Hannibal (PARTS 14 - 17) - Rome's Greatest Enemy - Second Punic War

 By day’s end, his outnumbered mercenaries had destroyed the majority of the largest army Rome had ever put to field, marking this as one of the bloodiest military encounters ever fought.

 For the Romans, Cannae became the benchmark by which subsequent defeats were measured.

 It would not be surpassed for another 600 years.

 The dazed survivors of the Roman army dispersed.

 Varro resurfaced in Venusia, in charge of as little as 70 horsemen who escaped the pursuing Numidians In Canusium, a certain 19-year old tribune by the name of Publius Scipio, together with three other tribunes, gathered a larger group of some three thousand men.

 Despite barely escaping the carnage, the young tribune was notable for inspiring the troops, going as far as threatening to kill those who spoke about fleeing, and forcing the men to take an oath never to betray Rome.

 In the days that followed, up to 10,000 survivors would converge on Canusium and Varro would resume command.

 The question was, what would Hannibal do now?

 A day after the battle, the Carthaginians were still plundering the two enemy camps, taking 19,300 prisoners.

 Hannibal saw to the burial of his fallen troops and gave Paullus a proper burial.

 But the dead Roman soldiers, were left to rot in the sun.

 While more than 50,000 men lay dead or dying in the plain below, the Carthaginian leadership met at a villa in Cannae.

 Visibly exhausted, they were in disagreement.

 Hannibal and some of his officers, wanted to rest the army and prepare for the campaign in southern Italy.

 Maharbal, a prominent cavalry commander, was among those who wanted to march on Rome without delay.

 Proclaiming, perhaps enthusiastically, that he would lead the Numidians to the capital in 5 days, he protested to Hannibal: “Truly the Gods do not give everything to the same man!

 You know how to win a victory Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one”.

 Whether or not these words were truly spoken, the reality was that Rome was 400km away.

 Another long march, after a grueling campaign had just ended, would be disastrous.

 Furthermore, the Senate adopted emergency measures to raise 4 legions in the coming weeks.

 Criminals, slaves, and boys as young as 16 or 17 were conscripted.

 While insufficient for a pitched battle, these troops would be enough to man the walls of Rome.

 Praetor Marcus Caludius Marcellus, previously tasked with reinforcing Sicily, was now sent to bolster the confidence of allies in Campania and wait for the wreck of the army of Cannae to join him.

 If he were to march on Rome, Hannibal would be placing himself between two Roman armies and would need to fend off relief forces that the Senate would muster over the coming months.

 To overcome the enemy’s vast manpower, Hannibal had hoped for reinforcements from Iberia, but thus far the Scipio brothers had kept Hasdrubal at bay.

 Worse, Carthaginian Senate’s planning and logistics left much to be desired.

 Troops in Spain and Italy were mostly paid by the Barcid family silver.

 Very little financial support came from Carthage itself thus far.

 This disjointed system was detrimental to the war effort and in stark contrast to the better organized Roman Senate, that strived to secure funding and logistical support for its army and navy in all theaters.

 So far the only attempt to supply Hannibal was a fleet of 70 ships, that roamed the waters of northern Italy in the aftermath of the battle of Trasimene, in 217.

 But, lack of coordination prevented them from making contact and many of these ships had since been captured near the port of Cosa.

 Confronted by these problems, Hannibal knew that despite his ability to outwit and surprise his opponents, his army would not endure the many corrosive years in the field without reinforcements and logistical support.

 The decision not to march on Rome, was sound.

 While the situation in southern Italy remained uncertain, another Roman army advanced north to punish the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul for siding with Hannibal.

 The expedition was launched just days after the main army went on its way to Cannae, as part of the Senate’s plan to destroy all enemies in the Italian peninsula, in one massive counterattack.

 Commanded by Lucius Postumius Albinus, the Romans marched through the Silva Litana forest, some 120km north-west of Ariminum.

 Albinus was a Roman politician and a veteran general.

 By now a man in his late 50s, he spent the last 10 years in retirement, but was recalled into service during this time of crisis.

 He was given two legions and had recruited allied troops, mustering a 25,000-strong army.

 With reports of enemy presence further north, Albinus expected to confront the tribesmen in the Po Valley.

 But the main Boii force was much closer.

 They secured the perimeter along the enemy’s line of march.

 The Gauls had cut into the trees in such a way that they would remain standing without assistance, but would topple over if given a slight shove.

 As the column advanced further along the woodland road, the tribesmen pushed the trees onto the enemy.

