Battle of Cumae 215 BC Hannibal (Part 18) Second Punic War

 

By spring of 215, Carthaginian forces under Mago Barca, intended to reinforce the war in Italy, and Hasdrubal the Bald, intended to bolster the revolt against Rome in Sardinia, were nearly ready.

 But before either army could make way, the Senate learned of the defeat at Hibera.

 Tensions rose on how to respond to the Scipio brothers.

 This exposed the divide between the Barcid faction, in favor of the war in Italy, and the so-called anti-war faction led by Hanno II, which opposed Hannibal’s war of conquest.

 Nevertheless, the Sardinian expedition was to sail as planned once all troops and provisions were gathered.

 But Mago was ordered not to depart for Italy until an agreement for the situation in Iberia was reached...

 The cunning Hanno II and his allies succeeded in delaying yet again, leaving Hannibal on his own in Italy for at least another year… As pleasing as it was for the Roman Senate to learn about the victory at Hibera, their attention was fully directed towards the upcoming campaign on the home front in Italy.

 The situation in Bruttium continued to worsen.

 After an 8-month siege, Petelia fell to the Carthaginians.

 The city suffered brutal punishment for their resistance.

 Hanno the Elder then swiftly advanced onto Consentia without resting his troops, fully realizing the importance of breaking the Petelia-Consentia axis, as the two most important pro-Roman cities in Bruttium.

 The news of the horrors that took place in Petelia preceded the Carthaginian army.

 In Consentia, the pro-Roman faction wanted to prepare for a siege.

 But, still without a significant victory in Italy, there was little support for the Roman cause among the populace.

 Fearing they would suffer the same fate as Petelia, the people of Consentia decided to surrender.

 With the gates to Bruttium now open, a new wave of support came for the Carthaginians.

 Towns from the hills mobilized their own militia-army to exact revenge on Croton, another pro-Roman city the natives deemed treacherous for siding with the enemy.

 The army of Hanno the Elder soon reached Locri, which surrendered without a fight.

 Other cities quickly followed suit.

 With the large port of Locri now in Carthaginian hands, Hanno the Elder sent a message to Carthage that a suitable safe haven for Carthaginian ships had been secured, urging the Senate to send Mago with the requested troops, supplies, and funds, as soon as possible.

 But Hanno II and his wealthy allies had other plans.

 For three months now, Mago Barca had been trying to get approval from the Senate to set sail with his army.

 He and the pro-Barcid faction argued that, if Hannibal defeated Rome in Italy, the war would be won.

 But… fearing the growing influence of the Barcid family, Hanno II rallied behind the wealthy aristocracy who above all else did not want to see Hannibal become the most powerful man in Carthage once the war was over – in their minds, as the man who conquered Rome there would be no one to stop him from becoming a de-facto emperor.

 Conveniently, their stance was that reinforcements should not go to the Barcid brother that was winning, but to the Barcid brother that was losing.

 Mago Barca would not be sailing for the port of Locri in Italy.

 He was to take his army of 12,000 experienced African infantry and 6,000 Numidian cavalry to Iberia, stripping Hannibal of these much-needed reinforcements.

 This, was the ripple effect of the defeat at Hibera.

 The victory of the Scipio brothers over Hasdrubal unintentionally gave political ammunition to Hanno II and his anti-Barcid faction.

 And they used it to great effect.

 For a third year in a row now, they’ve successfully prevented any significant reinforcements from being sent to Hannibal.

 Instead of the army, supplies, and funds he was promised, Hannibal would be getting only 4,000 Numidian cavalry and 40 elephants from the Senate.

 Ironically, the other army of 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry recruited under Hasdrubal the Bald would make way as planned, to reinforce the revolt against Rome in Sardinia.

 But the Romans had troubles of their own.

 The situation in Sicily remained bleak.

 Appius Claudius began operations to recover parts of the island.

 Undermanned and undersupplied, he avoided attacking the more consolidated Syracusans and instead began the grueling task of quelling the rebellion of the Greek cities in the north of the island – an uncertain campaign that would drag on for a year.

 Despite the situation in Sicily, the primary objective for the year 215 was to contain Hannibal.

 All Roman resources went towards supplying the three massive armies in Campania.

 Yet, the Roman generals would not challenge the Carthaginian in open battle.

 Caution was the order of the day.

 Moreover, a great cause for concern were rumors that Capua was pressuring Cumae to switch sides.

 To reassert Roman authority, Gracchus crossed the Volturnus river.

 Once celebrated as one of the most powerful cities in Italy, Cumae held a hillside position on the edge of the most fertile part of the Campanian plain,

 and its port still secured influence overseas.

 And as it turned out, the rumors were true.

 The Capuans wanted to use a nearby festival to invite Cumae’s officials for talks.

 If the negotiations didn’t go as planned, their intention was to storm the city while most of the garrison was away enjoying the festivities.

 Although unaware of what the Capuans were planning, Gracchus was suspicious enough to scout the surrounding area and make camp close to Cumae.

 He ordered the inhabitants to stay behind the walls and stockpile provisions.

 Concerned about Hannibal’s trickery, the Roman Consul did not want to risk losing the important city to the enemy.

 The hidden Capuan camp was soon discovered.

