Attila invades the Western Roman Empire - Battle of the Catalaunian Plains 451 AD - Part 2/2

 

In moving against the West, Attila insisted he was not an invader, but someone who is claiming his right as the emperor’s future brother-in-law.

 And with Honoria as his wife, the Hunnic king would get an opportunity to take over Gaul and continue the previous policy of supporting the West against its enemies, with the added benefit of territory within the empire and a direct connection to the throne.

 Rarely, if ever, was Aetius caught so completely off guard. Upon receiving word of the impending invasion, he set out from Italy to Gaul… Valentinian offered very little support, but Aetius brought with him the Auxilia Palatina.

 Although few in number, these were first-rate troops, capable of holding firm in line of battle, as well as conducting more mobile operations.

 Nevertheless, even when combined with his main force in Gaul,

 Aetius still didn’t have the

 numbers to defeat the invaders.

 It seemed that the Roman general faced an insurmountable problem.

 For over 20 years he relied on the Huns and Alans to stamp his authority on the Visigoths, Franks, Burgundians, and Bacaudae. But now, with Attila on his way, he had to turn to his enemies for help.

 Realizing he could never persuade Theodoric to join him, the ever resourceful Aetius sought assistance from Avitus.

 A prominent Roman aristocrat,

 Avitus once served as a Praetorian Prefect of Gaul and was a personal friend and trusted advisor of the Visigothic King.

 He appealed to Theodoric that now was not the time to settle old political scores with Aetius. Now was the time to throw in his lot with the Romans to stop Attila.

 Persuaded, the king marched out of his capital – diplomacy and charm produced what no war could have achieved, a force that could confront the greatest barbarian army yet to threaten the empire.

 For Aetius, however, the alliance with Theodoric was a marriage of convenience.

 He was forced to seek help and would have to make concessions to the Visigoths, but had no desire to see their power grow. His plan was to stop Attila, but to also remain the most powerful warlord in Gaul, and he would strive to prevent Theodoric from exploiting any victory against the Huns.

 Meanwhile, the Huns crossed the Rhine in the spring of 451, with contingents of Franks coming in from the north to join them.

 Attila had split his army into smaller bands to make foraging easier, concentrating his forces only near walled settlements.

 Assaulting and capturing a city would’ve given his army loot, slaves, and additional supplies.

 However, when confronted by well defended cities he could not afford the time needed for siege operations, and could only try to rely on fear to gain entry, offering to spare the inhabitants from a horrific sack in exchange for provisions and shelter.

 And if the gates remained closed, Attila would’ve probably kept moving.

 The Hunnic army captured and sacked Metz in early April, then proceeded to cut a swathe through the countryside. Without organized Roman standing forces, the invaders were virtually unopposed. Logistics dictated their movement much more than tactical considerations.

 Attila was obliged to allow his followers chance to loot, but his focus would’ve been on moving quickly and creating such a nuisance that Aetius would be forced to sue for peace.

 His goal was Aurelianum, an important strategic city. Capturing it would’ve split Gaul in half, but if that proved not enough to bring the Romans to the negotiating table, he could meet them in battle, defeat them, and extract terms, as he has done before in the East.

 The Alan leader Sangiban must’ve received word on the approaching Huns. It is possible that he tried to play a duplicitous game, angling to join the side that was most likely to win.

 There is certainly some debate about his loyalty, but it’s likely that he sided with Aetius early on, as the two had a fruitful alliance over the years.

 Whatever the case, what Attila failed to anticipate was a Romano-Visigothic alliance that could challenge him. Worse, Aetius got to Aurelianum first. He promptly entrenched the outskirts of the city and made it a rallying point for the troops coming from the north.

 The cunning general cut a deal with the Bacaudae and the recent immigrants from Britain, guaranteeing them freedom from imperial authority in exchange for their support.

 Additional Frankish auxiliaries, Saxons, contingents of outlaws from Armorica, Liticians and Burgundians were persuaded to join, as well as smaller Sarmatian, Celtic, Swabian and German tribes, also the Olibriones (who were former Roman soldiers), and the Alans from the Loire valley.

 Once Attila arrived, he knew that the defensive position at Aurelianum favored the Romans. There is some evidence to suggest that the he was unsettled by being confronted with Aetius’ combined army, on unfavorable forested ground around the Loire.

