Battle of Cornus 216 BC - Hannibal (Part 16) - Second Punic War

 

By the Autumn period of 216 BC, Hannibal was consolidating his power base in southern Italy.

 His main army at Capua stood at around 40,000 men, including additions from his Samnite allies.

 His brother Mago, now on his way south with 1200 Numidians, would recruit an additional 17,000 Lucanians and Bruttians, and bring his own force up to over 18,000 troops.

 Opposing them, Rome scrambled to raise new legions over the coming months. An impressive 80,000 troops would be put to field in Italy, with the majority concentrated in the south. But despite the Roman numerical strength exceeding that of their enemy, many of these were inexperienced recruits who felt abject terror

 at the thought of meeting Hannibal in battle.

 Worse, in some of the settlements of central Italy the number of Roman and Allied

 fighting men began to dwindle;

 which was a testament to the blood toll exacted on them by Hannibal’s tactical superiority and his wealth of ideas on the battlefield.

 Fabius Maximus, the father of the Fabian strategy, would again be elected consul for the next two years. He would revert to avoiding conflict with the Carthaginian general to preserve the troops and give Rome’s manpower time to recover.

 But while the war was thus far mostly dominated by the campaign of Hannibal in Italy, as the year 215 rolled around… the Second Punic War would spread across the Mediterranean… While Hannibal worked to add to his list of allies, his other objective was reinforcements. His brother Mago advanced south and besieged Petelia. Together with Consentia, these two cities were the among the most prominent in Bruttium, boasting a developed infrastructure, imposing walls, and a bustling city culture.

 In its quest to establish dominion over Italy, Rome favored the urban centers of Bruttium and had long been replacing their local ruling elite with the pro-Roman aristocracy. In turn, the pro-Roman factions of Petelia and Consentia treated the less urbanized communities in the region with disdain, which created a rift among Bruttians. Needless to say, these internal divisions suited Rome, as they made the region easier to control.

 But Mago now used this hostile factionalism to his advantage. He circulated news that Petelia was besieged, prompting thousands of Bruttians, who were angry at the city for siding with Rome, to join Hannibal.

 With his work in Bruttium complete, Mago left Hanno the Elder in charge of the army and embarked for Carthage to seek support for the campaign in Italy.

 By this stage neither side was

 the undisputed master of the sea.

 While Rome had overall superiority, the Carthaginian navy had significantly recovered from the setbacks earlier in the war. Both could patrol far into enemy waters and raid coastal towns, but lacked the strength to rule the waves of the Western Mediterranean.

 But with most of Bruttium now under Hannibal’s control, there was less risk for transporting troops from Africa to Italy. And with this Mago disembarked in Carthage.

 Murmurs reverberated in the packed Senate Hall.

 In attendance, all of Carthage’s notables anxiously waited.

 Then, Mago rose to speak, presenting before the Senate the progress of the campaign in Italy: “Colleagues… Countrymen… Since crossing the Alps, Hannibal had won several victories, including three great pitched battles against Rome’s main armies, two of which were completely destroyed, and their camps looted. And now the Romans avoid fighting us altogether, out of fear. 200,000 Roman fighting men are slain and 50,000 prisoners are taken.

 Italy is in a state of revolt and the South had gone over to Hannibal.

 With a single army Hannibal had achieved all of this, against several Roman armies.” Mago then turned away from the map, to present to the Senate a bag filled with hundreds of golden rings, belonging to the Roman aristocracy that fell at Cannae.

 He asked for funds and additional armies to be sent to Italy.

 With another 20 to 30 thousand troops at his disposal, Hannibal would BREAK Rome.

 Mago’s presentation suggested that, with the 18,000 strong army that he himself had recruited, consistent pressure could be applied in Bruttium until the last of the cities loyal to Rome either came to Hannibal’s side or were taken by force.

 Another army of 20,000 from Carthage could take and hold Apulia and its vital ports, thereby cutting Rome’s ability to contest the waters of the Ionian Sea. This would open lines of communication between Hannibal and a likely ally, Philip V of Macedon, enabling uninterrupted transport of ships, provisions, and troops.

 Finally, stationed in Campania with his main host, Hannibal would have complete control over Southern Italy. With three armies in close proximity, capable of quickly combining their forces, as well as controlling their respective areas individually, Carthaginian authority over local communities and cities would be absolute. As such, Hannibal could fully exploit Southern Italy’s manpower and resources to beat the Romans at their own game – the war of attrition – and could use his tactical brilliance to dominate the Romans on the battlefield.

 Hearing Mago’s report, most

 of the Senate rejoiced.

 But… as fortunes of war would have it, Hannibal’s worst enemies were not in Rome… but in Carthage.

