legions and forbade him to run for consul for the second time, something that would have stripped him of his legal immunity.

 Back at Brundisium Caesar was contemplating a crossing with two glaring problems in his mind.

 The first being his significantly inferior fleet in comparison with that of his enemies who were patrolling the area and the second being the fact that sailing in winter was pretty risky in antiquity since ancient ships could not cope well with severe weather conditions.

 On the other hand a passage through Illyricum would have been next to impossible.

 The delay would have been great and the route was treacherous, full of perils and hostile local tribes.

 So on the night of 4th of January (or 6th of November according to the modern calendar) Caesar, with 7 legions and 500 cavalry, crossed the Adriatic sea and successfully avoided the patrols of the republican navy, landing somewhere to the south of Palaeste.

 Meanwhile Pompey, who was stationed at the city of Beroia, was declared the supreme commander of the republican forces, an appointment that gave him supreme authority over the forces of the Roman state.

 And it was at this stage that he left Beroia and began his march towards Epirus in order to station his legions within the winter quarters of the area.

 Caesar had pushed on through the ragged ground of the area in which he landed and came down upon two completely unsuspecting cities, Apollonia and Oricum.

 The surprise was such that he captured them without any bloodshed.

 Moving northwards Caesar’s strategic goal was becoming clear.

 He was trying to deprive Pompey from his western coastal provinces and cut off the supply depos which were vital for his Adriatic fleet, an Adriatic fleet that was seriously hindering his army’s own communications and supply routes, forcing him to live by foraging the rocky and scarce land of Epirus that barely sustained its local population.

 Pompey must have heard about Caesar’s landing and immediately understood his intentions.

 He forced marched his army in order to cut Caesar’s northward advance, eventually managing to insert himself between Caesar and Dyracchium at Asparragium a critical crossroad that controlled the Roman Via Egnatia.

 The two armies faced each other on the opposite banks of the River Apsus, modern day Seman.

 Caesar had significantly inferior forces in comparison to Pompey’s so naturally Pompey tried to force the Caesarians into an unwanted and unfavorable engagement against his legions, but while he was attempting a crossing the bridge collapsed.

 The stalemate was inevitable.

 Of course Caesar was not being idle, he repeatedly appealed to his generals to send him re-enforcements but his generals had to face the same unfavorable and tricky conditions plus the assiduous patrolling of the republican fleet.

 Finally Marc Antony, with 4 legions and a detachment of light troops and cavalry, managed to cross the Adriatic but due to unexpected conditions his transports were blown further north than he intended into the bay of Nymphaeum.

 This delicate and complicated maneuvering, the chess of war , continued by the two masters of the “game”.

 Pompey would not allow Marc Antony to link up with Caesar without attempting an interception.

 He immediately broke camp and forced marched his troops towards Antony while Caesar marched his legions up the river until he found a point which was fordable.

 The rapid pace of Caesar ultimately deterred Pompey from continuing his attempt to intercept Marc Antony.

 So in order to avoid being trapped between the two contingents of his enemy he retreated westward, camping his army north of the river Genusus close to Asparagium in a convenient situation.

 This war of movement would continue and be expanded upon by Caesar who dispatched three of his subordinates to other operating theaters across the Greek mainland, one in Aetolia and the other to Thessaly where they could organize vital grain convoys for their severely undersupplied legions.

 The third commander Domitius Calvinus was sent to intercept 2 legions who were fast approaching via Macedonia in order to reinforce Pompey.

 Caesar and Pompey were now facing each other across another river, these delaying tactics were immensely beneficial for Pompey who could afford to fight a war of attrition since his supply situation was far superior and his control of the sea routes was uncontested and complete.

 On the other hand Caesar needed to force a swift conclusion to the hostilities and to entrain a striking and decisive blow to his enemy.

 Time was running against him.

 In typical Caesarian fashion he adopted a diversionary tactic which was based on speed and surprise.

 He broke camp and marched his army eastwards with the intention to deceive Pompey and hide his true destination who thought that he was simply trying to relocate his legions towards an area that would be supplied more easily.

 But when Caesar found a fordable area he crossed his legions and immediately headed towards Dyrrachium through a ragged and concealed path, his objective to cut off Pompey from the city he already knew was his main supply depot.

