Battle of Ager Falernus 217 BC - Hannibal (Part 8) - Second Punic War

 

It’s late in the year 217 BC.

 Destroyed towns and burned farmland stretch as far as the eye can see.

 Hannibal had plundered the Ager Falernus valley, perhaps the richest region in all of Rome.

 But he is now surrounded and trapped by a more numerous Roman army, led by a general who seems to know all about his old tricks.

 With cold weather approaching, the Carthaginian general is running out of time… It’s summer, 217 BC.

 Having decided not to march on Rome, Hannibal went back across the Apennine Mountains.

 He ordered that all military-aged Roman males that were encountered on the march, were to be killed.

 But the Carthaginian general had reasons to worry.

 His army fought in three battles without ever fully recovering from the crossing of the Alps.

 And by now, the men showed signs of scurvy and the horses of mange, both caused by vitamin deficiency.

 After ten days the Carthaginian army reached the Adriatic Sea.

 Hannibal allowed the men to recover through eating the plentiful produce gathered from this rich area.

 The horses were bathed in the sour wine, which had been captured in great quantities, to restore the condition of their coats.

 Meanwhile, Publius Cornelius Scipio was sent as pro-consul to Iberia with reinforcements of some 30 new ships, 8000 troops and fresh supplies.

 What persuaded the senate to divert such valuable resources to Iberia at a time when Hannibal was on a path of destruction in Italy, was their desire to prevent reinforcements from reaching Hannibal by land, but more importantly it was the senate’s determination upon a long-term Roman involvement in Iberia, made possible by Gnaeus' success on the battlefield at Tarraco and Ebro, as well as his flexible diplomatic methods through which he forged treaties of neutrality and alliances that brought many Iberian tribes to the Roman side.

 It is Gnaeus’ ability to act autonomously without waiting for directives from Rome that gave the senate a strategic advantage half-way across the Mediterranean, where they could otherwise exert no direct control.

 The senate felt assured that by supporting the Scipio brothers in Iberia, Rome would have good prospects for fighting the Carthaginians in their own back yard.

 Back in Italy, with the army restored to health, Hannibal continued advancing down the coast.

 He sent a message by sea to Carthage, reporting on the situation in Italy.

 Carthaginian Senate expressed delight with his progress and promised aid to support his campaign.

 Meanwhile, the appointed dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus took command of Geminus’ remaining four legions and went after Hannibal.

 Replacement of the terrible losses at Lake Trasimene required an emergency levy of two additional legions, which brought the dictator’s army to around 40,000 including allies.

 It is possible that some of the new recruits were very young and older men, originally intended for Rome’s city garrison, with some in the process of being trained while on the march.

 Fabius was a man in his late 50’s, rather old by the standards of Roman generals, but he was a proven commander.

 Having been awarded a triumph for his victory over the Ligurians during his consulship in 233 BC, he also held the position of censor in 230, and was elected consul again in 228.

 Now as dictator he was yet to reveal his plan on how he will deal with Hannibal.

 So far he had been advancing cautiously, carefully scouting ahead to give himself plenty of warning of the enemy’s presence.

 Meanwhile, Hannibal pillaged and burned his way down the coast, accumulating vast quantities of grain, cattle and other produce.

 His plan was to reach southern Italy where he expected to sway some of Rome’s allies to join him.

 The two commanders met for the first time in northern Apulia, encamping just 10km apart.

 Hannibal immediately offered battle outside the Roman camp.

 But no response came from Fabius.

 The Carthaginian general waited long enough to impress his own men with the enemy’s timidity, before leading the army back into camp.

 The following morning, Hannibal continued the march, ravaging the countryside as he went, in an attempt to goad Fabius into battle.

 He provokingly went past the Roman army back into the Appenine mountains… But the Roman dictator merely followed the enemy and apparently had no intention of risking a battle under any circumstances.

 This was certainly wise, as nearly half of his army was made up of raw recruits and some of the men were in awe of Hannibal who had defeated the Roman armies on three occasions that year.

 But Fabius’ strategy wasn’t too popular in Rome.

 Notwithstanding the disasters at the Trebia and Trasimene, powerful elements of the Roman senate still believed that Hannibal could be defeated in a pitched battle.

 Although he was appointed dictator, the senate restricted Fabius’ freedom of action by denying him the right to choose his own second in command.

 Instead, they foisted upon him Marcus Minucius Rufus, a former consul.

 Nevertheless, as Hannibal continued across the Appenines, Fabius shadowed him.

 The hilly country favored the Romans, allowing Fabius to stick to the high ground and only encamp in positions that Hannibal would never risk attacking.

 The dictator’s plan was to deprive the enemy of food supplies by launching small scale attacks on Carthaginian foraging parties, not inflicting many casualties, but making it difficult for them to gather food and fodder.

 But he would never risk a direct confrontation.

 Fabius also instructed inhabitants of surrounding villages to take with them all of the animals and food that they can, before destroying and burning everything that’s left behind, and seek refuge in fortified towns.