 The trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing Roman soldiers and horses and destroying equipment.

 Most of Albinus’ men died under the weight of the tree trunks and thick branches.

 The Boii waiting in the forest, moved in on the panicked survivors.

 Roman resistance was fiercest in the vanguard, but elsewhere the encounter became a one-sided slaughter.

 Albinus fought to avoid capture but was killed and decapitated.

 According to legend, his head was later taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull was covered with gold.

 It was used as a cup for drinking by the tribe’s high priest.

 A contingent of Roman veterans at the head of the column tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it.

 Very few Roman prisoners were taken.

 The Boii also took a vast amount of loot, with the Roman goods handily concentrated along the forest road.

 Of the 25,000 Romans; only 10 men survived the battle.

 Reports of the annihilation in Silva Litana came mere days after the catastrophe at Cannae.

 A panic hit the city of Rome.

 The Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.

 However, all offensive operations against the Gauls were suspended indefinitely.

 Varro; was now sent to levy new troops for the defense of Picenum and Etruria, where he would remain in command of up to two legions and an equal number of allied troops, for several years.

 Across the Mediterranean, in Iberia, the Romans fared better.

 Hasdrubal Barca managed to reorganize his forces after the defeat at the Ebro in 217.

 And, after receiving a contingent of 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry from Africa, he decided to close the distance against the Scipio brothers.

 But, some of the officers that he punished and imprisoned for cowardice after the Ebro debacle, had escaped back to their homes, among the Tartessian people.

 They instigated a revolt and captured the city of Ascua, which held a large Carthaginian depot for grain and other supplies.

 Reluctantly, Hasdrubal had to move south and abandon plans to advance across the Ebro in 216.

 All reports suggested that the uprising had the potential for spreading beyond the Tartessi territory.

 This would destabilize Carthaginian rule in Iberia, damage Hasdrubal’s supply lines, and endanger the safety of the rich copper and silver mines that were vital for the war effort.

 Hasdrubal met Calbo in battle and made short work of the rebel army, despite their large numbers.

 Around this time, he received news of the victory at Cannae and was ordered by the Carthaginian Senate to march his army to Italy as soon as he could.

 But he was now too far south and his army needed rest.

 Most he could do is reach the Ebro river before the onset of winter, but it was too late to campaign against the Romans.

 For the older Scipios this was a window of opportunity they would not miss.

 Previously, except for a brief expedition south of the Ebro, they largely stayed north of the river, weary of Hasdrubal’s generalship and the vast resources he had at his disposal.

 But, taking advantage of the Carthaginian general’s absence, the Scipios negotiated an alliance with some of the Celtiberan tribes.

 In addition, they enlisted many mercenaries from their ranks, and began preparations to push south across the Ebro next spring.

 Back in southern Italy, a Macedonian delegation was heading towards the Italian coast.

 Upon hearing of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, Philip V of Macedon wanted to propose an alliance with the Carthaginian general.

 His ambassadors joined Hannibal at his camp.

 The negotiations would drag on until next summer.

 And the situation in Italy would change dramatically over the coming months…

 Cut off in Italy, Hannibal would yet again show his uncanny ability to adapt to an unfavorable situation.

 During his year-long trek across the Apennines and back, he dispersed a vast number of scouts.

 Gradually, this network of spies uncovered how Rome interacted with the region.

 Hannibal learned that a variety of treaties tied the communities of southern Italy to Rome, which acted as hegemon of this alliance, rather than a ruler.

 Rome counted on its allies to supply half of the manpower and material that were vital for the war effort.

 But, most of these communities were non-Roman and didn’t speak Latin, and some were becoming disaffected by the highhanded Romans.

 This was the weak link, that Hannibal needed.

 Continuing his policy of clemency towards non-Romans, he released up to 11,000 Italian captives back to their homes.

 This calculated move prompted a surge of defections.

 He would now have access to resources needed to create his own base of operations in southern Italy.

 Next, he dispatched his brother Mago to Bruttium, where he was to consolidate Carthaginian control, recruit new troops, gather war supplies, and subdue cities still loyal to Rome.

 Lastly, he released 10 Roman prisoners, so they could arrange for the ransom for their 8,000 compatriots captured after the battle of Cannae.

 They were escorted by Carthalo, another prominent cavalry commander.

 By including one of his own officers in the delegation, Hannibal intended to seek terms, declaring that his objective was not to destroy Rome, but to restore Carthaginian dominance over the Western Mediterranean.

