Hannibal (PARTS 6 - 10) - Rome's Greatest Enemy - Second Punic War

 

The defeat at Trebia struck fear into the Roman leadership.

 The Republic lost all control over Cisalpine Gaul.

 Hannibal succeeded in bringing the Gauls to his side, nearly doubling his army.

 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry are now under his command.

 The march south continues...

 Faced with the Gallic uprising in Cisalpine Gaul and still shocked by the loss of tens of thousands of troops at Trebia, the Roman Senate is determined to turn things around in 217 BC.

 Amidst the political turmoil two new consuls are elected and sent north against Hannibal, with newly raised armies.

 Other theatres of war are not ignored, evident by the victory against the Carthaginians at the Ebro and the planned reinforcements set for Iberia later in the year.

 But the main focus of the Roman war effort is on home soil.

 The plan is to use the geography of the Italian Peninsula to their advantage.

 With the vast marshlands of the Arno river in the west, thought to be impassable during winter and spring, and the rugged Apennine mountain range cutting across the peninsula, the Romans know that there are only two routes into central Italy that Hannibal can take, and they move to block both.

 Consul Gaius Flaminius positions his army at Arretium, including the 10,000 legionaries that survived the battle of Trebia.

 His co-consul, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus is stationied at Ariminium.

 Both armies are bolstered with a higher number of horsemen than usual, perhaps to offset their numerical inferiority in cavalry.

 Hannibal meanwhile has problems of his own.

 While he did establish a base of operations in the Po Valley, Gallic support will weaken over time as his army continues to consume their resources.

 At the same time, the Romans decided not to pursue further battles in the north, so staying there makes little sense for Hannibal.

 He needs to put pressure on the Romans before his Gallic allies lose interest in the war.

 Just like the Senate, Hannibal knows that he can either go down the Adriatic coast and fight Servilius in the rugged terrain of Picenum, or he can fight Flaminius in the difficult Apennine mountain passes.

 Neither route is good.

 Whichever he chose, not only would the Romans be alerted about his movement ahead of time, but he would be forced into a prolonged and uncertain battle against the well defended Roman positions, which would allow time for the two consular armies to link up, something that Hannibal can ill afford.

 But with the arrival of warm spring weather the Carthaginian general does the unexpected.

 He decides to force march his army across the Apennine mountains and through the dangerous marshlands of the Arno river, aiming to surprise the two consuls and get into a good position to threaten Rome itself.

 The plan is arguably just as audacious as was the crossing of the Alps.

 The march is extremely difficult.

 Hannibal places his most disciplined infantry, the hard-marching Lybians and Iberians at the head of the column.

 They set a fast pace which the Gauls find difficult to maintain, as they are not used to forced marches.

 And by being at the back of the column they face the added difficulty of having to march through the sticky quagmire that has been churned up by the troops in front of them.

 The cavalry is in the rear of the column, ushering the Gauls forward and keeping an eye on any who might decide to turn back.

 The terrain, however, is the army's biggest enemy.

 The Arno river flooded after winter rains, turning the river basin into heavily flooded, muddy, wetlands.

 The endless dense swampland offers almost no dry areas for resting.

 Hannibal's troops wade through deep pools of water for 4 days and 3 nights, with almost no sleep, and no rest, whilst carrying their heavy equipment and supplies.

 Those fortunate enough to be mounted are able to sleep in their saddles, while a handful of those on foot manage to climb onto the bodies of dead horses and pack animals for a brief rest.

 Many die to infection, disease, exhaustion and drowning.

 Hannibal himself catches an eye infection, which cannot be treated because there is no time during the forced march, and he carries the infection for much of the journey, eventually losing sight in one eye.

 He emerges from the swamp on the back of his sole surviving elephant, probably the brave Syrian.

 All the while, the Romans assumed that Hannibal is contained in the north.

 But what they don't know, is that the Carthaginian general managed to cross the Apennine mountains and the Arno river wetlands with 50.000 troops in just four days, without being detected, and is now in position for the next stage of his campaign.

 He grants his army a few days to rest and sends scouting parties south.

 He learns that Flaminius is at Arretium and that the Etrurian plain can offer enough food and plunder to boost the morale of the troops.

 Having learned that Flaminius is an arrogant and rash commander, he plans to provoke him into giving battle by pillaging and burning the rich Etrurian countryside.

 Soon enough, plumes of smoke from burning villages and fields dot the land west of Arretium, followed by the Carthaginian column passing right next to Flaminius, brazenly taunting the Roman general.