 When Hanno II stood up to speak, a heavy silence fell upon the room. He was an immensely powerful aristocrat and a veteran commander, albeit not a very competent one. Most of his wealth and political power was derived from his stake in the silver mines of Iberia and the heavy taxation he imposed on African tribes that lived on the vast expanses of land which he owned. As such, in the Senate he represented the interests of the wealthy, for whom it was profitable to sue for peace with Rome, even with unfavorable terms for Carthage, because a peace agreement would enable Hanno and his supporters to resume their maritime commercial operations. In addition, their interests in rare metals is the reason why Hanno favored redirecting reinforcements to protect Iberia and why he preferred territorial expansion not into Italy, but into Africa, where he and his powerful friends stood to profit from expanding their already endless tracts of taxable land.

 These discrepancies between the interests of the super wealthy and the war effort of Carthage was what made Hanno the leading opponent of the Barca family and their war of conquest in Italy.

 He addressed Mago:

 “You say the armies of the enemy are slain. Yet you ask for more soldiers.

 You say the enemy camps are looted.

 Yet you ask for corn and funds.

 I wonder, if you ask for all of this help, is Hannibal truthful about his victories?

 If he is, then I say he doesn’t need help from us. And if he is not, then he doesn’t deserve it.

 At hearing this, Senators from the docks behind Hanno cheered him on.

 He continued: “You say, Mago, that Roman power is annihilated and that Italy is in a state of revolt. I ask you then, has a single Roman or any of the thirty-five tribes come to our side?” “No, they have not”, Mago replied.

 Hanno went on:

 “Then there are still TOO MANY

 ROMANS LEFT. Do you know then,

 Mago, is the enemy’s will to fight broken?

 Have they approached Hannibal for peace?” “I do not know”, Mago answered. A truthful answer, given that he parted ways with Hannibal soon after the battle of Cannae, and was unaware if any negotiations with Rome were taking place.

 “Well then”, Hanno concluded: “With many Romans still in the fight and no treating of peace, you have made no progress since the start of the war.

 I say, if Hannibal’s victories are true, he should seek terms with Rome, and not ask for help from Carthage. For if he cannot obtain peace after his supposed victories, what terms will he be able to obtain if his fortunes against the Romans change?

 It seems to me that we are not

 discussing peace, but only talking about helping the agenda of one man, Hannibal.” Hanno clearly showed in this Senatorial meeting why he was one of the most capable orators of his time. But as clever as he was in discrediting Hannibal, the supporters of the Barcids were outraged. And they had every reason to be.

 Hanno insisted that Carthage MUST negotiate with Rome, that peace was NECESSARY; thereby implying that Carthage should not, and CANNOT, risk the consequences of losing the war, but MUST make peace now while the going is good.

 If this fear of defeat ever reached the enemy, for the Romans it would be like smelling blood; despite their setbacks against Hannibal, with such division among Carthage’s top officials the Romans would know that they had already won the war.

 So it’s needless to say that Hanno’s dissemination of this dangerous rhetoric directly undermined Carthage’s war effort and perhaps its future as an imperial power. As Hannibal once said to his men, war is won by those who are ready to conquer or die. And Rome had already shown its readiness to conquer or perish. Carthage, having chosen to walk the path of empire for SIX HUNDRED years, HAD to show that same resolve if it was to be victorious and retain its imperial status.

 Hannibal’s supporters further argued that, as the only man who showed consistent success in command, deep in enemy territory no less, he MUST be supported, even if Iberia was lost.

 In their view, to conquer a peace agreement at the gates of Rome meant that the withdrawal of Roman troops from Iberia could be demanded as a condition during negotiations, and Carthaginian dominance over Western Mediterranean could be restored.

 Amidst this ongoing political turmoil in Carthage, the majority of the Senate was nevertheless impressed enough with Mago’s report to vote in favor of sending him back to Italy with an army and funds, to aid Hannibal. A host of 12,000 African infantry, up to 6,000 Numidian cavalry, and around 40 elephants were to be assembled.

 But… Hanno’s political tentacles reached across the empire, and he would severely slow down the recruitment of Hannibal’s reinforcements at every turn, prolonging the process for around 6 months.

 Then, as the latter days of autumn brought with them the scent of the stinging coldness that was just around the corner, a message arrived from Sardinia. It was from Hampsicora of Cornus, a Sardo-Punic political leader and one of the richest landowners of Sardinia.

 Much of the island was still

 dominated by the Punic elite,

 especially along the western and southern coasts, which were part of the Carthaginian empire for almost 250 years, until Sardinia came under Roman control just 20 years ago, in 237 BC.

 This resulted in a strained relationship between the Romans and Sardinia’s ruling class, and its population. Occasional clashes flared up, but the legions were largely able to keep the peace and exploit the island’s rich resources of grain, salt, wine, and olives, as well several big mining operations of gold and silver, a valuable source for minting new currency, and lead, which was used in various fields of civil life, from crockery to water pipes.

