Battle of Cannae 216 BC - FULL - (Hannibal PARTS 11 - 13) - Second Punic War

 

It is August 2nd, 216 BC.

 Somewhere in the hills south of the river Aufidius, two figures could be seen, creeping through the undergrowth, surrounded by the sounds of the forest.

 Accompanied by his father, a young boy was learning to hunt.

 Spotting their prey, the father whispered: “Nature is to be feared as much as it is"

 "to be revered, and glory

 awaits those who temper it."

 "Now, you will become a man.” As the boy trained his bow, the deer jolted and ran off.

 The pair looked around to see what startled the animal.

 As their ears perked up… screams!

 The sound of screams in the distance, caught their attention.

 To their amazement, just beyond the brush, in the plain below, taking place was what seemed like an enormous battle, near the town of Cannae...

 Hannibal … now spending his second winter in Italy, was commanding an undefeated army that inflicted losses on the Romans more severe than those suffered in the First Punic War, destroying several armies, marching across Italy at will, pillaging and setting the rich countryside ablaze, seemingly unopposed.

 Rome’s scorched earth tactics of the year prior, intended to starve Hannibal’s army, hadn't succeeded.

 His unchallenged presence in Italy was a humiliation for the Republic, and, at least politically, successes in Spain and Sicily were mere consolations.

 But Fabius’ dictatorship, despite failing in its’ primary objective, provided Rome time to recover and oversaw the rebuilding of the field army, now under temporary command of Servilius and Regulus.

 However, feeling the economic impact of Hannibal’s operations,

 and fearing defections from its’ allies, during the winter the Senate mobilized the Republic’s resources.

 Two new consuls, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro, would hold joint command over the largest army Rome had ever put to field, with troops assembled and trained across Italy over the coming months.

 As recruits were organized into legions, commanding officers appointed, drills conducted and oaths taken, a sense of trust developed between the men and their leaders, gradually building a confident and effective force,

 that was grimly determined to destroy the Carthaginian army in Italy, in 216 BC.

 Eight overstrength legions, each numbering 5000 troops, were raised.

 40,000 Roman infantry and 2,400 cavalry would form the core of the massive army.

 Along with each legion there would be an equal number of allied infantry, 40,000 in total, along with around 4,000 cavalry.

 All told, a host nearly 87,000-strong was assembled.

 A third of the Senate would serve in the army for the campaign of 216 BC, while most of the remaining senators sent their sons or relatives to join the legions.

 A very large number of equestrians (the Roman aristocracy) also joined, and numerous distinguished men served as military tribunes or as war counsellors to one of the consuls.

 Of the appointed tribunes, four would go on to become consuls, while three out of four praetors that were elected that year were all former consuls themselves, with some of them having held field commands in previous wars.

 These were experienced men who reached maturity in the First Punic War,

 who’s honor and tradition bound them to offer their services to Rome, realizing that the very idea of Roma Aeterna was now in jeopardy.

 For Hannibal, being in hostile territory and supplying an army of some 50,000 soldiers and 10,000 cavalry horses, as well as servants, wives, and camp followers, was a never-ending problem that dictated the activities of a network of foraging parties and movements of the army.

 But thanks to Hannibal’s logistical mindset, enough provisions were gathered at Geronium to last around six months, from late autumn 217, until spring of 216 BC.

 And now the year’s crops were ripe enough to be harvested by his troops during campaign season.

 In early June, Hannibal left his winter quarters, descending from the Apennines into the fertile region of Apulia, with the Roman army following at a distance.

 After observing Hannibal’s activities for several months, the two temporary consuls were asking for instructions from the Senate, now that the Carthaginians were on the move again, explaining that staying close to the enemy could force them into a battle.

 The Senate instructed them to wait until consuls Paullus and Varro arrived with their legions.

 This allowed the Carthaginian army to pillage their way through Apulia.

 For a third year in a row, Hannibal continued his campaign of violence, to demonstrate Rome’s inability to defend itself and its’ allies, in the hope that the continued perception of the Republic’s weakness would cause defections and rebellions

 among its’ allies in southern Italy.

 Therefore, seeking a decisive battle against Hannibal was a logical decision for the Romans.

 Prior defeats had not yet diminished their spirit, and their resources were sufficient to continue the war.

 Upon joining the two temporary consuls, Paullus and Varro led the combined force south along the coastal plain to confront Hannibal.

