Waterloo - The Truth behind Napoleon's final defeat

 

Late May, 1815.

 Exiled to Elba in 1814, Napoleon had returned in March and is once again Emperor of the French.

 Europe, committed to restoring the Old Order, has declared war on Napoleon.

 They plan to invade France and restore the monarchy.

 The Russian and Austrian are approaching from the east.

 The Anglo-Dutch army under Wellington is headquartered in Brussels.

 The Prussian Army under Blücher is headquartered in Namur.

 Napoleon is vastly outnumbered.

 King Louis XVIII has fled France and set up court in Ghent, 60 kilometers west of Brussels.

 From Ghent, the King’s agents and spies have infiltrated Napoleon’s government and army.

 The role of Fouché is well known, plotting Napoleon’s downfall from the moment he returned to France.

 However, there were many others.

 The King also has spies and agents in the French army, many in direct communication with Ghent, providing intelligence.

 Along the frontier, the King has stationed officers to collect deserters and sow discord.

 One such officer was the Marquis de Castries, a former aide-de-camp of Davout, now stationed in Namur, whose staff included a former Cuirassier, Frédéric Rilliet.

 Napoleon faced a severe shortage of horses, and the financial situation was perilous.

 An insurrection was raging in the Vendée requiring troops to be dispatched to the interior.

 Once the allies invaded, his military situation would arguably be better than in 1814, but his political situation was unstable.

 He needed an event to rally the country around him before the Allied invasion.

 Brussels was the answer.

 A lighting stroke to seize the Belgian capital, and possibly return Belgium to France, would captivate the nation.

 Traitors would be shaken from the army, and Napoleon would gain the political stability necessary to deal with those in government.

 Napoleon decided to strike.

 On June 3rd, Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult, who was Napoleon’s major-général, commander of the Army Headquarters and responsible for distributing his orders, to bring Gérard’s 4th Corps from Metz to Philippeville.

 Napoleon also reorganized the Cavalry, taking divisions attached to the Infantry Corps and creating 4 Cavalry Corps under the overall command of Marshal Grouchy.

 On June 4th, Soult gave a detailed report to Napoleon of the locations of the Infantry Corps of Armée du Nord and the time required to reach the staging areas for an invasion: 1st Corps at Maubeuge, 2-day march leaving on the 11th

 2nd Corps to the right of Maubeuge on the Sambre, 1-day march leaving on the 12th 3rd Corps north of Philippeville, 2-day march leaving on the 12th

 4th Corps at Philippeville, 7- or 8-day march leaving on the 6th

 6th Corps previously indicated to be at Avesnes, 5-day march leaving on the 9th Imperial Guard at Avesnes, staggered march arriving on the 13th

 Everything was planned so that the army would be in position by the evening of the 12th to be moved into final positions on the 13th and launched on the Sambre on June 14, the anniversary of the victories of Marengo and Friedland.

 Napoleon planned to come between the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies.

 The French army, vastly superior to either Allied army, would compel the allies to retreat, as neither could survive a battle on their own.

 Napoleon would occupy Brussels by June 16, a thunderclap heard across Europe.

 The King would be chased from the continent, and the traitors purged from his government and army.

 On June 5, Soult issued the orders to Gérard.

 They had been adjusted to have 4th Corps arrive in Rocroi by June 13th.

 The Emperor has ordered me to inform you that his plan is that you begin the Armée de la Moselle’s march, upon receipt of this order, that is to say, 7 June, and that you direct it following the itinerary, attached, to Rocroy where it must be on the thirteenth of this month without fail.

 On June 6, Soult sent orders to the rest of the Army.

 1st Corps was ordered to be ready to march within 3 hours of receiving orders.

 2nd Corps was ordered to concentrate near Maubeuge by June 13th.

 3rd Corps was ordered to concentrate between Mariembourg and Chimay by June 13th: 4th Corps was already ordered to Rocroi by June 13th.

 6th Corps was ordered to Avesnes by June 13th.

 The Guard had already been ordered to Avesnes, and Grouchy’s 4 reserve Cavalry Corps were also ordered into position.

 Napoleon had ordered to formation of 2 columns on the frontier and planned to use the day of June 13th to put the army into a final position.