 After all, by contemporary standards, he was the victor.

 With Rome’s hegemony over Italy and its very future in doubt: “Surely”, he thought: “They would see sense.”

 He was wrong.

 The Roman Senate refused Carthalo entry into the city.

 What is more, they even refused to speak to the delegation of Roman soldiers.

 There would be no ransom.

 To so publicly doom the lives of 8,000 of your own troops in captivity, was a show of determination that defied convention.

 Even the clever Hannibal must’ve been surprised by Rome’s refusal to negotiate.

 Still, the Carthaginian general was in a position of strength and his army remained unchallenged in Italy.

 It was reasonable to think that sustained pressure would eventually force the Romans to concede defeat.

 And now he was marching towards Campania to accept the defection of Capua, a city second only to Rome in size and importance on the Italian peninsula.

 The powerful city wanted to secure its own regional supremacy for some time.

 Now they used Hannibal’s growing presence in Italy as leverage to demand from Rome that one of the two consuls should always be selected from Capua.

 When their Roman allies refused, the Capuans had the pretext they needed to open the gates.

 Hannibal left a garrison to setup winter quarters in the city and resumed operations in Campania.

 Observing from Casilinum, Marcellus did not seek battle in the open, and instead chose to shadow the Carthaginians.

 Although the Roman general did not realize it yet, Hannibal wanted to draw him and his army away from Casilinum, which controlled Capua’s norther flank.

 The Carthaginian general stopped at Neapolis, recognizing the importance of its port, which could offer a safe haven for ships carrying reinforcements and supplies from Africa.

 However, the city’s garrison was commanded by a Roman mayor, and unlikely to defect.

 Since besieging a fortified coastal city without naval support was futile, the Carthaginian general did not waste any time.

 He turned his attention to Nuceria Alfaterna, one of the largest and oldest cities in ancient Campania, built in the 6th century BC, with Oscan, Etruscan, Samnite, and Roman heritage.

 The city was a hegemon of the Nucerian League, a Samnite alliance that included the cities of Pompeii, Stabia, and Herculaneum.

 Persuading the League to defect would further strengthen Hannibal’s position in Italy.

 Once in front of the city, the gates remained closed.

 Met with impregnable double-curtain walls, Hannibal’s only option was to surround the city.

 He threatened to subdue Nuceria by starvation.

 But, in light of his success at Capua he had hoped that his propaganda image of wanting to liberate and respect the independence of the Italian peoples would convince Nuceria's Senate to switch sides.

 But Nuceria remained a loyal ally of Rome.

 To combat the food shortage, the city officials expelled those who were unable to carry a weapon and fight.

 Nucerians gambled that Hannibal would not risk tarnishing his image by refusing to shelter the refugees.

 The Carthaginian general understood their plan.

 Not for the first time, he would demonstrate his ruthlessness and cunning.

 Instead of accepting those expelled from the city, he mixed them with refugees from several surrounding settlements and forced them back inside the walls.

 In an instant, Nuceria’s population doubled, the food stock quickly ran out, and the suffering began.

 Without hope of any help from the Romans, the Nucerian Senate opened negotiations.

 Hannibal gave safe passage to all inhabitants, who took shelter in nearby towns, then allowed his troops to plunder.

 Before leaving, the Carthaginians methodically levelled the city to the ground.

 After the destruction of Nuceria, Hannibal turned his army towards Nola, a key Campanian city, due to rumors that the inhabitants were on the verge of revolting against Rome.

 Marcellus reached the city just in time, and braced for the arrival of the Carthaginian general.

 Both commanders deployed in battle formation.

 Marcellus arrayed his men with the walls and gates behind them.

 Hannibal launched a probing attack, hoping that the inhabitants will rise once their heard that battle has commenced.

 Indeed, during the skirmish a few panicked senators came outside to warn that the situation in the city was unstable.

 Marcellus was careful not to commit his men, and as soon as the skirmish ended, he withdrew behind the walls.

 Senators of Nola, firmly in favor of keeping the alliance with Rome, now explained that the people were in favor of Hannibal, in part out of fear that he would devastate their fields around the city, and cause a famine.

 Furthermore, it was uncovered that there had been nocturnal talks between the inhabitants and the Carthaginians.

 It was agreed that once the Romans again deployed outside the walls, Hannibal would launch an attack, while the people inside would seize Marcellus’ supplies and weapons, close the gates, and take up position on the walls, thereby trapping the Romans.