 Watching from Arretium, Flaminius is fuming, knowing that it is he who is supposed to protect these lands, and yet one of the richest areas in Italy is burning on his watch.

 But he somehow resists challenging the Carthaginian general, persuaded by his advisers to stay put and wait until Servilius joins him.

 Unable to force an open battle, for Hannibal, an assault on Arretium is out of the question.

 He cannot risk losing too many of his experienced soldiers that he cannot replace.

 His army also has limited supplies and has to keep moving.

 Furthermore, Hannibal has no way of knowing how far the other Roman army is, and as far as he knows, Servilius could be arriving any day now.

 So the Carthaginian general decides to press on.

 Leaving not one, but two armies in his rear must've seemed mad.

 But actually, by bypassing Arretium, Hannibal maintains the initiative and keeps the Romans guessing.

 He wants to be the one who dictates the course of the campaign.

 Scouts soon bring good news.

 Flaminius decided not to wait for Servilius after all.

 Knowing that the battle is soon coming, Hannibal makes sure to let his Gallic troops know that they will be fighting against Flaminius, the man who caused them much misery in years past.

 Flaminius is renowned for his victories against Gallic tribes.

 He is responsible for introducing a law that allowed Romans to settle near and on Gallic lands.

 This created conflict which Flaminius resolved by invading and occupying more Gallic lands, and then proceeded to settle more Romans on the lands he conquered.

 Needless to say, he is hated by the Gauls and the 17,000 of them in Hannibal's army can't wait to get their hands on him.

 Meanwhile, for the Roman army that prides itself on its' military prowess it must be humiliating to pass through villages and countryside laid waste by the enemy.

 But Flaminius can still redeem himself, and he is only one day's march away.

 It's early morning of June 24th, 217BC.

 Flaminius marches out of his camp towards the smoke rising in the distance, apparently from Carthaginian campfires, eager to get to grips with the enemy.

 In the front he places veteran legionaries that survived the battle of Trebia, who are also very keen on meeting the enemy in battle.

 As the column moves, a low hanging mist envelops the lake and the valley.

 The shoreline is eerly quiet.

 The locals seem to have vanished.

 Unable to see too far ahead, the Romans literally stumble into Hannibal's heavy infantry who are blocking the road.

 Fighting spontaneously errupts at the far end of the valley.

 Despite being surprised by the enemy the Roman vanguard forms up in battle formation.

 Further back, it is some time before the Roman centre and rear realise what is happening in the front.

 The visibility is hampered by the low hanging morning mist.

 But in the hills above the mist, Hannibal's hidden troops can clearly see the Roman column.

 Although they do not know it yet, the Romans walked straight into an ambush.

 But let's take a moment to consider how difficult it was to set up the ambush at Lake Trasemine.

 Hannibal couldn't just send his troops up the hill to their positions, that would've left tracks all across the hillside.

 And with Flaminius hot on his heels he didn't have much time either.

 Yet Hannibal marched to the eastern end of the valley and somehow managed to coordinate tens of thousands of troops around the hills to the north into their correct positions, at night, all within a brief window of time and without arousing any suspicion.

 This is without doubt quite an astonishing military feat.

 Now, Hannibal signals his hidden forces to attack.

 It's unclear if trumpets signalled the start of the attack or if his captains were ordered to wait until the Romans are deep enough in the valley before sneaking up on them.

 Whatever the case, the ambush succeeds completely.

 The use of campfires in the distance tricked the Romans into moving deep into the valley, thinking that the Carthaginians are further ahead.

 And by masterfully hiding tens of thousands of his troops in the hills, Hannibal completely surrounded the enemy.

 Coming seemingly out of nowhere, Numidian cavalry and Gallic heavy infantry engage the Roman rear, closing off their line of retreat.

 Hannibal's light infantry, skirmishers and Gallic heavy infantry clash with the Roman centre.

 Having previously marched in a very loose formation, Flaminius' army is caught completely by surprise.

 They soon find themselves in a fight for their life.

 Their formations break up and many soldiers are left to fend for themselves.

 The fighting is so fierce that none of the combatants notice a strong nearby earthquake.

 After less than an hour of fighting, Hannibal's troops split apart the disorganised enemy column.

 From this point on the battle becomes a slaughter.

 Numidians and Gauls overwhelm the Roman rear, forcing them all the way to the lake shore.

 Many try to swim in their heavy armour, desperate to get away.

 According to Polybius, many Romans drown in the lake, while others who manage to stay afloat beg for mercy but are killed there and then.

