Battle of Silva Litana 216 BC - Hannibal (Part 14) - Second Punic War
On August 2nd 216 BC, Hannibal won his greatest victory near the town of Cannae, in southern Italy.
By day’s end, his outnumbered mercenaries had destroyed the majority of the largest army Rome had ever put to field, marking this as one of the bloodiest military encounters ever fought.
For the Romans, Cannae became the benchmark by which subsequent defeats were measured.
It would not be surpassed for another 600 years.
The dazed survivors of the Roman army dispersed.
Varro resurfaced in Venusia, in charge of as little as 70 horsemen who escaped the pursuing Numidians.
In Canusium, a certain 19-year old tribune by the name of Publius Scipio, together with three other tribunes, gathered a larger group of some three thousand men.
Despite barely escaping the carnage, the young tribune was notable for inspiring the troops, going as far as threatening to kill those who spoke about fleeing, and forcing the men to take an oath never to betray Rome.
In the days that followed, up to 10,000 survivors would converge on Canusium and Varro would resume command.
The question was, what would Hannibal do now?
A
day after the battle, the Carthaginians were still plundering the two enemy camps, taking 19,300 prisoners.
Hannibal saw to the burial of his fallen troops and gave Paullus a proper burial.
But the dead Roman soldiers, were left to rot in the sun.
While more than 50,000 men lay dead or dying in the plain below, the Carthaginian leadership met at a villa in Cannae.
Visibly exhausted, they were in disagreement.
Hannibal and some of his officers, wanted to rest the army and prepare for the campaign in southern Italy.
Maharbal, a prominent cavalry commander, was among those who wanted to march on Rome without delay.
Proclaiming, perhaps enthusiastically, that he would lead the Numidians to the capital in 5 days, he protested to Hannibal: “Truly the Gods do not give everything to the same man!
You know how to win a victory Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one”.
Whether or not these words were truly spoken, the reality was that Rome was 400km away.
Another long march, after a grueling campaign had just ended, would be disastrous.
Furthermore, the Senate adopted emergency measures to raise 4 legions in the coming weeks.
Criminals, slaves, and boys as young as 16 or 17 were conscripted.
While insufficient for a pitched battle, these troops would be enough to man the walls of Rome.
Praetor Marcus Caludius Marcellus, previously tasked with reinforcing Sicily, was now sent to bolster the confidence of allies in Campania and wait for the wreck of the army of Cannae to join him.
If he were to march on Rome, Hannibal would be placing himself between two Roman armies and would need to fend off relief forces that the Senate would muster over the coming months.
To overcome the enemy’s vast manpower, Hannibal had hoped for reinforcements from Iberia, but thus far the Scipio brothers had kept Hasdrubal at bay.
Worse, Carthaginian Senate’s planning and logistics left much to be desired.
Troops in Spain and Italy were mostly paid by the Barcid family silver.
Very little financial support came from Carthage itself thus far.
This disjointed system was detrimental to the war effort and in stark contrast to the better organized Roman Senate, that strived to secure funding and logistical support for its army and navy in all theaters.
So far the only attempt to supply Hannibal was a fleet of 70 ships, that roamed the waters of northern Italy in the aftermath of the battle of Trasimene, in 217.
But, lack of coordination prevented them from making contact and many of these ships had since been captured near the port of Cosa.
Confronted by these problems, Hannibal knew that despite his ability to outwit and surprise his opponents, his army would not endure the many corrosive years in the field without reinforcements and logistical support.
The decision not to march on Rome, was sound.
While the situation in southern Italy remained uncertain, another Roman army advanced north to punish the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul for siding with Hannibal.
The expedition was launched just days after the main army went on its way to Cannae, as part of the Senate’s plan to destroy all enemies in the Italian peninsula, in one massive counterattack.
Commanded by Lucius Postumius Albinus, the Romans marched through the Silva Litana forest, some 120km north-west of Ariminum.
Albinus was a Roman politician and a veteran general.
By now a man in his late 50s, he spent the last 10 years in retirement, but was recalled into service during this time of crisis.
He was given two legions and had recruited allied troops, mustering a 25,000-strong army.
With reports of enemy presence further north, Albinus expected to confront the tribesmen in the Po Valley.
But the main Boii force was much closer.
They secured the perimeter along the enemy’s line of march.
The Gauls had cut into the trees in such a way that they would remain standing without assistance, but would topple over if given a slight shove.
As the column advanced further along the woodland road, the tribesmen pushed the trees onto the enemy.
The trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing Roman soldiers and horses and destroying equipment.
Most of Albinus’ men died under the weight of the tree trunks and thick branches.
The Boii waiting in the forest, moved in on the panicked survivors.
Roman resistance was fiercest in the vanguard, but elsewhere the encounter became a one-sided slaughter.
Albinus fought to avoid capture but was killed and decapitated.
According to legend, his head was later taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull was covered with gold.
It was used as a cup for drinking by the tribe’s high priest.
A contingent of Roman veterans at the head of the column tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it.
Very few Roman prisoners were taken.
The Boii also took a vast amount of loot, with the Roman goods handily concentrated along the forest road.
Of the 25,000 Romans; only 10 men survived the battle.
Reports of the annihilation in Silva Litana came mere days after the catastrophe at Cannae.
A panic hit the city of Rome.
The Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.
However, all offensive operations against the Gauls were suspended indefinitely.
Varro; was now sent to levy new troops for the defense of Picenum and Etruria, where he would remain in command of up to two legions and an equal number of allied troops, for several years.
Across the Mediterranean, in Iberia, the Romans fared better.
Hasdrubal Barca managed to reorganize his forces after the defeat at the Ebro in 217.
And, after receiving a contingent of 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry from Africa, he decided to close the distance against the Scipio brothers.
But, some of the officers that he punished and imprisoned for cowardice after the Ebro debacle, had escaped back to their homes, among the Tartessian people.
They instigated a revolt and captured the city of Ascua, which held a large Carthaginian depot for grain and other supplies.
Reluctantly, Hasdrubal had to move south and abandon plans to advance across the Ebro in 216.
All reports suggested that the uprising had the potential for spreading beyond the Tartessi territory.
This would destabilize Carthaginian rule in Iberia, damage Hasdrubal’s supply lines, and endanger the safety of the rich copper and silver mines that were vital for the war effort.
Hasdrubal met Calbo in battle and made short work of the rebel army, despite their large numbers.
Around this time, he received news of the victory at Cannae and was ordered by the Carthaginian Senate to march his army to Italy as soon as he could.
But he was now too far south and his army needed rest.
Most he could do is reach the Ebro river before the onset of winter, but it was too late to campaign against the Romans.
For the older Scipios this was a window of opportunity they would not miss.
Previously, except for a brief expedition south of the Ebro, they largely stayed north of the river, weary of Hasdrubal’s generalship and the vast resources he had at his disposal.
But, taking advantage of the Carthaginian general’s absence, the Scipios negotiated an alliance with some of the Celtiberan tribes.
In addition, they enlisted many mercenaries from their ranks, and began preparations to push south across the Ebro next spring.
Back in southern Italy, a Macedonian delegation was heading towards the Italian coast.
Upon hearing of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, Philip V of Macedon wanted to propose an alliance with the Carthaginian general.
His ambassadors joined Hannibal at his camp.
The negotiations would drag on until next summer.
And the situation in Italy would change dramatically over the coming months…
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