 Marcellus thanked the senators for informing him…

 Before the city could revolt, the Roman general divided his army into three.

 Each contingent was ordered to deploy in complete silence behind the three gates facing the enemy.

 The baggage train was told to stay close to the army.

 His best infantry and the Roman cavalry were to deploy behind the central gate.

 To guard the side and rear doors, he re-deployed the recruits and velites from the walls and towers, and added the allied cavalry.

 In addition, Marcellus forbade the inhabitants from approaching the walls and gates, and the Roman headquarters in the center of the city was strengthened.

 After a long wait, it seemed strange to Hannibal that the Romans did not deploy in front of the central gate and that there were no troops manning the walls.

 Suspecting that his secret talks with the people of Nola were uncovered, he advanced forward.

 The plan was to attack the central gate, as Hannibal was convinced that the Nolans would rise once battle commenced.

 As the Carthaginians moved in a loose formation, the Roman trumpets sounded off.

 A loud clamor arose as Marcellus’ men came rushing out of the three gates.

 The Romans forewent forming in battle formation and instead pressed forward.

 What the maneuver lacked in sophistication, it made up for with surprise.

 At first, the Carthaginian center was in trouble, unable to react to the rapid attack.

 But Hannibal was soon able to stabilize the line.

 Meanwhile, the advance of the Roman wings fell upon the Carthaginian left and right.

 Then came a large cloud of dust, raised by Marcellus’ advancing baggage train, leading the Carthaginians to believe that the Roman army was much larger than it actually was.

 Recognizing that Marcellus had the initiative, Hannibal ordered the men to disengage.

 He knew that the ruse with the baggage train could cause panic among his ranks and did not want to let his opponent capitalize on it.

 The Romans dared not pursue, and the Carthaginians withdrew in good order.

 Hannibal was most certainly surprised by Marcellus’ capabilities as a general.

 He didn’t just shadow the Carthaginian army, but could judge when was the perfect moment to challenge them in battle.

 In a sense, Marcellus employed an aggressive version of the Fabian strategy.

 Although the attack on Nola was repulsed, Hannibal successfully drew Marcellus away from the Volturnus river.

 He now double-backed, taking Acerra after a short siege and proceeded to Casilinum, where Marcellus left a garrison.

 The town controlled a triple-archway bridge across the river Volturnus, on the main road that connected Capua to Rome.

 As one of the very few crossings across the formidable river, it was of crucial strategic value.

 After about a month, the Roman garrison was starved into submission.

 They paid an enormous sum for safe passage.

 By capturing Casilinum, Hannibal secured Capua’s northern flank and now held a vital point from where he could launch attacks towards Rome.

 A garrison was left to guard the town, while the rest of the army returned to winter quarters in Capua.

 Hannibal formally handed control over Casilinum to the Capuans and began making plans for the coming months.

 Back at Nola, Marcellus closed the gates and posted sentries to prevent anyone from leaving the city.

 Those that conspired with Hannibal were put on trial and beheaded.

 The Roman general then marched out and encamped on the heights overlooking Suessula, keeping a close eye on the Carthaginians.

 While the stalemate at Nola was unimportant in the strategic sense, Marcellus’ encounter with Hannibal was the first time the Romans avoided defeat in a battle against the Carthaginian.

 And the two generals would meet again… By the Autumn period of 216 BC, Hannibal was consolidating his power base in southern Italy.

 His main army at Capua stood at around 40,000 men, including additions from his Samnite allies.

 His brother Mago, now on his way south with 1200 Numidians, would recruit an additional 17,000 Lucanians and Bruttians, and bring his own force up to over 18,000 troops.

 Opposing them, Rome scrambled to raise new legions over the coming months. An impressive 80,000 troops would be put to field in Italy, with the majority concentrated in the south. But despite the Roman numerical strength exceeding that of their enemy, many of these were inexperienced recruits who felt abject terror at the thought of meeting Hannibal in battle.

 Worse, in some of the settlements of central Italy the number of Roman and Allied fighting men began to dwindle; which was a testament to the blood toll exacted on them by Hannibal’s tactical superiority and his wealth of ideas on the battlefield.

 Fabius Maximus, the father of the Fabian strategy, would again be elected consul for the next two years. He would revert to avoiding conflict with the Carthaginian general to preserve the troops and give Rome’s manpower time to recover.