 The two Roman commanders carefully scouted the route ahead,

 with riders patrolling the open country north of the river Aufidius, to ensure that no ambush

 against them could succeed.

 But the Romans too faced

 logistical challenges.

 Supplying 87,000 men, their mounts and pack animals was immensely problematic, and maneuvering a force of that size in close vicinity of the enemy, presented further challenges.

 The clouds of dust thrown up by the massive marching column was visible up to 10km away.

 Meanwhile, after raiding Apulia for about seven weeks,

 Hannibal was considering his next move.

 His scouts must've informed him of the large force he would have to face, and he knew that a Roman victory in a single battle could stop his invasion, and end any hopes

 of winning the war.

 Without any allies in southern Italy, if his army was dealt even a limited defeat it would've been difficult for it to survive, too far from its’ bases in Spain and the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul where supplies could be drawn from.

 Any significant losses of men in battle couldn't be replaced, and would diminish Hannibal's ability to plunder the countryside and wage war on the Romans.

 This would've resulted in lower rations and lack of payment for the troops, which would've certainly caused some of the contingents to lose heart and desert.

 Another rumour circled in Rome that Hannibal drew up a contingency plan, in case of defeat, to abandon the army and flee north with his cavalry,

 in the hope of cutting

 his way to Cisalpine Gaul.

 Whether or not this was true is impossible to say,

 but by mid-July Hannibal captured the town of Cannae.

 While it wasn't the wealthiest nor largest settlement in the area

 and was now abandoned, having suffered in the last year's campaign, Cannae was used by the Roman army as a supply depo.

 Capturing it, along with gathering the produce from the surrounding area secured plentiful provisions for the troops, which reduced the need to forage for some time.

 For the next several weeks, the Carthaginian general sat and waited for the Romans.

 Situated on a hilltop, Cannae was a good vantage point, overlooking the flat plain in the direction from which the Roman army would come.

 One of the Carthaginian officers by the name of Gisgo,

 nervously commented

 on the size of the enemy army.

 Undoubtedly he wasn’t the only one in the Carthaginian army,

 that was intimidated by the size of the Roman host.

 But… ever the master of mind games, Hannibal wittily remarked:

 "The thing that has escaped your notice is that, although there are so many of them,"

 "there is not one among

 them called Gisgo",

 thereby bolstering the confidence of the men and diffusing the tension into laughter.

 Although there was nothing stopping the Carthaginian general from continuing south, where more plunder could've been taken, he was aware that the Romans were coming and that he could not be perceived as trying to avoid battle, for no community in southern Italy would defect to his side

 if he lacked confidence

 in defeating Rome.

 At Cannae, Hannibal's objective was to meet and destroy the Romans...

 Some distance north of Cannae, the massive Roman host  lumbered forward through the plains of Apulia, when the forward elements spotted Hannibal, hastily abandoning his camp just ahead.

 The enthusiastic Roman vanguard rushed forward!

 The pursuit lacked organisation, but for once they caught the Carthaginian general off-guard and they were not about to allow him time to consolidate .

 But… while Hannibal’s standard did leave the camp, the Carthaginian general was in fact lurking in the forest nearby...

 He lured the Romans into an ambush yet again, despite their extensive scouting efforts.

 Panic gripped the Romans and it seemed like another disaster was afoot.

 But Consul Varro quickly rallied the troops and reformed the lines, managing to beat back the Carthaginians.

 Hannibal committed significant forces in an effort to destroy the Roman vanguard and shatter the morale of the Republic’s army in yet another ambush, but the legionaries he met on that rainy morning showed the kind of determination he hadn’t faced before… It’s late July, 216 BC. As the Roman column approached, word reached Paullus and Varro that the supply depo at Cannae fell into Carthaginian hands.

 The two consuls were alarmed by the news, knowing that Hannibal now had the resources to camp throughout the winter with little need to forage or pillage the surrounding area for supplies.

 This would keep the Carthaginians sheltered and rested, and would undoubtedly help Hannibal maintain high morale among the troops over the coming months.

 Meanwhile, Paullus and Varro were aware that, with their logistics disrupted, maintaining and supplying their vast army in the field would present numerous problems. From their perspective, a well-supplied Hannibal could now, in theory, try to play for time and prolong the war well into next year, which would give him plenty of opportunities to gain political points and successfully persuade Rome’s allies in Southern Italy to join him.

 For the Roman leadership, the thought of a possible cascade of defections on their peninsula was unacceptable. Hannibal had to be dealt with.