 The Roman centre fights a brave last stand, but after another two hours of fighting, most of Flaminius' men are cut down, while others drown in the lake as they try to swim away.

 According to legend, the Roman consul is recognized amidst the fighting and the enraged Gauls fight to get to him.

 The consul's best troops rally to protect him.

 But one of the Gallic warriors fights his way through and thrusts his spear into the consul, killing him.

 Meanwhile, the Roman vanguard still stands firm.

 Once they realised that the battle is lost, they start fighting their way through Hannibal's heavy infantry, desperate to escape the field.

 But they too would be captured within a day or two after the battle.

 In less than three hours of fighting, a whole Roman army is virtually wiped out.

 It is said that Flaminius' body was torn to pieces by Gallic soldiers.

 so much so that Hannibal was not able to find any trace of the consul after the battle, to give him a proper burial.

 Carthaginian losses, meanwhile, are minor.

 Large plunder is taken, especially military equipment.

 Hannibal re-equips his infantry.

 Each man is given a Roman mail, bronze helmet and an oval scutum shield.

 Within a few days the Romans suffer another disastrous loss.

 As Servilius was on the move to join Flaminius he hurriedly sent all of his 4,000 cavalry ahead of the army to help his co-consul.

 Hannibal learned of their movement even before Servilius knew about Flaminius' defeat.

 Maharbal, Hannibal's second-in-command, rode out to meet them, launching a surprise attack.

 Those who survived were captured.

 By eliminating Servilius' cavalry, Hannibal effectively neutralised his entire consular army.

 Few, if any, commanders have been able to match Hannibal's ambush at Lake Trasimene, where one entire army ambushed and effectively destroyed another entire army.

 The population in Rome fell into utter despair, as Lake Trasimene is not far and it seems like there is nothing that can stop Hannibal from attacking the city, as Servilius has to withdraw back to Ariminium to counter the Gauls who, encouraged by Hannibal's presence, aggressively began raiding Roman territory.

 In this time of crisis the Senate appoints a dictator, a certain Fabius Maximus, to co-ordinate the defence against Hannibal.

 But more on that in the next episode...

 So far we have followed Hannibal on his war path from Iberia, through Gaul, across the Alps, and all the way into central Italy.

 He defeated the Roman legions time after time and after just 7 months of campaigning in Italy he stood only 130km from the capital.

 The road to Rome was open, less than ten days'

 march away.

 But Hannibal's next move is a subject of much debate, and in this article we want to discuss the decisions he made after his victory at Lake Trasimene...

 The first 7 months of Hannibal Barca's campaign in Italy were nothing short of spectacular.

 Despite nearly half of his army perishing in the Alps, he led his tired troops and defeated the Romans at Ticinus and Trebia.

 This won him the support of Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul, many of whom joined the Carthaginian general.

 The march continued south towards central Italy, through the Apennine mountains and the Arno river swampland.

 The four days it took to cross the swamps were particularly costly.

 Many of his men drowned while others died from exhaustion.

 Hannibal himself lost sight in one eye due to infection.

 A great number of pack animals and horses were also lost, which caused a severe problem for his campaign plans.

 While he managed to patch up his baggage train by confiscating pack animals from Etruscan farmers, horses were far less common and needed to be trained for war.

 This left Hannibal's cavalry contingent greatly weakened for the upcoming battle against Flaminius.

 Yet, despite this setback, the elusive Carthaginian general remained hidden from the Romans after emerging from the swamp.

 Flaminius missed the opportunity to attack Hannibal's weakened enemy.

 And just days later, the Roman Consul would perish in the defeat at Lake Trasimene.

 Hannibal re-equipped his light infantry with weapons and armor taken from fallen Roman soldiers, and vast quantities of supplies were captured, such as food, canteens, clothing, boots, blankets, tents, saddles, bridles and fodder.

 But most importantly 4,000 pack animals and 2,000 cavalry horses were captured from Flaminius'

 army at Trasimene, and another 4,000 horses in Maharbal's ambush of Servilius' cavalry contingent Hannibal was now able to replace the horses he lost in the swamps, bringing his own cavalry contingent back to full strength.

 After 7 months of campaigning in Italy, Hannibal dominated the Romans in the field.

 Between the battle of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene and the ambush of Servilius' cavalry, Hannibal eliminated over 50,000 Roman soldiers, a number equal to 10 legions.

 Now that Fabius Maximus was elected dictator, Hannibal was encamped just 130km from the city of Rome.

 No army stood in his way and he could've marched on the capital in less than 10 days.

 Yet, he decided not to.