 This tactic, which would later become known as the “Fabian strategy”, served not only to deplete Hannibal’s forces, but also to gradually rebuild Roman military confidence.

 Hannibal understood that he needed to force an open battle in order to exploit the tactical superiority of his own army and prevent the situation from developing into an exhausting war of attrition that he cannot sustain.

 He clearly appreciated the implications to his war effort if Fabius would continue with this new strategy.

 But the cunning Carthaginian general had a plan…

 Fabius showed great skill to keep close to the enemy without giving him an opportunity to fight, but by the time Hannibal passed the walled city of Beneventum, the Roman army had fallen two days’ march behind.

 The Carthaginian general planned to enter Campania and devastate Ager Falernus, perhaps the richest area in Rome, famous for its’ exquisite wines and fertile land that made it the bread basket of the Republic.

 He felt that threatening such a prominent area, inhabited by Roman citizens, would either provoke Fabius into giving battle or demonstrate at last Rome’s weakness, which would hopefully Capua, Rome’s second largest city, along with other cities, switch sides.

 Upon entering the valley, Hannibal unleashed his troops, ordering them to strip the region of supplies and then burn all that remained.

 Immense amount of valuables were taken, as well as vast quantities of supplies and cattle.

 While Fabius’ strategy was already unpopular, now his political power began crumbling as quickly as the burning rich estates and villas.

 But even when urged to seek battle by an angry Minucius, as well as other officers and displeased troops, the under-pressure Fabius would have none of it.

 Even though the Ager Falernus was burning, it was not enough to bring him down from the hills to challenge the Carthaginians.

 It seems that Hannibal was the only one who understood the implications of Fabius' plan...

 Hannibal failed to provoke an open battle and despite the vast plunder that was taken, it was clear that he could not winter in the valley, as it couldn’t sustain his army until spring.

 He needed to establish a base where his army could winter and enjoy the spoils of its’ raiding.

 Several points led out from the valley.

 But Fabius had already strengthened the garrisons on the river to the south and placed small contingents on the eastern and western ends of the valley.

 Trying to force his way through any of these fortified points would be dangerous for Hannibal and his plan was to come back the way he came, where he already knew the lay of the land.

 But the Roman dictator stationed 4,000 legionaries on higher ground that would block the pass through which Hannibal intended to exit, and he encamped with the rest of the army on the hillside further west from where he could attack the Carthaginian rear once they tried to march out of the valley.

 Hannibal knew he was hemmed in and that once his supplies dwindled he would be forced to launch a direct attack against fortified Roman positions on unfavorable terrain where his cavalry would be unusable.

 And the longer he waited, the worse his situation would become.

 So he began making preparations.

 Finally, a few weeks into the stalemate Hannibal ordered the troops to eat a hearty supper and go to bed early to get as much rest as possible for the night ahead… As all activities in the three camps quieted down, the guards remained on their posts, and the campfires lit up the night sky.

 It seemed like another uneventful day had ended.

 But about an hour before daybreak a mass of torches appeared, heading across a small ridge in front of the pass.

 It seemed that Hannibal decided to force his way out after all.

 Thinking that they were being outflanked, the 4,000 Roman troops holding the pass left their position to block the enemy’s movement.

 Little did they know that the column of torches weren’t enemy soldiers, but thousands of captured oxen with burning branches tied to their horns, guided by Carthaginian camp followers.

 Upon reaching the milling animals, the legionaries halted in confusion.

 Then, out from the darkness came about 2000 Iberian javelinmen.

 Although outnumbered 2:1, they were more nimble than the heavily armored Romans and much more accustomed to fighting in the rugged terrain.

 As the fighting raged on the ridge, Hannibal was already moving with the rest of the army, in total silence…

 He planned to flank the Roman contingent through a very narrow passage that was now left unguarded.

 Fabius saw the torchlight and heard the noise of the fighting, but refused to move from his camp in the darkness, despite the urgings of his officers and Minucius in particular.

 Given the problems of fighting a night battle and the relative inexperience of his soldiers, Fabius probably made the correct decision.

 He had no way of knowing whether or not Hannibal was setting up another trap and it is questionable whether the Romans would have been able to locate and intercept the enemy in time.

 Hannibal was able to ascend the pass and escape with his army and plunder intact.

 As daylight broke the Carthaginian general reacted quicker than his opponent, sending a force of Iberian infantry from the rear of the column, to support the embattled and outnumbered troops on the ridge.

 The lightly armed and agile infantry managed to not only relieve the javelin-men, but inflicted heavy losses on the Roman contingent.

 The way in which Hannibal extricated his army from a seemingly hopeless situation became a classic of ancient generalship, finding its’ way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals.

 Fabius had been humiliated for allowing his enemy to escape.

 Even before Ager Falernus, many in Rome and within the army resented the dictator’s passive strategy.

 But while Fabius’ political reputation suffered, his troops actually gained valuable experience under his leadership.

 More importantly, he prevented Hannibal from potentially destroying another Roman army, which would’ve undoubtedly persuaded many of Rome’s allies to defect.

 And now he was following Hannibal back across the Apennines.

 The two commanders would meet again…