Battle of Delium 424 BC - Athens takes on Sparta - Peloponnesian War

 

In the aftermath of the Persian invasion, the formation of the Delian League brought together numerous Greek states, presumably to guard against retaliatory attacks by the Persians.

 In reality, the league was a

 de-facto Athenian Empire.

 Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, sought to check the growing power and ambition of Athens.

 Endemic warfare engulfed the Greek world as the two warring factions gradually dragged nearly every Aegean city state into the conflict.

 Sparta and her allies were able to raise formidable armies, and by 425 BC they enjoyed overall field superiority. The Athenians could not fend off forays into Attica and were forced to pursue a policy of retreating behind their city walls. But, they used their maritime supremacy to great effect, and just in the last two years they decisively defeated the Spartan fleet at Pylos, capturing most of their ships and a 420-strong garrison on the island of Sphacteria, including 120 Spartiates – the elite full citizens of Sparta.

 Equally important, the Athenians captured the island of Cythera, which served Sparta as a trading post to Egypt. Not only did this cut off a key trading route, but the Athenians could now use the captured ports of Pylos and Cythera to repair their ships and launch raids along the coast.

 Trying to press the advantage

 after their victories at Pylos, Sphacteria, and Cythera, two Athenian commanders, Hippocrates and Demosthenes targeted the Isthmus of Corinth, aiming to sever the Peloponnesian communications in half.

 However, under the leadership of Brasidas of Sparta, the attack on the strategically important city of Megara was repulsed, but the trading port of Nisaea fell to the Athenians.

 With these setbacks, the situation looked bleak for Sparta, forcing them to sue for peace.

 But Brasidas proved to be a thorn in the side of the Athenians. He secretly moved his forces through Thessaly and, with the help of the Macedonians, he opened a second front, inciting rebellions and defections among Athenian allies in the northern Aegean, most notably the colony of Amphipolis – the center of Athenian power in Thrace, where most of the timber for their ships came from.

 In the south, Sparta’s ally, the Boeotian League, rallied under Theban leadership. Pagondas of Thebes, a fiery and persuasive nobleman, used his rhetoric to reorganize the Boeotian forces, and launch an attack on Platea.

 Losing Amphipolis was a serious blow for the Athenians, who now found themselves fighting a two-front war of attrition that they could not win.

 Making matters worse, their manpower was impacted by the plague that struck Athens repeatedly between 430 and 426, killing up to a quarter of the population, including Pericles himself.

 To have any chance against the Peloponnesian armies, Hippocrates and Demosthenes realized they needed to deal a quick knockout blow to Sparta’s Peloponnesian alliance.

 They considered striking at the heart of the enemy by invading the Peloponnese directly, but this meant fighting the vaunted Spartan army in their own homeland.

 Instead, Hippocrates suggested

 they attack the Boeotian League.

 Knocking them out of the war

 would secure the northern flank and any future Spartan operations into Attica could not rely on the vital logistical support that Boeotia provided. Furthermore, Spartan forces commanded by Brasidas in Thrace would be cut off, and to return home they would have to march through hostile territory.

 The two commanders devised a

 plan for a three-pronged attack.

 Demosthenes was to lead a naval expedition, first to Naupactus, where he would gather troops and then launch an attack on Siphae, on the western Boeotian coast.

 Meanwhile in the east, Hippocrates was to command an attack on Delium, a strategically important border city that could serve as a base of operations into Boeotia and its access to the sea could be used by the Athenian navy to attack along the Boeotian coast.

 The third component of their plan was their contact with a network of Boeotian dissidents. Numerous pro-Athenian groups in the villages and cities, most notably Chaeronea, pledged to incite unrest in their home towns and spread the rebellion across Boeotia.

 The plan was bold.

 But, if successful, the Athenian attack on the two coastal centers would split the Boeotian response and the rebels would cause disruption from within.

 They would overwhelm and

 topple the oligarchic regime

 and install the pro Athenian leadership that would join the Delian League against Sparta, thereby tipping the balance of

 the war in favor of Athens.

 Then, on the agreed date in late autumn, Hippocrates marched on Delium, synchronizing his attack over land in the east, with Demosthenes’ amphibious assault in the west.

 Three days into the march, Delium and its prestigious temple of Apollo came into view. The city got its name after the sacred island of Delos, believed to be the birthplace of the god Apollo. It was thought that the nearby temple, a sanctuary of Apollo, granted divine advantages to those who controlled it.

 Hippocrates ordered the temple grounds seized and began setting up defenses. His soldiers dug trenches and used stones, brick, lumber, and wooden stakes to fortify the perimeter and build wooden towers along the ramparts.

 But… he had no way of knowing, that the carefully planned plot with the Boeotian conspirators had been compromised.

 Without arousing any suspicion, the Boeotian league discretely cracked down on the traitors, regained control of Chaeronea and reinforced Siphae, and the Athenians were none the wiser.

 When Demosthenes’ fleet approached, the city was well defended

 and he had no choice but to turn back.