 The subterfuge was successful and Caesar managed to beat Pompey to the coast, cutting off his enemy’s communications and he then proceeded to build a fortified camp to guard the road towards Dyrachium.

 In this game of warfare Caesar seemed to always be a step in front, in comparison to his enemies.

 The two generals seemed to have settled down for a new and protracted stalemate.

 It was at that point that Caesar demonstrated his ability to think outside the box when he was up against a numerically superior enemy who was better supplied but currently in no position and intention to engage with him in open battle.

 He needed to force Pompeys hand and simultaneously secure his position in order to be able to advance against the depot in Dyrrachium, so he resorted to a tactic that he had used before in Gaul with tremendous success.

 Taking into consideration the fact that Pompey’s position was surrounded by rough and high hills he occupied them, fortified key areas and then began to draw a line of circumvallation around Pompey’s position.

 We need not wonder about his intentions here and why he would choose such a complicated and labor intensive method to deal with his enemy, since we are lucky enough to have Caesar's own account.

 His reasons were the following, Pompey was significantly stronger in cavalry and he could use it to forage for grain and provisions without running any risk because of its superior mobility, so by confining his army within a narrow space Caesar would both negate the ability of Pompey’s cavalry to forage and render it militarily useless and difficult to sustain.

 And also there was another reason that was both psychological but also practical – Pompey’s reputation throughout the empire would suffer deeply if it became known that he was confined and besieged by Caesar while he did not dare to hazard a battle.

 While Caesar was being busy trying to expand his line of fortifications to confine Pompey within a compass as narrow as possible, Pompey saw and realized what was going on and immediately set into digging a line of fortifications within the line of Caesar in order to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible to prevent Caesar from blocking or surrounding him.

 As a result the two armies fought a series of skirmishes while they were contesting certain areas or hills.

 Even though Pompey was determined not to come to a general engagement he nonetheless frequently send light troops in order to harass the Caesarians.

 By the time the two armies completed their fortifications Caesars lines were stretched to 24km and Pompey’s lines were stretched just under 13km, even though Pompey managed to finish them first since he had greater manpower and a smaller compass to enclose.

 The two generals faced completely opposite situations now, Caesar was attempting to enclose a well-supplied and larger army with a smaller and thinly stretched one, while Pompey was hemmed in within an enclosed area without being able to maneuver or arrange his army as he saw fit.

 Of course Pompey’s large cavalry force and pack animals meant that the fodder was running out quickly and soon his horses would be out of the battle even though his ships were supplying him daily, plus there was a water shortage since Caesar had diverted the course of every river or stream that was running through Pompey’s lines.

 The sporadic skirmishing did not cease especially at night during which the Pompeians were frequently emerging from their trenches to pepper with arrows areas that were lighted by fires of Caesarians who were on guard.

 After a while the Caesarians were accustomed to this and learned to light their fires at one place and keep guard at another.

 By the beginning of June Pompey needed to break the stalemate.

 He somehow misinformed Caesar to believe that there was a faction within Dyracchium that was ready to surrender the city to him.

 Caesar with a detachment marched towards Dyrrachium but fell straight into a Pompeian ambush.

 Attacked from three sides simultaneously he was forced to conduct an orderly retreat, at the same time Pompey launched an all out assault across Caesar’s line of fortifications.

 It was a magnificent plan and it probably would have worked if he wasn’t up against an army of grizzled veterans who were defending a well-entrenched position on favorable ground.

 The Ceasarians held until their General managed to return unharmed back to their lines.

 The whole struggle was desperate as Caesar admits, even though his legions suffered superficial loses (20 men in comparison with Pompey’s 2000).

 In one fort they counted 30.000 arrows which had been thrown and in the shield of one centurion were found 230 holes!

 Caesar would attempt to force a battle every single day afterward, he drew up his army on a level ground and offered Pompey battle, being careful to advance his legionaries just before the range of Pompeys siege engines and light troops, Pompey would try to save face and would draw his legions within the range of his siege engines and light troops in front of his fortifications but so close to them that his rear line would almost touch the rampart.

 At some point something unexpected happened.

