Battle of Hibera 215 BC - Hannibal (Part 17) - Second Punic War

 

Having received orders from Carthage to lead his army overland at the earliest opportunity and join his brother Hannibal in Italy, Hasdrubal Barca continued his preparations after crushing the Tartessi rebellion earlier in the year.

 But… in a detailed report sent to the Senate, he insisted they send him a successor with a strong army to guard Carthaginian possessions in the Iberian Peninsula.

 Hasdrubal asserted that, even if all should go well, his successor in Iberia would NOT find it to be a peaceful province.

 This advice left a deep impression and received widespread support in the Carthaginian Senate.

 Throughout September and October, Himilco was put in charge of assembling an army of at least 20,000, along with an augmented fleet, and tasked with defending Iberia both by sea and land.

 Hasdrubal’s assertions were not without merit.

 The stockpiling of provisions and the collection of tribute from the subjugated population to finance the upcoming campaign stirred up rumors that the Carthaginian army was leaving, which was enough to fan unrest among the locals.

 There was real danger that once Hasdrubal marched off to Italy, many of the tribes would either revolt or join the Romans.

 Himilco arrived in late autumn 216 BC, signaling the start of the campaign to drive the Scipio brothers out of Iberia… By the time  Hasdrubal received his reinforcements in Iberia, the third winter of the war had set in and the fighting in all theatres had subsided.

 But trouble was brewing in Sicily.

 The Greek cities across the north and northeast of the island broke away, seeing their chance to gain independence from Rome.

 Then, at the turn of the year the elderly tyrant of Syracuse, Hieron II, had died.

 For FIFTY YEARS he was a loyal ally of Rome, but now the crown passed to his 15-year-old grandson Hieronymus.

 Hannibal’s successes in Italy convinced the young ruler to open negotiations on how to divide Sicily.

 Two envoys of Carthaginian-Syracusan descent, Hippocrates and Epicydes, came to Hieronymus, promising that the whole of Sicily will be a Syracusan possession.

 Internal political conflict raged for another 3 months, but the pro-Carthaginian faction eventually prevailed.

 Hieronymus joined Hannibal’s side with an army of 15,000 and another 4,000 under the leadership of Hippocrates and Epicydes.

 In addition, Carthaginian ships in the area were joined by the Syracusan fleet.

 Syracuse now threatened to tip the balance of the war…

 Rome was rapidly losing control over Sicily.

 The island was a springboard for raids against the African coast.

 Furthermore, it served as a shield for Italy proper.

 Conversely, Carthage could now use the ports of Sicily to launch raids against Roman cities and more safely transport troops to southern Italy.

 The reinforcements that Hannibal was expecting could give him the resources for a finishing blow.

 And with some of the best Roman troops now at risk of being cut off, two of Appius Claudius’ legions were withdrawn from Sicily back to mainland Italy, while the disgraced survivors of Cannae went the other way.

 Additional ships were sent to protect Sicily against a possible Carthaginian invasion, while the remaining squadrons patrolled Italy’s coastal waters.

 It was then, near Brundisium, that a Macedonian ship was intercepted.

 The Romans boarded the ship, finding both Macedonian and Carthaginian diplomats, as well as documents that showed Hannibal and Philip were negotiating an alliance.

 From those onboard the Romans learned that this was just one of many diplomatic missions between Hannibal and Philip.

 Marcus Valerius Laevinus was put in charge of Roman forces in Apulia, to contain the Macedonian threat.

 Meanwhile, Marcellus was overwhelmingly voted as one of the consuls for the year 215 thanks to his action at Nola, which prevented Hannibal from establishing full control over the main road that ran through Campania.

 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, another capable commander, was chosen as his colleague.

 However, the Senate disapproved of having two plebeian consuls and they forced Marcellus to step aside in favor of Fabius Maximus, retaining the title of proconsul instead.

 With manpower depleted in some communities of Italy due to losses against Hannibal, Rome reverted to the Fabian strategy of avoiding conflict with the Carthaginian general.

 Many towns were hastily fortified, and the Roman Senate decreed that the crops be brought to walled cities to increase food stockpiles and deprive Hannibal of provisions that he could loot.

 Farmers who failed to comply faced confiscation of land and property, as well as immediate imprisonment and forced labor in the mines.

 Unable to dislodge Hannibal and unwilling to meet him in battle, the Roman strategy was to contain him.

 With around 40,000 men at his disposal at Capua and another 20,000 under Hanno in Bruttium, Hannibal faced 100,000 Roman troops in southern Italy.

 In spring, Hannibal marched out of Capua, establishing his camp on Mount Tifata.

 This was a strong defensive position, from where he was at hand to support his Italian allies and oppose the Roman generals in the area.

 The imposing mountain could be easily found by reinforcements and supplies coming from his Italian allies and Carthage.

 Across the Mediterranean, Hasdrubal completed the muster of his forces at New Carthage and moved north once more towards the Ebro.

 Knowing that an arduous journey lay ahead, he made sure to levy enough funds to secure safe passage, purchase additional provisions and hire Gallic warriors on his way to Italy.

 But, at the fore was the destruction of the Roman army in Iberia.

 The Scipio brothers were aware of Hasdrubal’s plan.

