Road to Cannae 216 BC (Chapter 1) - Hannibal (Part 11) - Second Punic War

 

It is August 2nd, 216 BC.

 Somewhere in the hills south of the river Aufidius, two figures could be seen, creeping through the undergrowth, surrounded by the sounds of the forest.

 Accompanied by his father, a young boy was learning to hunt.

 Spotting their prey, the father whispered: “Nature is to be feared as much as it is"

 "to be revered, and glory awaits those who temper it."

 "Now, you will become a man.” As the boy trained his bow, the deer jolted and ran off.

 The pair looked around to see what startled the animal.

 As their ears perked up… screams!

 The sound of screams in the distance, caught their attention.

 To their amazement, just beyond the brush, in the plain below, taking place was what seemed like an enormous battle, near the town of Cannae...

 Hannibal … now spending his second winter in Italy, was commanding an undefeated army that inflicted losses on the Romans more severe than those suffered in the First Punic War, destroying several armies, marching across Italy at will, pillaging and setting the rich countryside ablaze, seemingly unopposed.

 Rome’s scorched earth tactics of the year prior, intended to starve Hannibal’s army, hadn't succeeded.

 His unchallenged presence in Italy was a humiliation for the Republic, and, at least politically, successes in Spain and Sicily were mere consolations.

 But Fabius’ dictatorship, despite failing in its’ primary objective, provided Rome time to recover and oversaw the rebuilding of the field army, now under temporary command of Servilius and Regulus.

 However, feeling the economic impact of Hannibal’s operations, and fearing defections from its’ allies, during the winter the Senate mobilized the Republic’s resources.

 Two new consuls, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro, would hold joint command over the largest army Rome had ever put to field, with troops assembled and trained across Italy over the coming months.

 As recruits were organized into legions, commanding officers appointed, drills conducted and oaths taken, a sense of trust developed between the men and their leaders, gradually building a confident and effective force,

 that was grimly determined to destroy the Carthaginian army in Italy, in 216 BC.

 Eight overstrength legions, each numbering 5000 troops, were raised.

 40,000 Roman infantry and 2,400 cavalry would form the core of the massive army.

 Along with each legion there would be an equal number of allied infantry, 40,000 in total, along with around 4,000 cavalry.

 All told, a host nearly 87,000-strong was assembled.

 A third of the Senate would serve in the army for the campaign of 216 BC, while most of the remaining senators sent their sons or relatives to join the legions.

 A very large number of equestrians (the Roman aristocracy) also joined, and numerous distinguished men served as military tribunes or as war counsellors to one of the consuls.

 Of the appointed tribunes, four would go on to become consuls, while three out of four praetors that were elected that year were all former consuls themselves, with some of them having held field commands in previous wars.

 These were experienced men who reached maturity in the First Punic War,

 who’s honor and tradition bound them to offer their services to Rome, realizing that the very idea of Roma Aeterna was now in jeopardy.

 For Hannibal, being in hostile territory and supplying an army of some 50,000 soldiers and 10,000 cavalry horses, as well as servants, wives, and camp followers, was a never-ending problem that dictated the activities of a network of foraging parties and movements of the army.

 But thanks to Hannibal’s logistical mindset, enough provisions were gathered at Geronium to last around six months, from late autumn 217, until spring of 216 BC.

 And now the year’s crops were ripe enough to be harvested by his troops during campaign season.

 In early June, Hannibal left his winter quarters, descending from the Apennines into the fertile region of Apulia, with the Roman army following at a distance.

 After observing Hannibal’s activities for several months, the two temporary consuls were asking for instructions from the Senate, now that the Carthaginians were on the move again, explaining that staying close to the enemy could force them into a battle.

 The Senate instructed them to wait until consuls Paullus and Varro arrived with their legions.

 This allowed the Carthaginian army to pillage their way through Apulia.

 For a third year in a row, Hannibal continued his campaign of violence, to demonstrate Rome’s inability to defend itself and its’ allies, in the hope that the continued perception of the Republic’s weakness would cause defections and rebellions among its’ allies in southern Italy.

 Therefore, seeking a decisive battle against Hannibal was a logical decision for the Romans.

 Prior defeats had not yet diminished their spirit, and their resources were sufficient to continue the war.

 Upon joining the two temporary consuls, Paullus and Varro led the combined force south along the coastal plain to confront Hannibal.

 The two Roman commanders carefully scouted the route ahead, with riders patrolling the open country north of the river Aufidius, to ensure that no ambush against them could succeed.

 But the Romans too faced logistical challenges.

 Supplying 87,000 men, their mounts and pack animals was immensely problematic, and maneuvering a force of that size in close vicinity of the enemy, presented further challenges.

 The clouds of dust thrown up by the massive marching column was visible up to 10km away.

 Meanwhile, after raiding Apulia for about seven weeks,

 Hannibal was considering his next move.

 His scouts must've informed him of the large force he would have to face, and he knew that a Roman victory in a single battle could stop his invasion, and end any hopes

 of winning the war.

 Without any allies in southern Italy, if his army was dealt even a limited defeat it would've been difficult for it to survive, too far from its’ bases in Spain and the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul where supplies could be drawn from.

 Any significant losses of men in battle couldn't be replaced, and would diminish Hannibal's ability to plunder the countryside and wage war on the Romans.

 This would've resulted in lower rations and lack of payment for the troops, which would've certainly caused some of the contingents to lose heart and desert.

 Another rumour circled in Rome that Hannibal drew up a contingency plan, in case of defeat, to abandon the army and flee north with his cavalry,

 in the hope of cutting

 his way to Cisalpine Gaul.

 Whether or not this was true is impossible to say,

 but by mid-July Hannibal captured the town of Cannae.

 While it wasn't the wealthiest nor largest settlement in the area

 and was now abandoned, having suffered in the last year's campaign, Cannae was used by the Roman army as a supply depo.

 Capturing it, along with gathering the produce from the surrounding area secured plentiful provisions for the troops, which reduced the need to forage for some time.

 For the next several weeks, the Carthaginian general sat and waited for the Romans.

 Situated on a hilltop, Cannae was a good vantage point, overlooking the flat plain in the direction from which the Roman army would come.

 One of the Carthaginian officers by the name of Gisgo,

 nervously commented

 on the size of the enemy army.

 Undoubtedly he wasn’t the only one in the Carthaginian army, that was intimidated by the size of the Roman host.

 But… ever the master of mind games, Hannibal wittily remarked:

 "The thing that has escaped your notice is that, although there are so many of them,"

 "there is not one among

 them called Gisgo",

 thereby bolstering the confidence of the men and diffusing the tension into laughter.

 Although there was nothing stopping the Carthaginian general from continuing south, where more plunder could've been taken, he was aware that the Romans were coming and that he could not be perceived as trying to avoid battle, for no community in southern Italy would defect to his side if he lacked confidence

 in defeating Rome.

 At Cannae, Hannibal's objective was to meet and destroy the Romans...