 Two officers of Caesar’s Gallic cavalry defected to Pompey and informed him of a certain weak position in Caesars fortifications.

 At the southern end of his entrenched lines of ramparts there was a gap and a place that wasn’t connected with a transverse line between them.

 Pompey decided to strike there and he would initiate what would prove to be the decisive engagement of the battle.

 At dusk of 9 July Pompey prepared an amphibious assault against the vulnerable position of the Caesarian fortification.

 He boarded a multitude of light and missile troops on board light galleys and attacked the position from three sides simultaneously.

 Backing this assault were six legions who managed to dislodge the defenders who were scattered and fled facing overwhelming odds.

 The rest of the Caesarian army was alarmed by the system of smoke that was established for just such occasions.

 Marc Antony, followed by Caesar himself, arrived at the scene after a while.

 In between the now contested double ramparts and the Pompeian line of fortifications there was an abandoned camp which was now occupied by the Pompeian assailants which they expanded by adding an outer rampart and in addition Pompey had ordered the construction of a new camp outside the Caesarian enclosure.

 Seeing this Caesar realized that he needed to act rapidly if he wanted stop his opponent from securing and fortifying an opening from his enclosure from which his cavalry could easily forage and find fodder.

 He secretly gathered 33 cohorts, arranged them into two columns and charged the fortified position of his enemy.

 The left wing of his attack column fell upon the unsuspecting Pompeians and managed to push them back, but the right wing followed along an extended palisade which led towards the river Lesnikia.

 That delay was crucial for the outcome of the engagement.

 After a while they realized that the palisade was not an extension of the fortified camp and they broke through within the narrow space between the camp and the river.

 Pompey, seeing the critical situation his army was facing gathered 5 legions from the outer camp and immediately send them to relieve his cornered defenders, ordering his cavalry to charge head on the right wing of the Caesarian attack column while it was squeezing itself through the levelled palisades.

 The Caesarian cavalry which was the first to break through the palisade noticed the significantly stronger Pompeian cavalry charging straight towards them.

 Fearing they were going to be trapped between the palisades and the camp they broke and fled.

 The panic spread to the infantry and soon the right wing of the Caeasarians was routed.

 The left wing that was being successful up until that point noticed what was happening and fearing that it will be overwhelmed broke and fled also.

 This cascade of panic was the critical point of the battle.

 Caesar’s legionaries were crushed and squeezed through the choke points from which they came.

 The first legionaries who fell down a 10 feet high ditch were trampled to death and the rest fled for their lives.

 Even Caesar himself failed to stop the rout of his veterans personally holding the legion’s standard and urging them to stand their ground.

 According to Appian, the panic was so widespread that one signifier inverted his standard and tried to kill Caesar with it!

 A legionary from his German bodyguards was there and sliced off his hand thus saving the general and changing the course of history.

 By the end of the engagement the strategic initiative had shifted drastically in favor of Pompey, and Caesar now realizing that his plan had failed and his siege lines were broken, ordered an immediate withdrawal so that his legions would be able to regroup.

 The casualty count was 32 centurions and tribunes and 960 irreplaceable veterans for the Caesarian side.

 This would probably be the direst and most severe situation that Caesar ever faced.

 That day the Caesarians abandoned their extensive fortifications and retreated southwards to regroup.

 The situation looked bleak for Caesar but he wasn’t over yet…

 (9-10 JULY 48 B.C.E)Julius Caesar is retreating, it is something that he rarely did during his illustrious career, his plan to trap the Pompeians close to Dyrrhachium backfired spectacularly and now his options were running out.

 The misfortunes for the Caesarians though did not end there and it was around the same time that the Pompeians managed to catch half of Caesars fleet at Messana(sicily) and burn every single ship .

 Back in Epeirus, Caesar was attempting a rapid retreat during the night, at dawn the next day he had almost finished the crossing of the river Genusus when his rear guard clashed with the pompeians who were hot on their hills, the Caesarians fought bravely and managed to give Caesar enough time in order to finish the crossing

 Once more the 2 armies faced each other across the same river occupying the same old camps from months before, but Caesar did not intend on staying, he conducted a speedy retreat and managed to slip from Pompeys grasp, marching towards Apollonia in which he left a small garrison.(1=1min) His Plan was to force Pompey to march inland away from his all-conquering fleet and his supply bases and to unite with the remaining forces of Domitius Calvinus who was facing off Pompeys reinforcements commanded by Scipio.

