Battle of Thapsus 46 BC ?? Caesar's Civil War

 Ruspina was a close call for Julius Caesar.

 Not only was he incapable of delivering a decisive blow to the apparently crumbling cause of his senatorial enemies, but he was lucky to escape with his army unscathed.

 After he barely fended off the forces of the optimates at the battle of Ruspina, Caesar was still in a logistical predicament, and his naval supply routes were flimsy and unsecured at best, with his soldiers improvising heavily and even resorting to feeding their horses and cattle with sea-weed in order to sustain them.

 At the same time, Metellus Scipio, the commander in chief of the “optimates”, began marching from Utica with the entire army in order assist Labienus and intercept Caesar.

 Caesar’s situation was critical.

 His hasty sea-crossing with a small force meant that he could neither properly secure a bridgehead for his incoming supplies, nor could he hope to use his army as his main strategic tool, which forced him to dig in and endure a defensive standoff.

 At the same time he send messages to his allies in Sicily, ordering them to immediately dispatch ships with the rest of his army and the much needed provisions.

 Caesar and Scipio were facing each other across the north African plain, but eventhough Scipio had a significant numerical advantage he would not dare to directly charge Caesar’s fortifications, something that Caesar was aware of.

 While he was biding his time, numerous delegations from coastal cities came to Caesar and either offered their services or pleaded with him to protect their cities from the “cruelty of his enemy".

 This was a perfect opportunity for Caesar to expand his operational and logistical base, so when several deputies from the neighboring city of Acilla requested from him a garrison that would assist them against the incursions of Scipio’s army, he immediately dispatched C.Messius with a few cohorts in order to take control of the town.

 Soon after he entered the city though, Messius was besieged by Considius Longus with a legion and few cavalry.

 During this slow and methodic game of strategic movements, Caesar was once more a step ahead than his enemy, forcing Scipio to play catch-up by responding to his maneuvers.

 Amidst this standstill, Caesar’s proconsul from Sicily was able to at last send him 2 more legions, the 13th and 14th, together with a strong detachment of Gallic horsemen.

 The reinforcements arrived safely to Ruspina and bolstered the pinned Caesarian army.

 The timing was vital because the two legions were composed of many of Caesar’s experienced veterans, and their arrival rejuvenated the demoralized and outnumbered raw levies that made up the bulk of his army.

 With the determination of his troops renewed, Caesar began taking the initiative.

 Scipio’s camp was placed upon a ridge nearby and Caesar saw an opportunity to gain a strategic advantage over his enemy by occupying the eminences.

 After a series of skirmishes mainly between light troops and cavalry, Caesar again diverted his actions and in battle array marched along the hills, obviously aiming to occupy the nearby city of Uzitta.

 And Scipio could not afford to lose Uzitta.

 It was a vital logistical depot and his main source of water supplies, so he immediately marched to aid the city, determined to defend it at all costs.

 Caesar’s unconventional approach to warfare would be something that his enemy would soon be forced to face.

 With his outnumbered army and with no hope of surprising or outflanking Scipio, Caesar needed to overcome both his numerical and topographical disadvantage so he set his main camp upon a hill opposite to Uzitta and began extending two lines of ditches straight towards each side of the city.

 By this labor intensive method, which was typical for Caesar, he intended to protect both of his flanks while attempting to occupy the city with a direct frontal assault.

 And as he began extending his siegeworks, King Juba of Numidia came to the aid of Scipio, with a substantial force of cavalry and light infantry, as well as numerous war elephants and 3 legions under his command.

 The stakes were getting higher by the minute.

 A series of skirmishes ensued upon the ridges and eminences around the city between the two generals, with Labienus having a prominent role during the numerous cavalry engagements that followed.

 While those hostilities were carrying on around Uzitta, two more legions that were send from Sicily managed to arrive safely at Ruspina, the 9th and the elite 10th legion.

 And the timing could not have been more crucial.

 With his army reinforced by 2 veteran legions the entrenching was accelerated and it wasn’t long before Caesar was able to extend his fortifications so close to Uzitta to have it within range of his siege engines.

 This gave the opportunity to numerous local kings, officers and high ranking officials that were sympathetic to Caesar, but forced to follow Scipio, to defect under the cover of darkness and reach his fortifications carrying with them crucial intelligence, offering their help and collaboration.

 On a daily basis Caesar would attempt to provoke Scipio into an full scale battle against his hardened veterans, by arranging his army in battle order within full view of the enemy army, assuming an aggressive formation and marching just a few hundred paces in front of Scipio’s fortifications.

 He remained so posted from morning till night without fighting because neither Scipio dared to advance within the narrow entrenched area where his army could not manoeuvre, nor would Caesar forfeit the protection that the fortifications offered to his army’s flanks.

 As a result, the opposing cavalry forces would engage in daily skirmishes around the fortifications, with the Caesarians trying to fend off the Scipiones, who were desperately attempting to deter their enemy from expanding the ramparts and completely cut them off.

 Meanwhile Considius Longus, after besieging Acilla for a protracted period of time, realized that he would not be able to storm the city’s defences so he dispersed his forces and abandoned the siege.