 However, while surveying the battlefield, disputes began over where to fight the planned battle.

 To the south lay Cannae on a line of hills, with undulated land beneath the hillsides and a very flat plain north of the river Aufidius.

 In ancient times the river itself is suspected to have had a different course, which ran further away from the hills, and the area surrounding it was mostly treeless cultivated open country, much like today.

 Paullus wasn’t pleased with the ground, arguing that the flat terrain favoured Hannibal’s more numerous and better cavalry, expressing his preference to move the camp into the hills to the west, where the more broken ground would be more suited to infantry and would restrict cavalry maneuvers.

 Varro disagreed, correctly pointing out that the legions performed best on fairly open ground, expressing his willingness to give battle even in the open country north of the river despite Hannibal’s superiority in cavalry, but arguing that deploying the army in the undulated terrain south of Aufidius would also suit the Roman infantry, whilst the river and the hills would restrict any extensive Carthaginian cavalry maneuvers on the flanks.

 Both consuls were clearly concerned about the mobility of Hannibal’s cavalry.

 Varro was certainly more eager to fight, and contemporary sources put this down to inexperience, whilst describing Paullus as the more level headed of the two.

 But Paullus’ plan was problematic in many ways: The Roman host was very large and was composed of a mix between newly trained troops and more experienced legionaries, which made movements, maneuvers and deployments of the army a slow process, which would’ve been even slower in the broken ground that Paullus suggested, despite other advantages such terrain would offer.

 In addition, it is doubtful that Hannibal would accept a battle against a numerically superior army in a well defended position, unsuited for his cavalry. He would’ve likely arrayed his troops in the plain below to taunt and challenge the Romans, and if they didn’t come down from the hillsides to fight, he would use this as propaganda to show off the Republic’s weakness to its’ Italian allies.

 Worse, Paullus’ plan to move into the hills to the west meant that the Romans would perhaps be forced to wait until an opportunity for a battle arose, and that could’ve potentially kept the army in the field for a long time.

 Feeding and supplying so many troops for a prolonged period would’ve been a major problem, whilst Hannibal now held the most important supply depo in the area, at Cannae, and could afford to wait.

 In addition, it is unlikely that Paullus completely refused the idea of giving battle on the flat terrain, because just like Varro he understood that the Roman camp was already too close to Hannibal, therefore repositioning to the western hills would essentially require them to disengage.

 But any withdrawal from the field in the face of the enemy was very difficult and dangerous, especially for an army dominated by infantry that faced superior cavalry, who could pick them off piecemeal and potentially cause a rout.

 Furthermore, despite being in open country, retreating from an outnumbered enemy would be deeply dispiriting for the troops, especially given that the Senate, the army, and the people of Rome wanted to fight and destroy Hannibal.

 In every sense the Roman army was now committed and could not easily pull away from the field without a battle. Therefore, whatever misgivings Paullus had, Varro’s preference to fight as soon as possible was not at all unreasonable, under the circumstances.

 The two Consuls came from

 very different backgrounds.

 Paullus was the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus, who was the principal financier of the famous Greek historian Polybius, the main contemporary source for the 2nd Punic War.

 Being paid by Paullus’ immensely influential and wealthy family, it is easy to see why Polybius portrayed the Consul in such a positive light, claiming that it was he who solely raised the morale of the army and made major efforts to organize the newly formed legions, whilst mentioning Varro only in passing as his “colleague”, not including him in his writings at all during the campaign until Hannibal was sighted, and even then Varro is portrayed as somewhat of an inexperienced hothead, in contrast to the supposedly more sensible Paullus. This can make it difficult to separate propaganda from the truth.

 However, it is true that Paullus had more military experience, having previously served as consul in 219 BC and was campaigning in Illyria. But, after being involved in a scandal with the distribution of war plunder, he was keen to avoid further stains on his reputation during his second consulship in 216 BC, which may have been part of the reason for his cautiousness prior to the battle.

 In military terms, the Illyrian war was a combined operation between the navy and the army, but there were no pitched battles. So despite the demands this campaign must’ve had on Paullus as a general, the conflict in Illyria did not require the skills needed for controlling a massive field army. And since his reputation was embellished in contemporary sources, we have no reliable way of knowing how good of a commander he was.

 In contrast, Varro was a novus homo, a “New Man", one of the very few in any generation of Roman political circles, to be the first in their family to reach high office. Contemporary sources further smear him by describing his ancestry as humble and poor, claiming that his father was a butcher and that Varro himself worked in the shop during his youth.