 He had positioned the army so that it could cross the Sambre at Maubeuge and fall on Mons, or it could cross at Charleroi.

 Either location would put Napoleon on a major road to Brussels and place the French army between Wellington and Blücher .

 On June 7, Napoleon ordered Soult to Lille to assure the security of the French frontier west of the planned advance.

 By June 11, Soult was ordered to return to Laon in order to meet Napoleon on June 12.

 On June 10, Napoleon finalized the concentration. With Soult absent, Bertrand, Grand Marshal of the Palace would be responsible for the dictation and distribution of the orders.

 Two orders would be written that day.

 The first positioned the army in a square south of Maubeuge with a corner of the square pointing directly at Mons.

 The second order written put the army in three balanced columns on roads to Charleroi.

 It is this second order that Bertrand distributed to the Army generals.

 The plan for Mons exists only as a draft on Bertrand’s notes, and an original sent to Soult.

 These orders were sent to Laon, where Soult was expected to arrive on June 11.

 Did Napoleon change his mind?

 Or was the order to advance on Mons a carefully constructed ruse meant to fool the allies?

 Fouché claimed he had an agent steal the plans of the campaign, a claim that Sir Walter Scott confirmed during the occupation of Paris after Waterloo.

 However, Fouché was playing both sides, and he arranged for the interception of these plans at the border.

 If the Allies defeated Napoleon, Fouché would say he tried to steal the plans, but if Napoleon won, he would say he captured a spy.

 During June, the Allies repeatedly heard rumors of an Attack on Mons.

 Is it possible Napoleon was giving the Allies and their agents in Paris false information in order to keep Wellington west of Charleroi?

 There are a couple facts that support the Mons plan as a ruse.

 First, unlike the Charleroi plan, all of the positions given are imprecise.

 2nd Corps is to the rear of Maubeuge, 1st Corps is near and to the rear, 3rd Corps is to the right, etc.

 This is unlike any order Napoleon sent in 1815, and the Charleroi plan, the one actually sent to the Generals, is absolutely precise with a location for each formation’s headquarters.

 Second, Grouchy had recently been given command of the newly organized Cavalry Corps, and 4th Corps had been recently ordered to join the Armée du Nord.

 Napoleon could hope that the Allies were unaware of these events, and both are excluded from the Mons plan letter Bertrand addressed to Soult!

 On June 11, Soult, for reasons unknown, remained in Avesnes.

 He was not in Laon when Napoleon’s orders arrived, and he only received them late in the day of June 12 in Avesnes.

 Considerable time was lost as the courier must have waited in Laon for Soult’s arrival until it was clear he was not coming.

 Soult initially began executing the orders for the advance on Charleroi, but then switched to the plan for Mons.

 Had two orderlies been sent to Laon, but arrived in Avesnes in reverse order?

 Thus confusing Soult?

 Or had Soult received the intercepted false Mons orders after the Charleroi orders?

 Whatever the event, Soult had adopted the Mons plan, contrary to Napoleon’s final wishes.

 Napoleon left Paris on June 12, and arrived in Avesnes on June 13.

 He immediately countermanded Soult’s orders and ordered the army into the three columns for an advance on Charleroi.

 As Soult plainly said to Vandamme: According to the orders that I sent to you yesterday, you were to gather your Army Corps in Beaumont, but the Emperor has again ordered the execution of the Order of the Day from the 10th of which I sent you the ampliation, according to which you were to gather your troops during the day of the 13th in front of Philippeville.

 It is thus the dispositions of the order given by the Emperor on the 10th that you must follow.

 The rest of the army was given similar orders.

 Due to the delays introduced by Soult not being in Laon, and giving the wrong orders, Napoleon would delay the advance until June 15.

 Vandamme would receive the orders too late, and Napoleon would order him to remain in Beaumont, thus overloading the center column.

 Napoleon used June14 to move the army closer to the frontier:

 Napoleon heard from his spies that the Allies had not moved on June 13 or June 14.

 He had every reason to believe he had achieved his goal of concentrating his army on the Sambre without Wellington or Blücher knowing.

 At 11:30 pm, Gneisenau, the Prussian Chief of Staff, began the concentration of the Prussian army.

 French traitors had informed him of the impending attack.

 The 12+ hours gained allowed the Prussians to field an army at Sombreffe.