 But things would not remain so smooth for Caesar for much longer.

 During the stand-off with Scipio’s forces he received urgent news that many of his transports ships that were anchored outside Leptis had been raided by nearby enemy troops and many of them were burned.

 With his lines of communication now severely threatened he decided to directly command the naval operations against the enemy fleet.

 After he successfully combined most of his scattered vessels into a single force he then proceeded to attack the fleet that was stationed close to Hadrumentum.

 The surprise was complete and most of the enemy’s ships that could not withdraw to the safety of the harbor were burned.

 Caesar managed to resolve this crisis in record time.

 It seemed that wherever he was able to personally intervene everything worked out in his favor.

 This “Midas touch” that he had on the battlefield was a unique trait that would consistently follow him throughout his military career.

 But despite all of his efforts, Caesar’s logistical situation was still critical.

 When he returned to his main camp he decided to abandon his attempts to storm the city of Uzitta and resume the war of movement.

 At dawn he gathered all of his legions and, after setting fire to his main camp, marched off towards Agar.

 There, he encamped on the plain before the town, and went with a part of his army around the country in search of provisions.

 Scipio meanwhile, hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him along the hills, with all of his forces, and posted himself about six miles off.

 If Caesar couldn’t dislodge his enemy he would attempt to outpace him, thus when he received intelligence from a spy that Scipio was out in the country side foraging, he saw an opportunity to occupy the nearby strategically placed city of Zeta.

 Under the cover of darkness, he force-marched his army, passed the enemy’s camp and occupied the town right under the nose of his enemies, and when he realized that Scipio was further down the country side foraging, he immediately set out to intercept him.

 But almost immediately it became apparent that most of Scipios army was already alarmed of Caesar’s presence and was hastily heading to aid their foraging comrades.

 Caesar’s force was not prepared for a full scale battle under these circumstances, with a large portion of his legions left to garrison his main camp and, being in a field that he did not choose, he would not risk it, so he disengaged and attempted a rapid retreat.

 As he drew near the enemy camp from which he was obliged to pass, Labienus and Afrianius were laying in ambush among the nearby hills with a strong detachment of Numidian light cavalry.

 The rear guard of Caesar’s veterans immediately faced about and prepared to receive the charge of the enemy cavalry, but as soon as they attempted to counter charge them, they fled back into the hills.

 It was apparent that the cavalry of the optimates was attempting to harass and delay Caesar’s retreat and oblige him to encamp at a place were no water was to be had.

 The situation that Caesar faced is described perfectly in one of our sources, where it is mentioned that “Caesar, to meet enemies of this sort, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran army which had been victorious in so many battles, but like a fencing master training up his gladiators, with what foot they must advance or retire; when they were to oppose and make good their ground; when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to launch their javelins” This march had already lasted from 3 in the morning to 4 in the afternoon and with Caesar’s legionaries exhausted, and the retreat almost coming to a halt due to constant enemy harassment, he needed to find a way out of this predicament.

 Realizing that, by keeping his cavalry in the rear, he kept losing horses which he could not easily replace, so he instead positioned contingents of his veteran legionaries as his rear-guard, with specific orders to receive and repulse the enemy’s constant charges.

 This tactic proved to be effective and by retreating in a methodical and slow manner, Caesar’s army was at last able to reach the camp safely just before sunset, after sustaining only a few casualties.

 The next day Caesar tried to induce Scipio into a full scale battle by deploying his army in battle order outside his camp but Scipio wouldn’t budge and remained lodged in his camp on the nearby hills.

 But the tactic of taunting his enemy remained unsuccessful, and Caesar resumed the warfare of rapid marches that his veterans were accustomed to, and directed his army towards the nearby city of Sarsura were there was a magazine of wheat.

 His legions were constantly harassed by the light cavalry of Scipio along the way, but this time Caesar was prepared.

 By assigning 300 legionaries from each legion with the special task of rapid intervention against the enemy’s rear-guard action he was able to successfully counter the incursions of Labienus’s cavalry and to reach Sarsura which he occupied by destroying the enemy garrison.

 The next day Caesar resumed his march against the nearby town of Tsidra, but this time due to the city’s stronger defences and the logistical difficulties that a potential siege would entail, he abandoned the attempt to capture it and returned back to his old camp near Agar.

 Between the two camps was a small town by the name of Tegea, in which Scipio retained a small garrison that he intended to assist.

 After yet another small and indecisive skirmish between the opposing cavalry and light infantry, the stalemate could not be broken.

 Caesar could not entice Scipio to abandon his favourable and well defended position near the city of Tagea, but neither could he afford to endure a prolonged siege, because being so far away from his main coastal supply depots imposed many difficulties.

 However, the apparent lack of an overall strategic objective for Scipio played into Caesar’s hand.

 The veteran general had a unique insight when it came to a warfare of movement and strategic planning.

 Caesar once again found himself in need of a decisive battle that his enemy was not willing to give, so he came up with a plan that would play into all of his and his army’s strengths: rapid movement, keen insight when it came to topographic considerations, a well-defined military objective and the boundless capacity of his legionaries for hard and unremitting labour.