 Despite being described as a brutish simpleton, in reality a “new man” needed substantial political ability to win elections against opponents from old prominent Roman families and their many clients who voted for them. Varro could not parade the achievements and high status of his ancestors, and had to find other ways of making his name known to the public, in a voting system that heavily favoured the rich, which in a way made him an underdog.

 This shows that Varro must’ve been a shrewd politician, who managed to gain the support of influential aristocrats and Senators, all of whom looked to invest in a candidate that would aggressively confront Hannibal – a desire that was widespread in all political circles in Rome.

 In addition, changes to Roman laws in 217 BC made it nearly impossible for a consular candidate without military experience to be elected, regardless of the influence and prestige of his financiers.

 So while Varro never held senior command, considering the serious crisis that Rome was in at this stage of the war, it is reasonable to assume that he could not have been made consul without certain military qualifications.

 On the second day came Varro’s turn to command.

 He led the army towards a position closer to the enemy, despite objections from his colleague.

 Hannibal responded by sending out groups of cavalry and light infantry to harass and slow down the advancing enemy column.

 Seeing the incoming Carthaginians, Varro closed ranks and the column only barely continued to move forward.

 A series of skirmishes caused significant confusion in the Roman ranks, but Varro’s formed close-order infantry drove back each attack.

 The sporadic fighting went on until dark, without either side gaining an edge or inflicting losses on the enemy, but the Roman progress to a new camp site slowed down to a crawl, because they were forced to maintain a constant fighting line, eventually encamping when night fell.

 Paullus, still supposedly reluctant to give battle in this terrain, took charge of the army next morning and continued the advance towards the site chosen for the main camp, marshalling the troops to close the distance with the Carthaginians.

 Meanwhile, Hannibal was still positioned on high ground near Cannae, south of the river, observing enemy movements without taking any action.

 The Romans proceeded to aggressively take control over the battlefield. Two thirds of the army remained in the main camp, while the remaining one third of the troops was sent across the river Aufidius.

 Setting up a second camp showed the determination of the Roman leadership to put pressure on the movement of enemy troops, whilst taking up a position from where they could protect their own foraging parties that ventured closer to Cannae.

 More importantly, this aggressive stance served to build up the confidence of the troops.

 Hannibal countered by advancing down from the high ground towards a new camp location, most likely the flat plateau atop a ridge west of the main Roman camp, leaving a garrison to guard the fortified depo at Cannae.

 The size of the Roman host was clearly on his mind, as he continuously spoke to the men, encouraging them that "this" is why they came to Italy! Challenging the Romans for control over the battlefield showed Hannibal’s belief in victory, which raised the spirits of the men.

 The new camp was in a fairly good defensive position,

 overlooking the plain below, with the river nearby offering the crucial water supply.

 On the last day of July, The Carthaginian general ordered the troops to prepare for battle.

 The camp was abuzz for much of the late afternoon, as the men sharpened their blades, cleaned their weapons, armor, and clothing, wanting to look their best and most intimidating once the battle commenced.

 Early on August 1st,

 the Carthaginian army marched out of their camp.

 On the Roman side, Paullus was once again in command.

 He posted covering forces in front of the palisades of each camp, but the legions stayed close to the ramparts and little was done to provoke a battle.

 Hannibal, meanwhile, took the initiative and dispatched his Numidians across the river to attack the secondary Roman camp.

 He kept the rest of the troops arrayed for battle, facing the enemy camp for several hours. He exploited Paullus’ reluctance to give battle to raise the confidence of his troops by impressing upon them that the Romans lacked the will to fight.

 Across the river, the

 Numidians were ordered not to press the camp directly but to harass the foraging parties, mostly consisting of servants gathering water supplies, and chase them from the field.

 For Hannibal, this was another way to humiliate the Romans and show to his troops the inability of the enemy to counter the Numidian raid and protect their foragers.

 Some of the Roman officers felt ashamed with how the day went, resolutely wanting to turn things around, and the troops were especially displeased with the delay.

 Undoubtedly the two consuls read the mood of the camp.

 And… on August 2nd, Varro decided to fight… On a sweltering August 2nd, the battle standard in front of Varro’s tent signalled to the troops to array for battle.

 As the gusts of south-westerly Volturnus wind raised clouds of fine dust across the dry Apulian soil, for the next several hours, army officers closely supervised the complex deployment to ensure that the legions would form in the correct order.