 But while the war was thus far mostly dominated by the campaign of Hannibal in Italy, as the year 215 rolled around… the Second Punic War would spread across the Mediterranean… While Hannibal worked to add to his list of allies, his other objective was reinforcements. His brother Mago advanced south and besieged Petelia. Together with Consentia, these two cities were the among the most prominent in Bruttium, boasting a developed infrastructure, imposing walls, and a bustling city culture.

 In its quest to establish dominion over Italy, Rome favored the urban centers of Bruttium and had long been replacing their local ruling elite with the pro-Roman aristocracy. In turn, the pro-Roman factions of Petelia and Consentia treated the less urbanized communities in the region with disdain, which created a rift among Bruttians. Needless to say, these internal divisions suited Rome, as they made the region easier to control.

 But Mago now used this hostile factionalism to his advantage. He circulated news that Petelia was besieged, prompting thousands of Bruttians, who were angry at the city for siding with Rome, to join Hannibal.

 With his work in Bruttium complete, Mago left Hanno the Elder in charge of the army and embarked for Carthage to seek support for the campaign in Italy.

 By this stage neither side was the undisputed master of the sea.

 While Rome had overall superiority, the Carthaginian navy had significantly recovered from the setbacks earlier in the war. Both could patrol far into enemy waters and raid coastal towns, but lacked the strength to rule the waves of the Western Mediterranean.

 But with most of Bruttium now under Hannibal’s control, there was less risk for transporting troops from Africa to Italy. And with this Mago disembarked in Carthage.

 Murmurs reverberated in the packed Senate Hall.

 In attendance, all of Carthage’s notables anxiously waited.

 Then, Mago rose to speak, presenting before the Senate the progress of the campaign in Italy: “Colleagues… Countrymen… Since crossing the Alps, Hannibal had won several victories, including three great pitched battles against Rome’s main armies, two of which were completely destroyed, and their camps looted. And now the Romans avoid fighting us altogether, out of fear. 200,000 Roman fighting men are slain and 50,000 prisoners are taken.

 Italy is in a state of revolt and the South had gone over to Hannibal.

 With a single army Hannibal had achieved all of this, against several Roman armies.” Mago then turned away from the map, to present to the Senate a bag filled with hundreds of golden rings, belonging to the Roman aristocracy that fell at Cannae.

 He asked for funds and additional armies to be sent to Italy.

 With another 20 to 30 thousand troops at his disposal, Hannibal would BREAK Rome.

 Mago’s presentation suggested that, with the 18,000 strong army that he himself had recruited, consistent pressure could be applied in Bruttium until the last of the cities loyal to Rome either came to Hannibal’s side or were taken by force.

 Another army of 20,000 from Carthage could take and hold Apulia and its vital ports, thereby cutting Rome’s ability to contest the waters of the Ionian Sea. This would open lines of communication between Hannibal and a likely ally, Philip V of Macedon, enabling uninterrupted transport of ships, provisions, and troops.

 Finally, stationed in Campania with his main host, Hannibal would have complete control over Southern Italy. With three armies in close proximity, capable of quickly combining their forces, as well as controlling their respective areas individually, Carthaginian authority over local communities and cities would be absolute. As such, Hannibal could fully exploit Southern Italy’s manpower and resources to beat the Romans at their own game – the war of attrition – and could use his tactical brilliance to dominate the Romans on the battlefield.

 Hearing Mago’s report, most of the Senate rejoiced.

 But… as fortunes of war would have it, Hannibal’s worst enemies were not in Rome… but in Carthage.

 When Hanno II stood up to speak, a heavy silence fell upon the room. He was an immensely powerful aristocrat and a veteran commander, albeit not a very competent one. Most of his wealth and political power was derived from his stake in the silver mines of Iberia and the heavy taxation he imposed on African tribes that lived on the vast expanses of land which he owned. As such, in the Senate he represented the interests of the wealthy, for whom it was profitable to sue for peace with Rome, even with unfavorable terms for Carthage, because a peace agreement would enable Hanno and his supporters to resume their maritime commercial operations. In addition, their interests in rare metals is the reason why Hanno favored redirecting reinforcements to protect Iberia and why he preferred territorial expansion not into Italy, but into Africa, where he and his powerful friends stood to profit from expanding their already endless tracts of taxable land.

 These discrepancies between the interests of the super wealthy and the war effort of Carthage was what made Hanno the leading opponent of the Barca family and their war of conquest in Italy.

 He addressed Mago:

 “You say the armies of the enemy are slain. Yet you ask for more soldiers.