 With the conspiracy to topple the regime thwarted and the western Athenian attack repulsed, Pagondas could now advance on Delium… Back at Delium, the ramparts were completed after five days of construction and Hippocrates allowed nearly all of the levied and allied light infantry to return to Attica. Having not seen any sign of the Boeotians, the Athenian commander was convinced that they were busy fighting the rebels and Demosthenes, and felt that no enemy relief force would come to aid the city any time soon. In his mind, garrisoning the fortification with his hoplite infantry and a contingent of cavalry was sufficient and it made no sense to keep the levied troops in the field.

 But as his troops marched out, the approaching Boeotian army was spotted.

 Hippocrates rushed out of the makeshift fortifications to re-join his troops, realizing that they were

 outnumbered, and caught in the open.

 Pagondas wanted to seize the moment to launch an attack before the Athenians could combine their forces, but he faced opposition from his generals.

 Knowing that the rebellion to the west was crushed and that Demosthenes was repulsed, some in the Boeotian leadership thought it pointless to fight the Athenians and preferred to let them leave.

 Frustrated, Pagondas insisted the column must keep moving, arguing that letting the Athenians go would be a mistake, for they would come back.

 Despite tensions running high in the Boeotian camp, the Theban commander personally ordered the men to advance.

 However, the opportunity to fight and defeat the Athenians piece meal was lost.

 Nevertheless, Pagondas tried to re-gain the initiative by marshalling his troops to the high ground on a hill overlooking the plain.

 Both armies had similar numbers of hoplites, light infantry, and cavalry.

 Pagondas drew up the Thebans up to a depth of 25 men, and had a clear advantage on the right.

 Hippocrates deployed his hoplites 8 rank deep, which gave him a stronger center and a slightly longer battle line.

 Pagondas tasked the cavalry and javelinmen on the wings to hold the defensible position in the broken terrain on the slope, to help prevent a possible envelopment.

 It was late in the day, which meant that the battle had to start soon...

 Hippocrates began addressing his men… Then, unexpectedly, the

 Boeotians advanced downhill.

 Despite being slightly outnumbered, the Athenians charged, confident after their impressive victories over the Spartans a year earlier.

 The sloped terrain was not the most conventional battleground for the Greek hoplites, and as the two armies slammed against each other, the downhill momentum quickly added to the pushing power of the deeper Theban formation.

 However, the rest of their battle line was a mix of Boeotian allies, lacking depth and quality of their Athenian counterparts.

 Boeotian infantry stood little chance, suffering badly against Hippocrates’ hoplites.

 The shouting of orders was drowned amidst the clamoring of steel and the

 harrowing screams of the fallen.

 Seeing that his center and left were in trouble, Pagondas quickly sent his cavalry reserve to their aid, using the hill to mask the movement of his troops.

 On the wings, the difficult

 terrain and the Boeotian javelinmen forced the Athenian cavalry not to engage.

 Meanwhile, the prowess of Pagondas’ finest Theban warriors bore fruit.

 Pushing downhill with their shields, they forced the Athenian hoplites to gradually give ground.

 But, in the center, the Boeotian formation was crumbling. Overrun by Athenian heavy infantry, some of the men turned their backs, clawing their way back up the hill.

 The Thespians on the left, however, refused to yield, and were gradually surrounded.

 So ferocious was the fighting amidst the dust and confusion, that some of the Athenian hoplites attacked each other, mistaking their own men for the enemy. Fighting to the death, the heroic last stand of the Thespians prevented the collapse of the Boeotian left wing.

 Seeing the enemy breaking through, chasing their comrades up the hill, Pagondas’ cavalry and javelinmen on the left started moving back to avoid being cut off in case of a rout.

 Victory for the Athenians was near.

 Surely, any moment now, the remnants of the Boeotian center would break.

 But then, Pagondas’ reserve cavalry appeared on the crest of the hill.

 Despite lacking the numbers to stabilize the line, they remained undeterred.

 Incredibly, the Athenians panicked! Seeing the enemy cavalry steamrolling down the slope, they thought that a SECOND Boeotian army arrived on the battlefield.

 Troops in the center that advanced furthest up the hill lost their nerve, routing en-masse.

 Just minutes later, the

 rest joined them in flight

 Some 500 Boeotian troops fell at Delium.

 Athenians lost 1200 men, which is among the highest casualty rates for hoplite battles.

 Their commander Hippocrates also perished, reportedly not long after the battle started.

 The pursuit lasted until sunset, and only nightfall prevented further

 losses for the Athenians.

 Most of them retreated to their makeshift fortification in Delium, where they were besieged for 17 days, before finally agreeing to surrender and return home.

 Athenian aura of invincibility, after their victories at Pylos, Sphacteria, and Cythera, was broken. Their attempt to knock Boeotia out of the war and force Sparta to seek peace had failed.

 Delium was a decisive victory for the Boeotians and the Peloponnesian league.

 It reinvigorated the Theban pride and encouraged Sparta to keep fighting.

 The Greek world would be plunged further into intermittent conflict, before the Peloponnesian army, led by the Spartan commander Lysander, would finally force the Athenians to surrender and seek peace, some 20 years later in 404 BC.