 Therefore, the Hunnic king

 withdrew from Aurelianum.

 He may have expected the take the city without a fight, but since this was no longer possible he had no choice but to give battle, and he wanted to do so on the ground of his own choosing.

 He was familiar with the terrain he had already marched through after crossing the Rhine and knew that the flat Catalaunian Fields would favor his army.

 Mounted contingents and the baggage train would’ve kept to the road, while the infantry made their way cross-country through the Forest of Orleans, with the rally point at Senones.

 Aetius had to delay for a few days, departing from Aurelianum only after all his reinforcements had arrived. He predicted that he will catch up to Attila before he could cross the Seine, roughly an 8-day march. To slow down the enemy, the Roman general dispatched fast moving contingents of riders ahead of the main army to harass Attila’s column in the hilly, heavily forested territory, where there was little room for the Huns to maneuver.

 While this didn’t cause significant losses to Attila, it made resupplying his troops that much more difficult, while the Roman allied army was well provisioned.

 A large skirmish by Aetius’ Franks in the rear of the Hunnic column further slowed down Attila’s advance, allowing Aetius to catch up. This forced Attila to leave a sizeable rearguard of Gepids, to allow the main army to take up position on the fields ahead.

 In light of the retreat from Aurelianum and having to fight off ambushes and skirmishing attacks over the past 10 days, the morale in the Hunnic army would’ve suffered.

 Attila had the added challenge of keeping the spirits up, assuring his followers that the favorable terrain just ahead, is where they will make a stand and defeat the Romans… As he reached the open Catalaunian fields, Attila had to make a decision.

 He was on the defensive, and his army was tiring.

 He could either risk it all by giving battle or retreat to fight another day. The Hunnic king was aware that there might not be another day, knowing that an army retreating through hostile territory was like a sick herd – an easy prey.

 Worse, to run away in the face of the enemy was no way for a warrior to live, certainly no way for a leader of his stature to retain his authority over the many tribal warlords under his command.

 He would fight the Romans.

 As June 19th drew to a close,

 Attila sent a cavalry detachment to occupy a ridge overlooking the valley, recognizing its importance straight away.

 Further ahead, he encamped on the banks of the Siene, with a wagon fort formed in the front and a bridge to the rear, that would provide a vital avenue of escape across the river if things went badly. Towards the south-west, 7km of flat open plains extended as far as the eye can see, which would give the Huns advance warning of the approaching enemy.

 Tonight, his troops would

 get a good night’s rest…

 Early on June 20th, the morning twilight witnessed a comet ominously piercing through the sky, as if to signal the start of the battle.

 Soon after, Aetius’ appeared…

 Just as Attila suspected, the Roman general had divided his army into two columns, arriving around 7 a.m.

 Aetius wanted to deploy as early in the day as possible. He needed a quick, decisive battle.

 The conglomeration of his allies would disperse back to their homes if they became stuck in a prolonged war of attrition.

 After getting word from his scouts that the Romans are on their way, the Hunnic king began deploying his troops.

 Crucially, he sent another contingent of cavalry to reinforce the Hunnic riders on the ridge to the south. Unlike Aetius, Attila wanted to start the battle as late in the day as possible.

 If he could delay until there were only a few hours left before sunset, this would allow him to regroup under the cover of darkness if the Romans got the upper hand.

 And just as he suspected, Aetius did not want to leave a Hunnic contingent to his rear.

 While the rest of the army continued towards the battlefield, the Roman general tasked King Theodoric’s son Thorismund, commander of the Visigothic cavalry, with taking the ridge.

 As the Visigoths approached up the slope, the Huns kept their distance. They withdrew slowly, showering the enemy with arrows.

 The harassment slowed down Thorismund’s advance, as the nimble horsemen kept retreating out of harm’s way. Attila had no intention of fighting for control of the heights, rather on the flat plain below that better suited his army.

 Deploying his horsemen on the ridge was intended to disrupt Aetius’ movements and drag out his deployment. And it seemed like Attila’s delaying tactics were working.

 It wasn’t until 11 a.m. that the Visigoths finally gained control of the heights, some FOUR hours after the Roman army first appeared on the battlefield.