 Varro, and the rest of the Roman leadership, decided to show the enemy their willingness to fight.

 However, they had no way of knowing if the Carthaginians would accept a battle in this new location.

 But then...

 Hannibal led his troops through the gates...

 The two armies crossed the river Aufidius at various points and marched onto the dust-blown flat plain below the town of Cannae.

 Yet, the Romans still weren’t sure that Hannibal would give battle, so they left a 10,000 strong garrison in the main camp.

 It was Paullus who insisted on this, arguing that, besides guarding the baggage, this force could also threaten Hannibal’s camp and cut off his line of retreat once the battle went in favour of the Romans.

 However, Hannibal wasted no time in deploying his army, sending out his light troops to form a protective screen for the main body.

 Varro too sent out the velites to mask the process of deployment from the enemy.

 There are suggestions that the Roman leadership didn’t actually expect the more mobile Carthaginians to fight on such a narrow and confined battlefield, and merely wanted to deploy the legions in front of the enemy to boost morale and rebuild their confidence, after being humiliated the day before for refusing to fight.

 Such practices of building up the confidence of the men were common in the battles of this period, but it is far more probable that the Romans did, in fact, fully intend to fight this battle on the ground of their own choosing.

 Whatever the case, Hannibal is said to have had 40,000 infantry and 10,000 horse, while the Romans fielded around 70,000 infantry and 6,400 cavalry.

 Varro placed a screen of around 15,000 velites in front of the main line.

 4,000 allied horse were positioned on the left under his direct command, while Paullus was in charge of the 2,400 Roman cavalry deployed on the right.

 To compensate for their numerical inferiority, the squadrons of horsemen were packed in a tighter formation, with no more than 1.5m between each rider.

 Room to maneuver the horses wasn’t necessary as their role would be purely defensive while the infantry drove the attack forward.

 Regular Roman infantry was mixed with the cavalry to give more stability to the static squadrons.

 Servilius commanded the 55,000 Roman legionaries and allied troops in the center, arrayed in a much deeper and more tightly packed triplex acies.

 Varro used the overstrength maniples to add depth to the infantry formations.

 Furthermore, he reduced the gaps between the lines to bring the full weight of the legions to bear, aiming to overwhelm the enemy.

 He knew that, at Trasimene, the Roman heavy infantry held off the Carthaginians for hours, inflicting significant losses, despite being in an unfavourable position.

 And the year prior to that at Trebia, the legions hacked their way through the Carthaginian center, getting the better of both the Gauls and several contingents of Libyans, Hannibal’s best infantry.

 It’s worth noting that the tighter maniple formations restricted the tactical flexibility, but eased the coordination of the massive army and, more importantly, the deeper formations possessed longer endurance in a direct confrontation, thus the Roman leadership was confident that the legions can outmatch the enemy and crush Hannibal’s center yet again.

 To achieve this Varro chose the battlefield wisely.

 He packed the legions on a narrow front, with the river and the hills near Cannae protecting the flanks from envelopment.

 This would force the Carthaginian horsemen into a frontal charge and the Roman cavalry was tasked with delaying long enough for the legions to finish the job.

 If they could break through the Punic center, it wouldn’t matter if the weaker Roman horse lost the fight on the wings, because at that point the Carthaginian cavalry couldn’t do much more than harass the large block of legions.

 The selection of the battleground at Cannae could allow the heavy infantry to smash their Punic enemy.

 We do not know if Varro alone planned this or if he was assisted by Paullus, Servilius and other members of the Roman leadership.

 The Roman plan was simple, but efficient.

 Meanwhile, Hannibal placed around 6,000 Spanish skirmishers and up to 2000 renowned Balearic slingers as a screening force in front of the army, instructing them to raise as much dust as possible to hide the disposition of the troops.

 Behind them formed the close order infantry, with 21,000 Gallic warriors making up the bulk of the main line.

 3,000 veteran Spanish infantry were interspersed to strengthen the center.

 But, unlike at Trebia, where his main line collapsed because he amassed all of his infantry to try and match the Romans and didn’t keep any reserves for decisive action and to plug the gaps in the line, this time he positioned the 8,000 Libyans, his best, most disciplined men, in the rear, hiding them from view behind the formations in the front.

 On the Punic right were 4,000 Numidian horsemen, commanded by Hanno, tasked with holding the flank, while on the opposite side the Carthaginian general placed 2,000 Spanish and 4,000 Gallic cavalry, under the command of Hasdrubal, planning