 Under the cover of night he broke camp and marched straight against the coastal city of Thapsus that was occupied by a well-known general of the optimates, C.Virgilius.

 Thapsus was already besieged by sea and would now become the incentive for the decisive battle that Caesar needed so much.

 When Caesar arrived he immediately set his legionaries to dig a series of ditches and ramparts around the whole town in order to cut it off and prevent any succors from reaching it.

 Scipio could not afford the disgrace of abandoning both Virgilius and the “thapsitani”, who were loyal all along to the cause of the optimates .

 When he received news of Caesar’s designs he immediately marched his army towards Thapsus and camped just 8 miles away from the city opposite to Caesar’s siege works.

 It is not exactly clear how long it took but it’s obvious from the ancient sources that, within a few days, Caesar’s legions were able to completely surround Thapsus with and elaborate double network of ditches, ramparts and a few strategically positioned forts.

 Surrounded and completely cut off by both land and sea, the Thapsitani were doomed unless Scipio could break the encirclement.

 The next day Scipio left his fort and advanced a few miles closer to Caesar, just off the range of his siege engines.

 His army was arranged in battle order and was facing the Caesarians that were now clearly in sight.

 Caesar noticed this movement and drew off most of his army from the works in order to face the enemy, left a small garrison to guard the forts and gave specific instructions to his fleet to raise a shout on his signal so as to distract Virgilius’s forces in case his legions were engaged in battle.

 Caesar drew up his army in 3 lines.

 On his right wing he placed the 10th and 2nd legion of veterans, the 8th and 9th legions on his left wing and in his center he positioned five more legions.

 He also placed the 5th legion, which was split in two halves, to guard his flanks and entrusted it to deal with the enemy elephants.

 His cavalry was positioned on both of his wings, intermixed with archers and light troops.

 The opposing army of Scipio was drawn up similarly with 3 lines of infantry, and his cavalry and light troops on both wings, but he also had positioned his numerus elephants in front of his main battle line for shock value and intimidation.

 Scipio hoped that with his elephants he could create enough havoc within Caesar’s lines once the battle commenced and had them specifically trained to endure the sound of slings and arrows.

 All told, Scipio deployed approximately 12 legions at Thapsus, including a strong contingent of light Numidian cavalry, commanded by King Juba.

 Caesar went from rank to rank to rouse the spirits of his veterans, reminding them of their former victories and animating them with his expressions.

 He exhorted the new recruits who had never seen battle before to emulate the courage and endurance of the veterans and endeavour to attain the same degree of glory and renown for themselves.

 As he ran from rank to rank he noticed that the army of Scipio was in turmoil, with a portion of it still working on the fortifications of their new camp and many others being very uneasy hurrying from place to place or retiring behind the ramparts while others coming out again in confusion.

 As many others from his army began to observe this, Caesar’s officers and centurions beseeched and implored their general to give the order for an all-out attack, his veterans of the renowned 10th legion, who so often were at the forefront of his triumphs, were especially uneasy and chafing at the beat to launch against their enemies.

 As Caesar did not wish to commence a battle by a sudden charge he tried to restrain the eagerness of the men and mitigate their aggressive impulses, but despite his best efforts, all of a sudden a trumpeter on the right wing, who was compelled by the fuming veterans of his 10th legion, sounded the charge.

 The small trickle of furiously attacking veterans soon became a flood and neither the centurions, nor Caesar himself were able to stop them.

 Caesar understood that the enthusiasm of his soldier could not be restrained and after wishing them “Good luck” he spurred on his horse and joined them in the charge.

 The explosive onslaught of the veterans gave Scipio little time to respond.

 Caesar’s archers and light troops showered the opposing elephants with their darts and arrows in such a way that the animals panicked turned about and trampled their own troops who were still within the ramparts of the camp.

 Soon afterwards the Caesarian right wing enveloped their surprised enemies and occupied the camp.

 The ferocity of the attack is captured by an instance described in one of our sources, a veteran of the 5th legion who, after witnessing the horrific mangling of a camp follower by an elephant, charged the animal by himself.

 When the elephant grabbed him with his trunk he still did not panic but retained the presence of mind to brand his sword and wound the elephant’s trunk.

 Miraculously the animal eased its grab, released him, and fled.

 Soon the battle turned into a rout and the optimates were running for their lives.

 Caesar’s veterans managed to kill almost 10.000 enemy legionaries while their own loses are described as being negligible, ranging from 50 to almost a 1000 men.

 The unstoppable Caesarian advance chased off the opposing Scipiones from their left towards their right flank and soon the veterans occupied both enemy camps.

 The fleeing rabble could not pose a threat any longer to the triumphant leader of the "Populares".

 The African campaign was all but won.

 The battle of Thapsus was a unique instance of Caesar completely losing control of his army.

 Nevertheless the sheer guts, experience and ferocity of his veterans still gave him a total and decisive victory.

 All seemed lost for the scattered optimates, with north Africa, Greece, Italy and Asia minor under the iron grip of the Caesarians.

 Now, Spain remained the only refuge for the optimates...