 Instead of advancing towards the middle of the field where he would be vulnerable to encirclement by the fast moving Huns, Aetius anchored his right flank on the rising slope to the south, and his left wing on the

 thick forest to the north.

 Just like Attila, Aetius tried to formulate his own contingency plan by forming his line at the start of the steep meadow that lead up to the high lands behind him.

 If the battle went against him, this would allow him to withdraw uphill where it would’ve been difficult for the mounted Huns to pursue him.

 Theodoric and the Visigoths held the right wing.

 Most of them dismounted to form a shield wall, to protect themselves from the Hunnic archers.

 A small cavalry contingent remained in reserve, commanded by the King himself.

 The mounted Alans were placed in the center-right.

 Perhaps doubtful of Sangiban’s dedication to the cause, Aetius may have wanted to surround the Alan leader with a host of faithful troops.

 Rather than forming a shield wall like the rest of the battle array, the Alans fought on horseback similarly to the Huns.

 Aetius took command in the center-left.

 From there to the left wing extended the Roman infantry, including the Franks, Burgundians, Saxons, and other allied tribes. Like the Visigoths, the majority formed a shield wall.

 Two cavalry contingents were placed in reserve to plug any holes in the line.

 Meanwhile, Attila observed

 Aetius’ defensive deployment.

 With the Roman formation tucked into the bottom of the hillside and most of the troops locked in a shield wall, no envelopment would be possible.

 But, even though Aetius’ deployment left no option except a frontal assault, Atilla had never been defeated in battle and he was on the battlefield of his own choosing. After all, it was he who crossed the Rhine to wage war on the Romans. Now was his chance to defeat them.

 He took up position in the center with his Huns, the core of his army.

 On the left wing, Ostrogothic cavalry formed in the front. Arrayed in the second line were Germanic footmen, the Burgundians, Thuringians, Alammani, Rugians, Heruls, and others.

 On the right wing, Frankish infantry and Gepid cavalry were placed in the front, with another contingent of mixed Germanic infantry in the back.

 The second line of Germanic infantry on both wings was to serve as a rallying point for the cavalry and to reinforce any attacks.

 Just as he had planned, Attila successfully delayed Aetius’ deployment.

 Only 5 to 6 hours remained until sunset.

 It was time.

 Atilla planned to focus his attack on the weaker Roman center-right. He would’ve seen that the placement of mounted Alans was the most vulnerable point in Aetius’ line and he wanted to take advantage of that.

 He tasked the Franks and Gepids on the right, and the Ostrogoths on the left with pinning down the Romans and Visigoths, to allow him time to break the Alans.

 The Huns attacked in successive waves, maximizing the effect of their archery. To the average Roman soldier, it seemed that the barbarians purposely scattered into smaller bands, rushing about in disorder.

 The Alan contingent bore the brunt of the storm of arrows, but Attila also focused his volleys on the Visigoths and the Roman center-right, in order to support the mounted attack on the wings.

 He knew that a cavalry charge could break against determined infantry and he wanted to soften up and disrupt Aetius’ ranks before the Ostrogoths, Franks, and Gepids began their charge.

 The Hunnic barrage continued for hours, giving Aetius’ men no respite. The physical and psychological impact on the Romans and Visigoths, cowering behind their shields, must have been immense.

 The Alans kept responding with barrages of their own, but being mounted and stationary made them much easier targets, and as their losses mounted, gaps appeared in their line.

 Sensing that the concentrated arrow volleys have weakened their resolve, Attila ordered a general charge!

 On a very narrow front, the Hunnic wedged formations smashed into the Alans, cutting straight through their formation. Overwhelmed, some of the Alans held on, while others fled, opening a gap that split the Roman army in two.

 Theodoric and Aetius turned their cavalry contingents in a desperate attempt to plug the whole in the center and stop the breakthrough.

 Either side of the gap, the shock of the Hunnic charge pushed back the enemy, bending their battle lines inwards.

 Then came Attila’s Germanic infantry, adding more impetus to the attack. The men in the front clashed with their shields in close combat, jabbing at the enemy with spears and swords.