 Pompey and Caesar were simultaneously marching against time, Caesar took a southern road up the valley of the river Aous and Pompey took his familiar main roman road of Via-Egnatia with quite opposite objectives from each other, Caesar was trying to link up with his general while Pompey was attempting to surprise and annihilate him via a series of forced marches.

 By a struck of luck and just 4 hours before Pompey could trap him, Calvinus was informed of his arrival and immediately made a U turn towards the south barely escaping the Pompeian iron grip

 Caesar and Calvinus united their armies near the city of Aeginium.

 The plain of Thessaly with its fertile fields lay before them, Caesars main strategic goal was clear, capture the near by cities and incorporate them to his supply lines, marching southwards the first city his legions encountered was Gomphi, the inhabitants of the city were encouraged by overinflated rumours of his defeat at Dyrrhachium, “ to share Pompeys victory rather than be a part of Caesars misfortunes” as he himself put it in his commentaries, this defiance could not remain unpunished and Caesar decided to make an example of the city by unleashing his veterans who ransacked it, it was a practise that proved to be quite an effective incentive for the locals to collaborate since after that almost all of Thessaly decided to side with Caesar.The next city in his way Metropolis, surrendered to Caesar with a little encouragement by some captives from Gomphi, the caesarean legions advanced further towards Thessaly reaching the river Enipeus, near the city of Pharsalus.

 Meanwhile Pompey who advanced from Via engatia, made a right turn and headed southwards to the city of Larissa, in which the two legions commanded by Scipio were stationed.

 The Pompeian contingents united near the city and marched towards the plain of Pharsalus, when the army reached the hills overlooking the plain of Pharsalus Pompey immediately understood that any further advance was pointless since Caesars army was blocking the road.

 The monumental clash of the two generals was imminent, it was a battle that would eventually decide the future of a whole empire and the course of western civilization for the next centuries.

 While Caesar was already encamped in a convenient position near the bridge controlling the passage to the city of Pharsalus, Pompey marched his army on a slope at the north edge of the plain from which he could overlook the Caesarian positions and upon which his legions were favourably placed in a strong defensive position.

 Caesar was running out of time, his supply situation was precarious and his reputation had suffered a critical blow after the unfortunate conclusion of the Battle of Dyrrhachium, he still needed to force a swift conclusion to the hostilities and his trust in his veterans did not budge at all even after the debacle at Dyrrhachium and he also had one distinctive and unique advantage in comparison to his enemy, while Pompeys word and command was in no way absolute and undisputed since he was just first among equals with temporary and limited authority over the republics aristocrats who were always trying to mingle and intervene with his command, Caesars word and authority over his army and his generals was absolute, undisputed and complete.

 Caesar would attempt to force a battle every day, marching out of his camp and arranging his legions in an aggressive manner, hoping that would convince his enemy to leave his defensive position and face him in a single decisive engagement, but Pompey not willing to abandon the safety of his hills would draw out his army but just at the end of the slope bordering the northern part of the plain.

 The great rogue general demonstrated his elaborate thinking into his own account of the battle, proving that each move that he made was totally deliberate and nothing was left to chance, by marching daily his legions closer and closer to Pompeys camp he slowly boosted the morale of his men and made them accustomed to this kind of battle, he specifically knew that if he was to succeed in a potential clash with the republican forces, his men would have to face the by many degrees numerically superior cavalry of the Pompeians so he intermixed with his own cavalry a selected group of the youngest and most active men of the vanguard and instilled them, by this daily practise, with a lack of fear and a contempt for Pompeys numerical superiority.

 After many days of this military ballet, Caesar gave up hope and he did not believe that Pompey was willing to risk everything in a single battle against his hardened veterans, nonetheless against his better judgement and at the exact day that he intended to brake camp and march out something unexpected happened,on the morning of August 9th or 7th of june by the modern calendar, Pompeys arrangement shifted from its usual alignment and advanced further than usual from his entrenchments.