 Let's try to examine why.

 In warfare, tactical objectives and strategic objectives need to be connected in some form.

 "Tactics" refers to methods that an army employs in order to win battles.

 "Strategy" deals with broad objectives that a warring country has, as well as the means necessary to achieve these objectives.

 Without strategy, battles are disconnected individual events.

 Without tactics, any strategy falls apart.

 In the 2nd Punic war, Rome's strategic objectives were to keep the territories it won in the 1st Punic war and perhaps seize parts of Iberia.

 Carthage, on the other hand, sought to retain dominance over Iberia and its' valuable silver mines, and win back Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, that were lost in the 1st war, along with other minor islands in the Mediterranean.

 This would enable Carthage to regain its'

 dominance on the sea.

 Rome correctly understood Carthage's objectives and moved to prevent them.

 Of the 11 legions that were in the field at the time of Hannibal's arrival in Italy, 2 were stationed in Sicily, 2 in Sardinia, and 2 were sent to Iberia, while 1 remained in Tarentum.

 4 legions were left in Italy to deal with Hannibal.

 At the time of the battle at Lake Trasimene two legions were commanded by Flaminius, which were destroyed.

 The other two were commanded by Servilius, which were rendered useless after the destruction of their cavalry, forcing Servilius to return north to fight an ongoing battle with the marauding Gauls.

 With the appointment of Fabius Maximus, Rome did authorise the formation of two new legions for the defense of the city, an annual practice that became regular as of 217 BC.

 But these legions likely were not fully trained, and perhaps weren't at full strength either.

 Hannibal, held a clear advantage in the field.

 Furthermore, he could rely on the 70 Carthaginian ships that roamed the waters off the Etruscan coast, only 120km from Hannibal's position.

 Why did Carthage send these ships so far into Roman waters?

 70 ships was over 60% of their entire fleet.

 Since they were not carrying reinforcements nor supplies for the army in Italy, their presence near Rome itself right at the same time when Hannibal was also so close to the capital suggests that a possible land-sea operation was planned to take the city.

 The 70 Carthaginian warships would prevent Roman transport ships from ferrying troops from Sardinia to the capital, while Hannibal attacks the city.

 The fact that supports this is the positioning of the Roman fleet.

 Of the 220 ships in the fleet, 10 were at Ariminium on the Adriatic coast, 150 were protecting the waters of Sicily, and another 30 were stationed in Iberia to support the Scipio brothers.

 Therefore, only around 30 warships were protecting the capital.

 With 70 ships Carthage had a clear naval advantage for any immediate operations against the city.

 And on land, Hannibal was virtually at the gates, unopposed.

 To move on the capital after Trasimene would've made tactical AND strategic sense.

 An attack, a siege, or even a feint, would've forced the Romans to withdraw troops from other theaters to protect the city.

 This would've exposed Sicily, Sardinia, or Iberia, to Carthaginian attacks.

 At the same time, Hannibal could lift the siege to deal with any approaching armies.

 This failure to create a link between the strategic and tactical objectives perhaps played a decisive role in the outcome of the war.

 Hannibal himself later acknowledged that this was a missed opportunity, but he never explained his decisions.

 Two main reasons for not attacking the Roman capital were suggested by historians: First, that Hannibal did not have enough troops to besiege the city, due to its' size and its' garrison.

 This first argument doesn't sufficiently explain why Hannibal decided not to attack.

 Namely, during the times of the Republic, the population of the city of Rome was between 450,000 and 500,000 people.

 The entire population lived in an area of just 13.5-square-km.

 The city was surrounded by the 11km-long Servian Wall, a stone barrier that's 10m high in some places.

 There were 5 main gates on major roads leading into the city.

 10-meter-deep defensive trenches were dug up in front of the walls where the city faced open fields.

 These defences should not have posed a formidable obstacle to Carthaginian engineering abilities.

 Nor was the city too big to be besieged by Hannibal's army of around 50,000 troops.

 In addition, even if the city's garrison of two legions were battle ready, 10,000 troops manning the walls and multiple gates would not have posed a strong enough threat to deter an attack.

 The second suggestion is that a naval blockade was not possible because the Roman fleet would keep the supply lines open along the river Tiber.

 This would've been true had Ostia been big enough to be Rome's main port at that time, but it didn't become a major port for another 250 years, until Emperor Claudius expanded it.

 At the time of the 2nd Punic war, the majority of seaborne supplies for the capital came through the port of Puteoli, over 190km down the coast, and were then transported to the city overland.

 Hannibal could've cut off these supplies by blocking the roads.