 Gracchus launched a surprise attack at midnight, the same day.

 With a substantial portion of the Capuan contingent attending the festival, in the hope that the Cumaeans will show up, the weakly defended camp was overrun.

 Over 2,000 Capuans were killed, including their commander.

 For Gracchus, this concentration of Capuan forces meant only one thing… it wouldn’t be long before the Carthaginian army appeared.

 Indeed, Hannibal, having known about the conspiracy beforehand, was already on his way.

 Fabius’ scouts discovered Hannibal’s movement.

 He could’ve put pressure on the Carthaginian army on its northern flank, albeit by committing to a dangerous crossing of the Volturnus while the enemy was nearby.

 Instead, Fabius refused to leave his fortified position north of the river.

 Gracchus was on his own.

 Sensing danger, he did not wait for his own scout reports,

 but swiftly withdrew behind the walls of Cumae.

 His instincts were right.

 Soon after, a tower lookout spotted Hannibal’s standard on the horizon… With his army of 40,000 Hannibal arrived before the gates of Cumae sometime in June 215.

 He deployed at some distance and challenged the Romans to fight him.

 The 25,000 strong Roman army was outnumbered,

 but the sloped terrain in front of the city favored the defenders.

 The Carthaginians would have to slog their way up to attack a Roman army deployed in front of the walls.

 But the troops under Gracchus’ command were a mix of allies and volunteer slaves.

 The Roman Consul constantly drilled his men to form a proper fighting force, but he still deemed them unfit to fight against Hannibal’s veteran mercenaries in open battle.

 The Romans would stay behind the walls of Cumae.

 Meanwhile, the construction that had been going on in the Carthaginian battle line turned out not to be the setting of camps, but the constructing of towers.

 This time, Hannibal would force the issue.

 The Romans scrambled to construct their own tower.

 Once ready, a Carthaginian formation arrayed behind the tower and advanced towards the wall.

 Gracchus directed his men to place the Roman tower to counter the focus point of Hannibal’s attack.

 A rain of projectiles was exchanged and parts of the two towers kept catching fire, which the soldiers frantically extinguished.

 Finally, the Carthaginian tower reached the wall.

 Despite being outnumbered at the top, Hannibal’s experienced troops remained steadfast, pushing their way onto the wall.

 The fighting was brutal.

 But the Roman discipline held until both sides were exhausted.

 As the Carthaginians withdrew the tower, the less experienced Roman soldiers wanted to take the fight to the enemy.

 This is what Hannibal was hoping for - that a minor Roman victory will motivate them to accept a battle in the open.

 But Gracchus knew better.

 However, seeing Hannibal arraying new formations at various points along the wall and more construction possibly going on behind enemy lines, he assumed that a renewed attack was coming.

 Having barely held the Carthaginians at bay during the first assault, the Roman Consul feared that his troops might not be able to prevent Hannibal from storming the city, and he ordered the men to withdraw behind the walls of the citadel.

 But, Hannibal was just as unwilling to risk his irreplaceable troops in a chaotic battle among the streets and houses of Cumae.

 He too withdrew, and marched back to his camp at Mount Tifata.

 But while the attack on Cumae went on, Fabius finally broke camp and crossed the river.

 However, he did not attempt flank Hannibal and surround his position from the rear.

 Instead, he made way towards Suessula, where he joined forces with Marcellus.

 All three Roman armies were now south of the Volturnus.

 Hannibal was hemmed in.

 Ironically, his success in persuading the Italic states to join his cause was now contributing to the success of the Fabian strategy.

 The Carthaginian general could no longer march his smaller army away to another region and lure the Romans into a battle.

 Now he had allies to protect, chiefly Capua.

 Despite being outnumbered, he had to fight to preserve the coalition he had created.

 Rome, meanwhile, continued avoiding a major battle, instead directing their attacks on Hannibal’s allies.

 In July, Marcellus left camp to raid the towns in Samnium.

 Hannibal now faced a dilemma.

 With only 40,000 troops he faced up to 100,000 Romans.

 He could split his forces to check Marcellus and protect Capua at the same time, but this would leave him at grave risk of being overrun.

 Or, he could concentrate his forces near Capua and leave the Samnite towns to their fate, which would make him appear weak and unable to protect his allies – something that would quickly lead to the breakup of his Italian coalition.

 Soon enough, the Samnites sent envoys, seeking help from Hannibal.

 After some deliberation the Carthaginian broke camp, but he surprised everyone by making way for Nola, for a second time.

 The wily general correctly guessed that neither Fabius nor Gracchus would challenge him in the open, and he thus outmaneuvered the Romans yet again.

 Hannibal’s thinking was sound.

 Nola held an important position, being on the main road that cut through Campania.

 Devastating the region around the city would both satisfy his army and force Marcellus

 away from Samnium.

 Moreover, the pro-Carthaginian sentiment was still strong in the city, and if it went over to the Carthaginian side, Hannibal’s lines of communication in Campania would strengthen and push the Romans towards the sea.

 In addition, Hannibal sent word to Hanno the Elder, recalling him back to Campania, just as he was preparing to attack Rhegium.

 Realizing the danger, Marcellus immediately turned back…

 The Second Battle of Nola was about to begin…