 Word of his decrees and preparations had reached them.

 They understood well, what is at stake.

 If Hasdrubal were to link up with Hannibal in Italy, that would spell the end of Rome.

 But… undefeated since disembarking in Iberia nearly three years ago, the Scipios enjoyed confidence of their troops and could count on the fighting spirit of their heavy infantry.

 They marched out of the camp and crossed the Ebro at Amposta, a town that defected to the Romans, then proceeded to attack Carthaginian allies.

 Moving up stream, a small detachment stayed on the northern side of the river, while Gnaeus led the main body of the army along the southern bank.

 Publius commanded the fleet up the river to support operations on land.

 Their main target was the city of Hibera, the wealthiest city in the region.

 Strategically placed, it held a vital river crossing, and from its fluvial port it controlled the traffic of the lower Ebro.

 The taking of Hibera and the scorching of the surrounding towns and countryside would significantly delay the enemy’s projected march.

 But then, Hasdrubal’s army appeared earlier than expected.

 Confident that Hibera can hold out behind its fortifications, he did not speed to the relief of his ally.

 Instead, he marched on Amposta.

 Situated at the mouth of the Ebro, the town was larger than other settlements in the vicinity and housed important grain silos.

 Its defenses, however, could not hold out as long as Hibera’s.

 If Amposta were to fall, the Roman army and fleet would not be able to prevent the reduction of their main camp.

 Worse, Hasdrubal would be able to cross the Ebro uncontested and position his army between the Romans and Tarraco, cutting their supply lines.

 For the Carthaginians, their objective was clear.

 To continue their march to Italy, they had to overrun Roman positions north of the Ebro.

 They needed a battle of annihilation.

 Thus, Hasdrubal clearly wanted to lure the Romans into a decisive encounter, and he succeeded.

 The Scipio brothers aborted the siege of Hibera and set out for Amposta.

 Besides aforementioned problems that the Romans might face, not challenging Hasdrubal would also hurt their prestige.

 Leaving a Roman ally to their fate would shake the loyalty of other communities.

 The Scipios HAD to act.

 On a plain just south of the Ebro river, the two armies deployed for a set piece battle.

 The Romans deployed in their traditional formation, with velites in the front, three lines of infantry, flanked by the Italian allies and Iberian auxiliaries, who were in turn flanked by the cavalry.

 Hasdrubal placed the Iberian and Ligurian mercenary infantry in the center, flanked by the Punic and Lybian heavy infantry.

 Numidian light and contingents of Mauri cavalry occupied the right wing, while the Iberian and Lybian-Punic cavalry were on the left, with elephants behind both wings.

 Being on the south side of the Ebro, Gnaeus had to advance.

 As long as the Carthaginians were present it would’ve been very dangerous to attempt a river crossing, even with the aid of the Roman fleet.

 When the battle was joined, Hasdrubal pulled back the Iberian infantry.

 The Numidians and Mauri harassed the Italian cavalry opposing them, causing chaos among their ranks.

 On the left wing, the Iberian and Lybian-Punic horse proved superior to the Roman cavalry.

 Then, as planned, the Lybian and Punic heavy infantry struck the flanks of the Roman infantry.

 Like his older brother at Cannae had done the year prior, Hasdrubal wanted to hold the Roman center until his cavalry swept the field of Roman mounted units, before regrouping to attack the enemy’s rear to complete the envelopment.

 But… not keen on embarking on a journey to Italy far from their homes, the Iberian troops were in poor spirits.

 In stark contrast, the Romans knew that their return home depended on the outcome of the battle.

 They were ready to win or die.

 It wasn’t long before the Iberians in the center lost heart.

 They broke and fled in the face of the advancing Roman infantry.

 Hasdrubal’s plan fell apart.

 With his cavalry still engaged, only the Lybian and Punic infantry were now facing the Roman legions, and they were quickly pushed back.

 Seeing that the line collapsed, the Carthaginian cavalry wheeled about and retreated.

 Hasdrubal also escaped, crucially managing to take the treasury with him.

 Locked in bitter fighting, most of the Lybian and Punic heavy infantry, the best, and most loyal troops, perished, while the rest of the army marched away to safety.

 Despite their victory, the Scipios did not follow up with a campaign of their own.

 Their finances were critical and there was little prospect of reinforcements from Rome, due to heavy losses suffered in Italy.

 As experienced generals the brothers knew that their position was precarious against the vast resources of Carthaginian Iberia.

 They could not risk their army in major encounters, for the time being.

 But their victory pushed the Carthaginians out of the Ebro valley.

 The wealthy city of Hibera surrendered to Rome and with that came the usual hostage taking, punitive payments, and the obligation to provide auxiliary troops.

 The submission of Hibera meant that other important fortified Iberian towns in Ilercavonia, such as Intibili and Ildum also surrendered to the Scipios.

 Now, the Romans could use the length of the Ebro to move troops and supplies, launch small scale raids to destabilize Carthaginian rule in the area, and apply pressure on the tribes that lived along the river to join Rome.

 But most crucially, the Scipios had not only prevented their own expulsion from Iberia, but also the doubling of Carthaginian forces in Italy, something which Rome would not have withstood.

 The impact of the battle of Hibera would be far reaching…

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