 But most importantly, Sardinia was a vital point for controlling access to Roman waters, and could serve to intercept

 Carthaginian shipping to the south.

 However, the situation was now ripe for revolt.

 The ambassadors that carried the message pleaded for help, and the Carthaginian Senate made a decision to mobilize another army of 12,000 infantry and 1,500 horse, to be sent to Sardinia under the command of Hasdrubal the Bald.

 Meanwhile, on the restive island, Hampsicora was joined by Hanno of Tharros.

 Their combined force motivated more cities to rise up and some of the inland tribes pledged their support as well. Rebellion in Sardinia had begun.

 News of the unrest had reached Praetor Quintus Mucius Scaevola, a member of the ancient and noble patrician family. He immediately sent word back to Rome, asking for help. The Roman legion under his command was understrength due to sickness, that he too suffered from and was unable to perform his duties. Provisions and payments for the troops were irregular amidst the chaos of the war, which only made the situation worse.

 Upon receiving his message, the Roman Senate hurriedly sent Titus Manlius Torquatus with a small contingent and provisions to patch up the legion in Sardinia.

 Titus was a distinguished Roman politician, twice a consul in 235 and 224 BC, and a member of the Manlia family, one of the most important patrician families of the Republic.

 Once he disembarked at Carales,

 Titus temporarily assumed command, bringing news that more

 reinforcements would come next spring.

 But upon learning of the activities of the rebels, he realized that he would not be able to hold out through the winter. The legion was still understrength and in poor health.

 Worse, once the Sardo-Punic army fully mobilized, they would outnumber the Romans at least 2:1 and this ratio would rise to 4:1 if the Carthaginians managed reach the island before winter.

 Something needed to be done, now. So Titus took provisions to last a few days, and gathered no more than 6,000 men that were fit to march towards Cornus.

 Meanwhile, Hampsicora journeyed

 into the Sardinian interior

 to recruit troops from the tribes that declared their support for the uprising. He left his son Hiostus in charge of the 10,000 strong army and the collection of provisions, until he returned.

 But Titus was closing in, fast.

 On approach, the numerical advantage of the Sardo-Punic army was clear.

 Tucked in between the sea to the west and the hills to the east, they held a strong position with the walls of Cornus behind them.

 But Titus observed that the enemy was not in full battle order and that no archers were manning the walls. It appeared as if they were not expecting a battle.

 He ordered the Roman line forward!

 All too aware of the poor physical condition of his men, Titus slowed the advance to a crawl, making it easier for his tired troops to maintain their formation. He had hoped that by closing the distance he would unnerve the enemy and force them into committing themselves forward. If the Sardo-Punic troops broke formation to charge, this would give the compact Roman legion a chance.

 But Hiostus’ orders were not to attack.

 Titus gradually halted his advance a mere stone’s throw away from the opponent, yet they wouldn’t move. Understanding that it would be impossible to dislodge a more numerous and better rested army from their defensive position, the Roman general resorted to harsh language.

 He berated Hiostus, questioning his bravery and his manhood. Some of the centurions joined in with their own insults. The laughter of the Roman troops could be heard inside the city.

 The young Sardo-Punic aristocrat was fuming! After a few minutes of this verbal barrage, he could take no more!

 With their pride bruised, Hiostus’ men attacked with zest. The weary Roman line bore the initial brunt of the charge with some difficulty. But they held their nerve, encouraged by experienced centurions to stay compact behind their shields, until the enemy ran out of steam.

 Titus then gave the signal!

 The formation of the less disciplined Sardo-Punic troops quickly began to crumble against the advance of the veteran legionaries.

 Step by step, the Roman line trodden forward, jabbing at the enemy from behind the wall of shields. It soon became clear that Hiostus’ rash attack for the sake of saving face in front of his men, was a bad decision.

 By attacking the Roman line he

 abandoned his strong defensive position, and trapped his own army between the enemy, the hills and the sea, and the walls of the city.

 Unable to escape, 5700 Sardo-Punic troops, some 60% of his army, were cut down. But the exhausted Romans could fight no more, and had begun taking losses as well.

 Seeing that his men are at

 their limit, Titus pulled back.

 The Roman victory at Cornius did not succeed in destroying one Sardo-Punic army before another one could be assembled, but it gave Titus some time to prepare for the next encounter.

 Many of his men died on the way back due to exhaustion and sickness. But Titus’ swift action killed off some of the best troops that the rebel cities could levy, and had put a dent in the morale of the Sardo-Punic army. Whatever troops Hampiscora recruited from the other cities and tribes further inland, he would now likely be more inclined to wait for the Carthaginian army to come to his aid, than to take on the Romans himself.

 For now, the Roman army in Sardinia held on… Thank you so much for watching. If you enjoy our articles, click like and subscribe, as a sacrifice to the gods of the algorithm. A big thanks to our Patreon army for their invaluable support!

 And as always, we’ll see you in the next one.