Back across the Apennines - Hannibal (Part 9) - Second Punic War

 

It’s late summer, 217 BC.

 As the fires across the Ager Falernus valley died down after months of Carthaginian raiding, the locals returned to their burned towns and cities,

 struggling to bring their lives back to normal.

 Having outwitted Fabius, Hannibal escaped the valley.

 And now, there was real fear in the Roman Senate,

 as the Carthaginian General marched north towards Rome itself… Escaping the Ager Falernus valley with his army and plunder intact

 again highlighted Hannibal’s genius.

 And as the Carthaginian army now marched north along the Volturnus river, fears in Rome were re-ignited that the attack on the city was imminent.

 But, despite the road to Rome being open for the second time…

 Hannibal marshall ed his army back into the Apennine mountains.

 His string of victories was not enough to secure alliances in Italy, and the Carthaginian general knew that without a firm foothold in the plains of Campania, he needed to establish winter quarters in a better strategic position.

 Heading back east to his old campaigning ground near the Adriatic coast was a prudent decision.

 Encumbered with plunder and herds of cattle, the Carthaginians moved slowly, cutting a swath of destruction along their line of march, ravaging farms and property, collecting provisions and prisoners as they moved, unopposed by Fabius.

 While this unchallenged destruction of Roman lands and the prior escape from the Ager Falernus valley were the two latest embarrassing incidents that caused outrage against Fabius in the Senate, it was in fact his strategy that preserved the Roman army from potential destruction.

 Thanks to Fabius, the Republic stayed in the fight, which, arguably, kept their Italian allies from joining Hannibal.

 Yet, due to his cautious war plans, Fabius’ popularity in Rome was crumbling and his allies in the Senate found it impossible to rally political support around him.

 It also didn’t help that, by now, news spread throughout Rome that Fabius’ property and lands were spared during Carthaginian raiding of the Ager Falernus valley, which cast further doubts about him.

 The Roman general tried in vain to improve his reputation by selling parts of his property to ransom Roman prisoners from Hannibal, after hearing that the Senate would not fund their release.

 But despite the unabating criticism against him and demands for a more aggressive stance, he kept to the Fabian strategy, refusing to be drawn into a battle not of his choosing, and continued to shadow Hannibal.

 His scorched earth policy had a very limited effect, as many citizens refused to burn their towns and crops, but it did manage to hamper the movement of the Carthaginian army, which did not have a secure supply chain and had to live off the land.

 Meanwhile, Hannibal reached a place he deemed suitable for his winter quarters.

 The town of Geronium…

 It is unclear if Geronium was taken by force when Hannibal’s terms were rejected or if he took possession of the town after the inhabitants fled.

 Either way, Hannibal encamped just outside the town and had his troops repair the collapsed wall, as well as surround the town with a trench and a palisade,

 turning Geronium into a fortified granary for the Carthaginian army, where provisions

 and livestock were stored.

 The sick and wounded

 recovered in the camp,

 as thousands fanned out

 to forage the fertile plain to the west, while others pastured the cattle and horses on the hillsides to the east.

 With enough provisions to last until spring in a strong defensive position, with several roads offering multiple mountain crossings into Apulia,

 Geronium was the perfect place to winter with an army.

 Meanwhile,

 in the foothills across the valley, the Romans arrived some three days later and began encamping.

 But the dissatisfaction in the Senate finally boiled over forcing Fabius to depart for Rome.

 Officially, he journeyed to the capital to observe religious duties.

 However, the more likely reason for his absence from the front line

 was to confront his critics and explain his actions, in an effort to salvage

 any support he could for his campaign.

 While the political discussion raged on, back in the Roman camp near Geronium, Minucius assumed a more aggressive stance.

 As second-in-command, he was left in charge of the army with orders to follow the Fabian strategy.

 But, eager to put pressure on Hannibal, he set up camp in the plain, from where he sent out parties of cavalry and velites to hunt down the Carthaginian foragers.

 Although most of the foragers escaped unharmed, Hannibal moved quickly to protect his foraging grounds, by sending 2,000 Libyans to occupy the ridge overlooking the Roman camp, and just to the south he established a temporary camp, where he stationed two thirds of his army.

 Eager to square up against the enemy, Minucius sent the heavy infantry towards the Carthaginian camp, while his light infantry and cavalry went for the ridge.

 This seemingly created a problem for Hannibal.

 Not only was he outnumbered, but he left his cavalry in the main camp.

 Whether he did this intentionally to appear weaker and trick the Romans into attacking or because the horses needed resting, he now lacked the mobility needed for the clash against Minucius.

 With superior numbers and mobility on their side, the Romans took the ridge.

 Seeing his chance to put more pressure on the Carthaginians, Minucius moved his camp to the top of the captured hill.

 Expecting another attack, Hannibal restricted all foraging operations, keeping the troops in a state of readiness within the forward camp.

 But Minucius stayed put, and after a few days of inaction the Carthaginian general finally broke the stalemate by sending troops to forage in ever increasing numbers each day, until eventually some 4,000 men were committed.

 Dispersing so many troops in the surrounding countryside while already being outnumbered begs the question: Did Hannibal so desperately need provisions for the winter and was forced to forage?

 Or did he want to weaken his position, perhaps even appear incompetent, to provoke Minucius into fighting and winning a few skirmishes, with the aim of luring the Roman general into a trap once he became overconfident?

 Whatever the case, Minucius answered in force.

 He led the heavy infantry against the Carthaginian camp, while sending his cavalry and light infantry through the back gate to hunt down the foragers.

 The skirmish was a bloody affair, with the Romans getting the better of the engagement, killing many of Hannibal's foragers.

 Realizing it was time to regroup, Hannibal marched back to his main camp.

 Exaggerated accounts of this victory caused widespread rejoicing in Rome.

 Senators and citizens alike believed that they finally had a commander who can defeat Hannibal.

 Hailed for his success, a law was hastily passed that made Minucius co-dictator, which was effectively a return to having two senior magistrates in charge.

 But things did not go smoothly.

 Fabius urged caution, while Minucius wanted to take aggressive action.

 Due to persistent arguments over strategy, Fabius proposed that they command the army on alternate days, or split the army into two independent commands.

 Minucius decided to take 4 legions and establish his own camp…