 Caesar after no long deliberation understood that the time had come, he immediately addressed himself to his soldiers when they were at the gates of the camp ready to march out.

 (Caesars speech= We must defer, our march at present and set our thoughts on battle, which has been our constant wish, let us then meet the foe with resolute souls, We shall not hereafter easily find such and opportunity )

 On the other side of the field Pompey was confident that his all conquering and massive cavalry )force would be the key for victory.

 “I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and inclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy” The two armies treaded towards each other in a machine like manner, Pompeys army was composed of 47.000 legionaries or a 110 cohorts at their full strength, some auxiliaries and a few cohorts remained to guard his camp, his cavalry was commanded by a Caesarian former officer who defected to the Pompeian side, Titus Labienus , his left wing was commanded by him personally, there he placed 2 legions that were delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of his disputes with the senate in compliance with one of their decrees, Scipio with the Syrian legions commanded the centre, and his right wing was commanded by Afranius, there pompey placed what he deemed as his most trusted legions that would include the Cilician legion in conjunction with some cohorts that he managed to salvage from Spain.

 Caesars order of battle was the following, on his left wing he placed the 9th and 8th legion eventhough the 9th was so weakened by the battle of Dyrrhachium that he placed the eighth legion pretty close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two and he gave the command to Antonius, the centre was under the command of Calvinus and the right wing was under the direct command of Sulla, Caesar himself was positioned just behind the right wing opposite to his rival and close to his best and most reliable legion the 10th, his small cavalry force together with all of his slingers and light troops were placed opposite to Pompeys cavalry, and at the last moment Caesar drew a single cohort from every legion in his third line and made a concealed 4th line with the task to stab the cavalrymen of Pompey with their Pilla once they broke through, here he knew the outcome of the battle would be decided, in total 80 cohorts made up 9 legions or 22.000 men arranged in the typical triplex acies Roman formation of the period, a couple of cohorts were left behind to guard their camp.

 Moments after Caesar gave the signal to charge, a centurion of renown bravery from his elite X legion named Crastinus, saluted him and said “General, I will act in such a manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me living or dead.

 And with such high spirits Caesars outnumbered veterans charged against Pompeys numerically superior but mostly inexperienced recruits, but the Pompeians would not move and decided to stand their ground and receive Caesars charge with their lines unbroken, the Caesarian veterans were accustomed to this and being practised in former battles they halted almost midway, redressed their ranks and renewed their charge threw their Pila and instantly drew their swords clashing against the Pompeian line.

 At the same time Pompeys cavalry began its charge, almost 7000 horses followed by archers and slingers, were moving as a single block against the massively outnumbered Caesarian cavalry, the Caesarians did not withstand their charge but expectedly gave ground a little, at that moment Julius Caesar gave the signal to his 4th hidden line and they charged holding their Pila high and stabbing the Pompeians into their faces, in Caesars words “they rushed with such fury that not a man of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains.

 By their retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless, were all cut to pieces”

 It was the turning point of the battle, Pompeys plan had completely backfired and his “hammer” was now being chased off the field, the victorious 4th line wheeled about upon Pompeys unprotected left wing while it was still engaged, and it was now that Caesar gave the order to his 3rd line to advance.

 The Pompeians fought bravely but without the support of their cavalry, being pushed from the front and attacked from their flank and rear,and with the arrival of Caesars fresh third line they broke and began to flee for their lives, it was really like rolling a carpet after that with the republican left flank being the first to brake the rest followed.

 Pompey would not stay to share the fate of his legionaries and he fled towards the camp, he gave orders to some cohorts and auxiliaries to protect the ramparts and withdrew to his tent waiting for the outcome of the battle.

 The victorious Caesarians pushed on towards the camp and made short work of the defenders who could not withstand the multitude of projectiles that were thrown against them, the defenders and the survivors abandoned any further effort to protect the camp and fled to the near by hills leaving the victorious Caesarians to occupy it, when Pompey heard that Caesars troops were able to force the gates he Is supposed to have exclaimed “What, into the very camp?”.

 It was a total victory for Julius Caesar, the magnitude of his triumph would only become