 At least for some time a naval blockade of Rome would not be needed, and the Carthaginian ships could focus on preventing transports from bringing in reinforcements from Sardinia.

 So why did Hannibal, one of history's greatest risk takers, choose not to attempt to take the city while he was arguably at his strongest and Rome was at its' weakest?

 One possibility that is often suggested by historians is that Hannibal's view of war was influenced by Hellenistic thinking.

 He was certainly an admirer of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

 Namely, Hannibal's view was maybe that the total destruction of the enemy was not needed to win the war.

 Instead, battles would be fought until the leadership of one side conceded defeat once they realized that they can no longer win on the field of battle and stood to lose more if they continued fighting.

 Therefore, he may have assumed that Rome would seek terms once the many contests of arms had been decided.

 If Hannibal did indeed hold this conventional Hellenistic viewpoint, he may have thought that an attack on Rome would've been more costly than fighting battles in the open.

 But the Roman view of war was straightforward: Destroy or be Destroyed.

 Rome would not accept any form of defeat, no matter the cost.

 They would rather fight to the last man than have an enemy assert their dominance by imposing conditions on its' citizens.

 Perhaps Hannibal still didn't fully understand this in 217BC.

 Whatever the case, Fabius began defensive preparations in Rome while, unbeknownst to him, Hannibal turned east towards the Adriatic coast.

 A game of cat and mouse between the two commanders is about to begin...

 It’s late in the year 217 BC.

 Destroyed towns and burned farmland stretch as far as the eye can see.

 Hannibal had plundered the Ager Falernus valley, perhaps the richest region in all of Rome.

 But he is now surrounded and trapped by a more numerous Roman army, led by a general who seems to know all about his old tricks.

 With cold weather approaching, the Carthaginian general is running out of time… It’s summer, 217 BC.

 Having decided not to march on Rome, Hannibal went back across the Apennine Mountains.

 He ordered that all military-aged Roman males that were encountered on the march, were to be killed.

 But the Carthaginian general had reasons to worry.

 His army fought in three battles without ever fully recovering from the crossing of the Alps.

 And by now, the men showed signs of scurvy and the horses of mange, both caused by vitamin deficiency.

 After ten days the Carthaginian army reached the Adriatic Sea.

 Hannibal allowed the men to recover through eating the plentiful produce gathered from this rich area.

 The horses were bathed in the sour wine, which had been captured in great quantities, to restore the condition of their coats.

 Meanwhile, Publius Cornelius Scipio was sent as pro-consul to Iberia with reinforcements of some 30 new ships, 8000 troops and fresh supplies.

 What persuaded the senate to divert such valuable resources to Iberia at a time when Hannibal was on a path of destruction in Italy, was their desire to prevent reinforcements from reaching Hannibal by land, but more importantly it was the senate’s determination upon a long-term Roman involvement in Iberia, made possible by Gnaeus' success on the battlefield at Tarraco and Ebro, as well as his flexible diplomatic methods through which he forged treaties of neutrality and alliances that brought many Iberian tribes to the Roman side.

 It is Gnaeus’ ability to act autonomously without waiting for directives from Rome that gave the senate a strategic advantage half-way across the Mediterranean, where they could otherwise exert no direct control.

 The senate felt assured that by supporting the Scipio brothers in Iberia, Rome would have good prospects for fighting the Carthaginians in their own back yard.

 Back in Italy, with the army restored to health, Hannibal continued advancing down the coast.

 He sent a message by sea to Carthage, reporting on the situation in Italy.

 Carthaginian Senate expressed delight with his progress and promised aid to support his campaign.

 Meanwhile, the appointed dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus took command of Geminus’ remaining four legions and went after Hannibal.

 Replacement of the terrible losses at Lake Trasimene required an emergency levy of two additional legions, which brought the dictator’s army to around 40,000 including allies.

 It is possible that some of the new recruits were very young and older men, originally intended for Rome’s city garrison, with some in the process of being trained while on the march.

 Fabius was a man in his late 50’s, rather old by the standards of Roman generals, but he was a proven commander.

 Having been awarded a triumph for his victory over the Ligurians during his consulship in 233 BC, he also held the position of censor in 230, and was elected consul again in 228.

 Now as dictator he was yet to reveal his plan on how he will deal with Hannibal.

 So far he had been advancing cautiously, carefully scouting ahead to give himself plenty of warning of the enemy’s presence.

 Meanwhile, Hannibal pillaged and burned his way down the coast, accumulating vast quantities of grain, cattle and other produce.