 As the great Prussian historian, Lettow-Vorbeck, states:

 Without this treason committed by members of the French army, the surprise intended by Napoleon would have been successful to an even stronger degree than was the case now.

 Though delayed, and worried about an advance via Mons, the gathered Prussian army allowed Wellington to order the concentration of his army at Quatre Bras

 without fears of immediate destruction.

 Napoleon’s plan was to prevent allied cooperation, but not only were Wellington and Blücher working together on June 16, they literally were able to meet in person.

 Napoleon believed on June 16 he would push a single Prussian Corps aside, and force-march that night with his guard to Brussels.

 But instead of facing no major battles, the French ended up fighting two.

 Ney and Wellington met at Quatre Bras and fought to a stalemate, while Napoleon defeated Blücher at Ligny.

 However, on June 18 the allied armies were joined, and would deal Napoleon a decisive defeat at Waterloo.

 French traitors had destroyed Napoleon’s plan.

 But the root of this destruction was the delay which allowed the King’s agents in the French army to tip off the Prussians.

 Had Napoleon kept to his original schedule, the French army would have crossed the Sambre and occupied the Nivelles-Namur road.

 Wellington and Blücher would have had their communications greatly impacted, and would not have been able to coordinate a defense.

 Napoleon would have occupied Brussels, or had either army chosen to give battle, destroyed it.

 The delay was caused by Soult remaining in Avesnes, and the confusion caused by two orders.

 What was the purpose of the Mons orders?

 Had Napoleon changed his mind, or had a carefully constructed ruse gone horrifically bad?

 On June 22nd, 1815, Napoleon signed his abdication.

 It is believed that this took place in the Salon d’Argent, in the Palais de l'Élysée, Napoleon’s residence during the 100 Days.

 The Salon d’Argent is in the rear of the palace on its eastern side.

 If he signed his abdication there, it is possible the Salon d’Argent served as his office during 1815.

 Adjacent to the office is a staircase.

 Napoleon would be exiled to St. Helena, joined by his faithful companion Bertrand.

 In 1821, after Napoleon’s death, Bertrand returned to Europe, arriving in Portsmouth on August 1st.

 On August 6, Bertrand and his family traveled to London where they took residence at Brunet’s Hotel of Leicester Square, along with Montholon and his family.

 During their stay in England, Bertrand and Montholon were often visited by various officers and government officials.

 On September 15, John Cam Hobhouse visited Bertrand, and he recounted this visit in his diary:

 "I called with D. Kinnaird on Count Bertrand,"

 "at Brunet’s Hotel."

 "Found him and his Countess, his brother, and another person there."

 "The Countess ill with a cough – a pale, tall, thin, agreeable-looking woman, of a"

 "certain age."

 "The Count very solicitous about her health."

 "Bertrand drew near to me and spoke frankly about my book."

 "Said the Emperor saw at once that il sortait de la classe; that he saw I had had recourse"

 "to good informants."

 "That he, at first, had resolved to answer the book and to correct many points of which"

 "he alone has knowledge, having the reins of Government, and could give a just account;"

 "that he observed I had altered my opinions as to the libéraux in the second edition,"

 "and had seen that they did wrong to suspect the Emperor and to debate about liberty when"

 "they should be defending their country against the foreigners."

 "This alluded to a note which Constant furnished me with."

 "Bertrand told me that the reason why Napoleon discontinued writing his remarks on my book"

 "was, first, he took up the employment, and wrote those things which all the world knows."

 "I did not ask him what he really wrote, but Montholon told Kinnaird that he wrote the"

 "account of the battle of Waterloo, which Phillips published."

 "The other reason was that he could not write on my book without exposing the treachery"

 "of many men still about the French Court, which he did not wish to do."

 "I said, “Fouché, for instance?”"

 "“Yes,” said Bertrand, “I myself introduced by the back stairs to Napoleon the courier"

 "who had Fouché’s dispatches to the enemy – EIGHT DAYS before the battle of Waterloo.”"

 Eight days before the battle of Waterloo, on June 10, 1815, Napoleon and Bertrand, who were consumed with preparing the final concentration orders for the campaign in Belgium, apprehended an agent of Fouché carrying dispatches to the enemy.