 On the Roman left, the battle swayed back and forth, but the mixed allied infantry managed to slow down the push of the Gepids and the Franks.

 On the right flank, however, the Visigoths were pressed hard by the combined charge of the Huns, Ostrogoths, and the mixed Germanic infantry.

 Then, word reached Aetius that King Theodoric was killed in the fighting, while rallying his men.

 Realizing that this was a

 critical moment in the battle, the Roman general gave the signal to Thorismund.

 Until now hidden from view

 behind the crest of the hill,

 the Visigothic cavalry poured down the slope.

 Caught off guard, Attila’s Germanic infantry faced about to form a line

 against the incoming cavalry.

 But, without enough time to form a shield wall, they were quickly overrun.

 In the center, Aetius managed to rally the Alans and stabilize the line.

 Attila’s attempt to steamroll the Roman center had failed, and now his attack stalled.

 Soon, his left wing fell apart, as the Ostrogoths fled the field.

 To avoid encirclement, Attila too disengaged and retreated towards the fortified camp.

 Sporadic skirmishing continued until sunset, when all fighting died down.

 Upon learning of the death of his father, Thorismund wanted to besiege the Hunnic camp and continue the fight on the next day.

 But, some sources claim that, inexplicably, Aetius used his charm to dissuade the Visigothic heir apparent, reminding him that it would be wiser for him to depart for Toulouse to secure his throne.

 Another story suggests that the Roman general received payment from the Hunnic king and possibly looked to rebuild the relationship with the Huns, whose mercenaries he could again use to re-assert his authority in Gaul.

 It remains unclear why Aetius didn’t press the advantage when he had Attila at his mercy. But in all likelihood, after defeating the Huns, he was faced with the inevitable break-up of his temporary alliance, and thus had no choice but to end the engagement.

 Whatever the case, Attila was able to withdraw from the field in good order and head back across the Rhine… Aetius’ accomplishment on the Catalaunian fields cannot be overstated. In defeating the Huns he demonstrated exceptional leadership, diplomatic, strategic, and tactical prowess, which made him one of the greatest leaders of late antiquity.

 His former friend Attila didn’t succeed in carving out a kingdom in Gaul, but still wielded immense power and was not ready to give up his ambitions against the West.

 The following year, he surprised Aetius by invading Italy. Aquileia was besieged and captured. Cities across the Po valley were sacked, although the capital Ravenna was protected by its surrounding marshes.

 Attila continued south, before abruptly retreating due to supply shortages and a possible outbreak of plague within his army. He and his troops had already acquired considerable plunder and many were keen to head back home before winter.

 In addition, the Eastern Empire began launching offensive operations against Attila’s kingdom, which was another reason to withdraw from Italy.

 While Western Rome did not defeat him, Attila’s own power rested on continuous success and the failure to win an outright victory may have weakened his authority. Nevertheless, he planned to renew his campaign next year.

 But in early 453 he took a young wife and after a night of excessive celebration he was found dead the following morning. Exact cause of his death is not known, but he left no designated heir, and the fight for the throne among his sons, and the many allies making their bids for power, caused the Hunnic realm to

 collapse within just a few years.

 Fate was not kind to Aetius either. His power began to wane in recent years, ever since he could no longer recruit the Huns to fight for him. And with Attila defeated, his military expertise was less necessary. By 454, the general understood his precarious position and hoped to use his influence over the emperor to secure his position by making sure that the marriage between his son and the emperor’s daughter went through.

 But Emperor Valentinian, now in his 30’s, still resented Aetius. However, he was never able to rule in his own right and was instead influenced by ambitious men at his court.

 One such man was a senator, Petronius Maximus, who plotted his own rise to power.

 Exploiting the hatred that

 Valentinian had for Aetius,

 the senator persuaded him to lure the general to a meeting in Ravenna. Once there, Valentinian and his eunuch chamberlain attacked Aetius during a discussion, and hacked him to death.

 Still, the instigator Petronius had grander designs. Just a few months later, he recruited two of Aetius’ bodyguards to murder Valentinian.

 Soon after, Petronius declared himself emperor… All of the major actors involved in the events surrounding the Catalaunian fields, were dead within a few years

 after the battle.

 As for the Roman empire. It would continue to stagger onwards for another twenty years...